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Does violence against women increase in the aftermath of war? If so, why? Scholars and
policy-makers have begun to ask questions about violence against women in the post-conflict
space, yet complexities in measurement and a focus on outcomes (rather than mechanisms)
leave essential questions unanswered. This dissertation refines and scopes these questions to
learn about whether, how, and why the social context that supports violence against women
changes as a result of war.
The central argument of this dissertation is that armed conflict fosters protective masculine
norms that, in turn, affect how communities socially sanction or punish local crimes, including
violence against women. Drawing insights from feminist theory, economics, social psychology
and political science, the theory of protective masculine norms describes a process by which
the gendered nature of protection and exigencies of community security lead communities
to choose more severe punishment for public crimes deemed to threaten their communities.
Protection tradeoffs, however, also lead people to choose less severe punishment for other
“private” crimes.
I derive and examine the observable implications of this theory in the context of eastern
DR Congo, a place where there are high levels of violence against women that has also been
exposed to high levels of insecurity associated with armed violence in the distant and recent
past. Chapter 1 lays the framework for the dissertation; describing the social nature of
violence against women, processes of norm change, the research approach, and the derivation
of protective masculine norms theory. Then, because protective masculine norms are broadly
shared across societies, Chapter 2 investigates the nature of war, law, and punishment
processes in eastern DR Congo to understand how the theory and findings travel to other
contexts.
Chapter 3 motivates the theory of protective masculine norms by providing the empirical
foundation for differentiating between forms of violence against women and placing them in a
framework with other crimes. Contrary to prominent theories about empowerment, backlash
and violent masculinities; armed conflict fails to affect preferences for punishing rape and
domestic violence in a unidirectional way. Armed conflict increases how severely people prefer
to punish rape and stealing, but decreases how severely people prefer to punish domestic
violence. The qualitative evidence underscores the relevance of disaggregating crimes against
women in terms of public community threats and private crimes.
Chapter 4 explicates the theory of protective masculine norms, grounding it in the
literature and in the case. I examine the quantitative and descriptive evidence related to
alternative hypotheses that may account for armed conflict’s effects: exposure to wartime
crimes, security structures and demographic change. Finding little support for alternative
theories, I describe the design of and results from qualitative work probing central propositions
within protective masculine norms theory: Protection is gendered, people have shared
memories of conflict incidents, this affects their subsequent behaviors, and internal crimes
are related to perceived provision of protection.
Since sanctioning is a public act subject to group dynamics and norms, Chapter 5
examines the implications of protective masculine norms and the findings about preference
change for how groups choose to punish crimes. Armed conflict may affect how groups choose
to punish crimes by changing individual-level preferences, by changing group dynamics,
neither, or both. I find that armed conflict affects group preferences primarly through
individual-level preference change, underscoring the relevance of preference change for social
sanctioning in the aftermath of war. The data also show that group dynamics make people’s
preferences more extreme, suggesting the importance of norms to shaping preferences - a
central tenet of the theory.
Chapter 6 discusses the emerging research agenda of protective masculine norms and
its contributions. Questions remain about levels of violence against women after war. But,
already protective masculine norms has begun to unify a formerly disparate set of findings
emerging about armed conflict, domestic violence, and social and legal change.
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In 2010, the United Nations Secretary General created a new position, appointing Margot
Wallstrom Special Representative for sexual violence in armed conflict. Her appointment
marked the pinnacle of a widespread understanding among both scholars and policy-makers
that rape is used by armed groups during armed conflict as a tool of war. UN Security
Council Resolution 1820 and its sister resolutions all aim to end impunity for this form of
wartime violence that women disproportionately experience; and, in doing so, further embed
women’s security within the security agenda of states.
Yet, time and time again, research reveals that women’s insecurity extends far beyond
the context of war. In 2006, a compilation of cross-country surveys by the World Health
Organization estimated that that between 15 and 71 percent of women in a broad set of
study countries had experienced physical or sexual violence in their lifetimes (Garcia-Moreno
et al. 2006).1 Such pervasive levels of violence against women can both galvanize advocacy
efforts against violence against women and foster disbelief in the possibility of change.
Conflict’s aftermath, however, is thought of as a critical juncture - a moment in time
when both domestic and international actors work together to rebuild, redesign and create
more stable and equitable societies, including for women. It is also a space where women may
be subject to increased levels of harm due to violent masculinities, decay of legal institutions
and infrastructural damage. As security concerns have broadened to include peace-building
and post-conflict stability operations, new questions have arisen about women’s security in
the post-conflict space. But, because political science research has focused on violence that
armed groups perpetrate as part of the armed conflict, relatively little is known about war’s
1Study countries include Bangladesh, Brazil, Ethiopia, Japan, Namibia, Peru, Samoa, Serbia and
Montenegro, Thailand, and the United Republic of Tanzania.
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effects on the violence against women that follows war. This dissertation moves beyond the
war context to examine women’s security in the post-conflict space.
Does violence against women increase in the aftermath of war? If so, why? How can this
violence be addressed? Even while scholars have begun to consider questions about violence
in the post-conflict space, complexities in measurement and a focus on outcomes (rather than
mechanisms) leave essential questions unanswered. This dissertation refines and scopes these
questions to learn about whether, how, and why the social context that supports violence
against women changes as a result of war.
The social context is a set of reactions to violence against women, reactions which are
normatively important because they reflect tolerance for violence of this kind. An exploration
of the social context asks how people think about and engage with one another in their
community surrounding issues of violence against women. To what extent is violence against
women accepted, supported or even lauded? How do people treat fellow community members
that perpetrate violence against women? Do they prefer to punish perpetrators when acting
as individuals? As groups?
Not only is the social context normatively important, but it yields insights into the broad
and elusive repertoires of violence that women face in their day-to-day lives. The social
context reflects violence that might not be captured by surveys designed to estimate the
sheer magnitude of specific forms. Reactions to violence shape and constrain the ability of
the legal system to function. Finally, the social context can play a role in encouraging or
deterring perpetrators of violent crimes.
Political theorists have long theorized about armed conflict as a locus of change (e.g. Fanon,
Marx, Engels). It is a point in time in which new regimes and ideas emerge (or at least the
time that they jump onto the world stage) and old regimes die. Canonically, Tilly (1990)
argued that war was at the heart of the emergence of the modern state system due to the
strong state bureaucracies that emerged hand-in-hand with waging modern war. In the same
vein, this study suggests that the widely-felt and widely-shared shock of armed conflict will
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have implications for the social dynamics that follow.
The effect of armed conflict on violence against women in the post-conflict space is under-
theorized and underexamined given its relevance to international advocacy work, postconflict
peacebuilding efforts, and women’s empowerment programming. In this dissertation, I exam-
ine the effects of war on the social context of violence against women in eastern Democratic
Republic of Congo, a place where there is intense interest in advocacy work to improve the
lives of women in the wake of armed conflict, and a focal point of scholarly research on the
sources, motives, and measures to address rape (Alison 2007; Baaz and Stern 2009; Eriksson
Baaz and Stern 2010; Johnson et al. 2010; Kelly et al. 2012; Meger 2010).
More broadly, this research area speaks to fundamental questions that emerge from
historical institutionalist scholarship about attitudes, institutions and the potential for
change. Besley and Reynal-Querol’s (2014) study of the role of past conflict on present
conflict; Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) study of the effects of the slave trade on modern
social trust; and Alesina et al. (2016) study how historical plow agriculture affects gender
roles today. This scholarship points to specific events or technologies that resonate and have
large and persistent effects over time. A focus on how armed conflict changes social dynamics
addresses fundamental theoretical questions of whether and how attitudes and norms, often
thought to be “sticky” features of society, change (Chandra 2006).
1.1.2 Summary of Main Argument
The central argument of this dissertation is that armed conflict fosters protective masculine
norms that, in turn, affect how communities socially punish local crimes, including violence
against women. Drawing insights from feminist theory, economics, social psychology and
political science, the theory of protective masculine norms describes a process by which the
gendered nature of protection and exigencies of community security in the aftermath of war
lead people to choose more severe punishment for public crimes deemed to threaten their
communities. Protection tradeoffs, however, also lead people to choose less severe punishment
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for other “private” crimes.
The theory of protective masculine norms calls attention to an undertheorized and
paradoxical aspect of male protection and violence, describing how protected populations
can be simultaneously protected and harmed by their protectors. As a result of war, men
want to contribute to protecting their communities, making them more likely to root out
crimes such as public rape. But communities also give these men more leeway to perpetrate
violence against women in their homes in the name of protection. In this way, protective
masculine norms theory pushes academic and policy communities towards thinking in a more
nuanced way about masculinities that emerge from the circumstance of war.
The theory and findings challenge prominent frameworks for thinking about violence
against women after war. One strain of literature suggests that armed conflict allows women
to take on new roles in society, improving their positions and treatment (Wood 2008; Tripp
2015; Mageza-Barthel 2015). Another strain of literature suggests that war fosters harmful
gender attitudes and practices when male groups organize, bond, and engage in war (Cohen
2016; Morris 1996; Zurbriggen 2010). Such harmful masculinities can undermine the post-war
security environment for women by unhinging social norms and sanctions that keep violent
behaviors perpetrated against women at bay.
While these alternative theories suggest that that the gendered nature of war leads to
unidirectional outcomes on violence against women, I find that war’s effects are multidimen-
sional and dependent on how people perceive the violent crime. As described in the theory of
protective masculine norms, good things don’t always move together and bad things don’t
always move together. Protection and violence are intertwined.
1.1.3 Theory Generation Process
The theory of protective masculine norms is developed through a multi-stage research process
that draws from both inductive and deductive approaches in the specific case of eastern DR
Congo. The theory and findings are grounded in 6 months of my own fieldwork as well as
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longer spans of inquiry, data collection, coding and reporting by local research teams. This
work could not have been completed without the involvement and expertise of Research
Initiatives for Social Development, whose members have helped to question, refine and
implement (and thus define) this project in multiple phases since 2015.
I integrate quantitative and qualitative approaches throughout this research to evaluate
effects, trace processes, and embed the theory in the local context. The research project uses
original quantitative and qualitative data from 80 focus groups held across 20 villages, 40
randomly sampled interviews across 4 villages, and 48 elite interviews held between 2016 and
2018. I also integrate data from original survey measures from 2015.
Given the uncharted nature of this area of research, I draw several theories from the
prominent literature about armed conflict’s effects and derive the implications of those
theories for the social context of violence against women in the aftermath of war. When the
quantitative evidence of armed conflict’s effects fail to align with expectations, I build on the
quantitative findings and qualitative insights to develop the theory of protective masculine
norms that can explain the findings. At the same time, I derive and assess the applicability
of several additional theories that might explain the same effects. Finding little support for
the alternative theories in further analyses - but continuing to find support for the theory
of protective masculine norms - I conduct additional fieldwork in the same communities to
trace the logic and refine the theory.
This dissertation integrates a rich literature on conflict, power and violence against women
from non-positivist, feminist tradition to inspire questions and inform expectations about
trends in the world. Yet, I examine quantitative and qualitative evidence for described
theories fully in the positivist tradition with the goal of establishing evidence for causal
effects. As part of a different ontological tradition, critical feminist theories are integrated
but not “tested” by the the findings that emerge.
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1.1.4 The case of eastern Democratic Republic of Congo
Sexual violence, war, armed groups, foreign actors, mines, international advocacy, peace-
keeping - these frames of reference for Democratic Republic of Congo are strong and widely
shared among scholars, policy-makers and media consumers across the world. Chapter 2
delves into these histories and frames in order to inform the generalizability of the research
findings. But prior to this discussion, a few words should be said about the context, my
motivations for choosing DR Congo, and the ethics of undertaking research in this case. I
also introduce several scope conditions for the theory.
My decision to study armed conflict’s effects on the social context of violence against women
in eastern DR Congo is motivated by theoretical, normative, and empirical considerations.
Armed conflict has ebbed and flowed in DR Congo’s eastern regions at various levels and
intensities involving numerous armed actors over the past 20 years. Rape and other forms
of violence by armed groups occurs at very high levels, but domestic violence - violence by
intimate partners - is also notably high.
At the outset of this research, the violence in DR Congo was described in both the
scholarly and policy arenas as a rational way to wage war and, at the same time, as indicative
of a violent and barbaric culture. But how are “norms” and “culture” shaped by the situation
of armed violence that has been gripping Congo’s eastern regions for the past 20 years?
Questions about armed conflict’s effects on the social context provide insights into norm
emergence and change that can challenge cultural stereotypes.
Yet, this study navigates carefully in this normative endeavour. Focusing on violence
against women in DR Congo can feed into exceptionalizing it in this case. However, and as I
will discuss further, violence against women is a widely shared phenomonenon across societies
- as is war. Recognizing this shared harm and drawing from the broad feminist literature on
patriarchy and violence suggests the generalizability of the findings even as they grow out of
this specific context.
This study examines variation in community exposure to violence within the single context
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of DR Congo to learn about armed conflict’s effects. This follows the approach taken in
many studies on the microdynamics of violence and is better able to control and account for
specificities of the conflict that might be driving differences if comparisons were made across
contexts.
In taking this approach, however, DR Congo presents a hard case for finding effects.
All communities in my area of study experienced higher levels of violence in the distant as
compared to the recent past. Thus, observed differences between communities that have and
have not been recently exposed to armed conflict are the result of additional exposure to
armed conflict rather than exposure per se.2 The effects of armed conflict may be even larger
in communities without such a shared history of conflict exposure.
As will become clear, the key component of the micro-theory of protective masculine
norms developed in this dissertation is that communities act to protect themselves in the wake
of exposure to armed conflict. This community-level reaction is contingent on community
members’ beliefs that they need to provide their own security. This means that the theory
describes processes that will occur in the aftermath of armed conflict in places where
communities feel that they cannot rely on the state to ensure their security from repeated
episodes. Thus, the theory of protective masculine norms and the findings of this dissertation
are most directly applicable to weak states confronting armed conflict.
While this dissertation develops a micro-theory of protective masculine norms in relation to
eastern DR Congo, it also sheds light on protective masculine norms as a general phenomenon.
Despite clear scope conditions for the theory that I describe, protective masculine norms as a
general phenonomen are potentially relevant in a broad range of contexts - but may manifest
differently. I provide an example extension of the theory of protective masculine norms in
the final chapter with an application to the Croatian context.
2This becomes apparent in the process tracing exercise I undertake in Chapter 4.
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1.1.5 Summary of Introductory Chapter
This section has introduced my question and research approach. It has also introduced
and motivated the case. In the remaining sections of this introductory chapter, I provide
a theoretical discussion of violence against women and a framework for thinking about
its relationship with social sanctioning of this violence. I argue for placing primacy on
understanding social sanctioning of violence against women to learn about dynamics of
violence.
I then turn to a discussion of armed conflict and lay the foundation for studying its effects.
Drawing insights from the social sanctioning framework, I describe questions that emerge
from existing studies of armed conflict’s effects on violence against women, arguing that social
sanctioning provides a new lens through which to study armed conflict’s effects.
Finally, how does social sanctioning change? I provide an overview of norm change,
describing several broad hypotheses about the effects of armed conflict on social sanctioning.
I situate the remaining chapters of the dissertation in relation to these hypotheses.
1.2 Violence against Women
1.2.1 Definitions
According to the United Nations definition, violence against women is “any act of gender-
based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm
or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life” (UN General Assembly 1993). The
key component linking these forms of violence is the motivation: Violence against women is
perpetrated against women specifically because they are women.
Since motivations for attacks are difficult to establish, the term violence against women
is used to refer to forms of violence that primarily target women such as sexual violence,
human trafficking, female genital mutilation, intimate partner violence and domestic violence
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(Women 2013). This slippage is made explicit within the definition of gender-based violence
given by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),
which defines gender-based violence as “violence that is directed against a woman because
she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately” (Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women 1992).3
Feminist scholars have uncovered multitudinous arenas in which women experience violence
associated with unequal and patriarchal gender hierarchies (Brownmiller 2013; Hunnicutt
2009; Tickner 1995; True 2012). Ann Tickner (1995) and Jacqui True (2012, 5) have argued
that, because of the relationship between violence and underlying disparities, much violence
against women is, at root, gender-based. In common parlance, the term gender-based violence
is often used to refer to violence against women to the exclusion of violence against men,
reflecting the widespread, systemic and gender-based nature of the violence that women face
(2012, 4–5). I use the term violence against women for definitional precision to reflect that
this study is about violence directed against women.
The term violence is socially constructed and can be defined in broad or narrow ways
(Muehlenhard and Kimes 1999). Organizations such as UN Women and the European
Institute for Gender Equality highlight the importance of examining broad forms of violence
including physical, sexual, psychological, and economic forms of violence or abuse. Such
broad definitions are useful for understanding how violence may manifest differently across
genders.
This study, however, defines violence more narrowly to focus on physical forms of violence
against women. Physical forms of violence can be more consistently measured and assessed
across contexts (Jewkes 2002). I focus on two forms of physical violence that disproportionately
affect women across the globe - rape and domestic violence - to understand armed conflict’s
effects on violence against women. While men can be targets of rape and domestic violence,
3CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19 (llth session, 1992). The term gender-based violence is
broader than women, encompassing violence against men because they are men.Because of CEDAW’s clear
focus on women, this reference to gender-based violence is specific to women.
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it is clear that women tend to be disproportionately affected (Human Security Report Project
2005; Leiby 2009; Hunnicutt 2009).
I define rape according to the ICC’s definition which includes two components: “(i) The
perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration, however slight,
of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the
anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part of the body. (ii) The
invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by
fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such
person or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion
was committed against a person incapable of giving genuine consent” (United Nations 1998).
By domestic violence, I refer to physical violence by a current or former intimate partner.
This can be any act of physical violence against women, including but not limited to the
operational definition within standard Demographic Health Survey questionnaires for domestic
violence: beating, hair-pulling, slapping, punching, shoving, stabbing with a knife or other
object, threatening to cause bodily harm with a weapon, or forcing a woman to engage in
sexual intercourse or another sexual act when she does not want to (Kishor and Johnson
2004; Garcia-Moreno et al. 2005).
My focus on rape and domestic violence raises an initially perplexing question about
intimate partner rape. After all, much of the physical violence that women experience by
their intimate partners is, by definition, rape. At the intersection, these two phenomena are
the same form of violence against women.
However, local accounts and understandings of what counts as rape are central to this
study and agreement across contexts on the point varies widely. For example in the United
States, women could not pursue husbands for perpetrating spousal rape in all 50 states until
1977 (Whatley 1993). In eastern DR Congo, spousal rape or intimate partner sexual violence
is not considered a crime in the legal code.
To embed this study in the local context and maintain definitions that are widely applicable,
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Figure 1.1: Rape and Domestic Violence
I place intimate partner rape aside to study rape by non-intimate partners and physical,
non-sexual forms of domestic violence. I will return to the discussion of how intimate partner
rape enters into the theoretical framework in the concluding chapter.
1.2.2 Ethics and Measurement
Understanding what brings about change in violence against women requires measuring and
learning about violence against women that takes place. As with other sensitive subjects,
ethics associated with research on violence against women must attend to respect for autonomy
of persons, protection of vulnerable persons and beneficence. But specificities of the subject
matter also give researchers pause and warrant reflection both by those that conduct research
and consumers of the information gleaned from their studies (Boesten 2017; Boesten 2018).
First, taking part in a study about violence against women can communicate information
about one’s experience to other members of society, including husbands that may respond
by perpetrating more abuse towards participating wives. This precaution undergirds an
important standard on violence against women research: not to interview men and women
from the same household on the subject of violence against women, particularly domestic
violence. In some cases, where the population is small and participants know one another it
may not be appropriate to interview both men and women on this subject within the same
community. Yet the privacy of the subject matter must be weighed in relation to accurately
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informing participants of the research goals and what the process will entail.
Discussion of one’s own experiences of violence has the potential to be cathartic, and
scholars have found that many participants voluntarily choose to discuss their histories of
rape (Cohen 2010). Viewed in this light, research about violence becomes analogous to an
intervention in which the individual’s voice and pain is heard (Ellsberg and Heise 2005, 43).
Yet, engaging in discussions about violence also has the potential to re-traumatize victims or
impose further shame on victims and their families (Fujii 2010; Olujic 1995).
A growing evidence-base suggests a need for a precautionary approach to research on
violence against women. Cohen (2010) provides an account of findings from a group of
researchers studying domestic violence in Ethiopia. In a follow-up study, they found that
twenty percent of participants had been beaten because of their involvement in the survey
(Parcesepe, Stark, and Roberts 2008).4 Wary scholars have cancelled studies that ask questions
about violence against women both in Mexico due to violent backlash from husbands of
participants that took part (Ellsberg and Heise 2002) and in Sri Lanka, due to the recognition
that local stigma for taking part in the study was too great to offset any potential benefit to
participants (Swiss and Jennings 2006).
There are some conditions under which it is necessary to ask questions about exposure
to rape or domestic violence. However, researchers must be confident that the questions
and study design contribute new knowledge - numbers that inspire more confidence than
questions - while minimizing risk.
In my own research, as described in following chapters, I choose not to ask direct questions
about violence against women - but instead to engage with communities and individuals within
them to better understand the social context. I understand the measures of social context
(preferences for punishment, perceptions of how others will react, discussions with community
members, descriptions of local processes) as concrete and subject to fewer questions and less
measurement error than measures of violence against women. I expound on this point in
4This study was described in Cohen (2010, pg.63).
12
Chapter 6.
1.3 Social Sanctioning Framework
1.3.1 Factors Influencing Perpetration
There are a multitude of frameworks for understanding the determinants of violence against
women with an eye to reducing this violence. The study of violence against women has roots
in public health, law, sociology, anthropology, economics, and, increasingly, political science.
Over time, scholars across disciplines have come to recognize the utility of multifaceted
approaches that recognize both individual and social determinants of violence against women
as well as their interrelationship.
For example, it is important to ask both why the issue of violence against women is more
systemic on some societies than in others and why only some men within every society perpe-
trate violence against women? Heise (1998) offered a unified ecological framework describing
individual and social determinants of violence against women as mutually reinforcing and
mutually constituted. The model served to bring together two camps of scholars studying
violence against women: Feminist scholars focusing on the structural causes of violence
against women and public health scholars focusing on individual-level factors. Since this
time, scholars have increasingly accepted that individual-level and social-level factors both
contribute to violence against women - with the understanding that a focus on social factors
does not negate individual responsibility and culpability for engaging in harmful acts.
To explicate the interrelationship, at the individual level, a person’s attitude towards
women and attitude towards acts of violence against women affect whether an individual
perpetrates.5 At the social level, factors such as social or legal punishment and social
norms can serve to reduce or amplify the likelihood that an individual will perpetrate
5An attitude is an individual’s preference or feeling about someone or something. For a review the
literature on the observational relationship between attitudes towards rape and perpetration, see Polaschek
and Ward (2002)
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given some initial predilection to perpetrate. The idea is that perceived social and legal
factors will influence an individual’s behavior at a given point in time independently of that
individual’s attitude. But, one must also recognize that an individual’s attitude is not formed
independently - but influenced by the environment in which an individual lives.
I emphasize influence, because social factors and individual attitudes are related but
remain distinct. This is true even in contexts such as in DR Congo - where scholars have
questioned whether individual preferences (rather than community preferences) are a useful
subject of inquiry (Johnson and Van de Vijver 2003). Chapter 5 will present data showing
that people’s private preferences are influenced by the social sphere but also continue to
remain distinct.6 The difference between individual attitudes and other social factors is key
to processes of norm, attitude and behavior change.
Attitudes are socially-influenced individual preferences about how one should behave.
Norms are beliefs or ideas about how other people in a community behave or think one should
behave. People may rely on their perceptions of how others behave as an indicator for how
they think one should behave, which is referred to as a descriptive norm. Or people may
draw from their perceptions of how others think they should behave, which is referred to as a
prescriptive norm (Tankard and Paluck 2016).7 Note that descriptive and prescriptive norms
may at times conflict. For example, as in the case of DR Congo, domestic violence may be
perpetrated widely, but not considered ideal behavior. Both descriptive and prescriptive
norms likely weigh into an individual’s decision to perpetrate, but the key point is that -
in norms theories - social factors (behaviors and ideals of others and/or expectations about
the behaviors or ideals of others) influence an individual’s behavior given that individual’s
attitude at a particular point in time.
6The data examine how changes in preferences for punishment (not perpetration) vary in the private and
public spheres.
7This difference is essential for norms change interventions. Tankard and Paluck (2016) describe how,
when norms are out of line with the norm one seeks to propogate, providing information about the descriptive
norm can have detrimental consequences. This is relevant for revealing estimates of violence against women
where statistical estimates tend to be high.
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1.3.2 Crimes and Deterrence
Legal reforms across the world have been driven by the idea that authorities can deter violence
against women to some extent through increasing the potential disincentives as compared
to the incentives for engaging in an illegal behavior (Mayerfeld 2006). The criminological
framework undergirds international efforts to bring accountability to perpetrators of sexual
violence in wartime in UN Security Council Resolution 1820 and following sister resolutions
1888, 1960, and 2106. Individual attitudes, assessments of positive social sanctions, assess-
ments of negative social sanctions, and the likelihood of legal punishment all weigh into a
varied and complex calculation that potential perpetrators of violence against women make.
Authorities seek to regulate violence against women by categorizing it (in its many forms)
as a crime, defining punishments and imposing those punishments.8 Becker (1968) provides a
foundational model that establishes criminals as rational agents who respond to incentives
and disincentives for engaging in crime. His model demonstrates that crime can be deterred
through increasing the costs of engaging in illegal behavior - but only to a certain threshold,
because it would be irrational for the state to take on all of the costs necessary to reduce
crime to zero (Becker 1968). Within every society, different people accept different levels of
risk; some will continue to perpetrate crime in the face of extreme punishments.9 Irrational
individuals fall outside of the scope of the deterrence model, but the assumption is that the
majority of individuals respond to perceived costs.10
Becker’s model is derived to address crimes, broadly construed, and has been critiqued
for the primacy it gives to costs and benefits for crimes that may be considered heinous
and reprehensible (Stern 1978).11 Normatively, violence against women is a moral issue that
8A crime is defined as act of action or omission that is punishable by a legal authority. A crime, by this
definition, can be classified as criminal or civil.
9This is the same assumption presented in the Granoveter’s threshold model for joining a riot or
undertaking other risky group activities (Granovetter 1978).
10Taking stock of the evidence base for rational behavior in the area of criminology, Paternoster (2010)
finds strong support for the claim that criminals behave rationally.
11Stern critiques Becker’s model for weighing social costs and benefits rather than addressing moral
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authorities should punish irrelevant of costs. But how extensive are states rights to pursue all
necessary costs to reduce violence against women to zero? And, then, what capacity do states
have if given extensive rights to pursue and punish? Even while violence against women is a
clear moral issue, the deterrence model remains central to understanding its regulation.
Evidence also suggests that costs matter when people think about engaging in perpetrating
acts of violence against women. In lab research with college males, Bachman, Paternoster,
and Ward (1992) find that the perceived likelihood of formal punishment is an important
determinant of people’s projections of whether they would perpetrate a hypothetical crime
of sexual violence.12 The effect of perceived legal punishment is, however, heterogeneous;
expectations of punishment have no effect when a respondent is morally opposed to the
hypothetical act.13 This heterogeneous finding elucidates the interaction between attitudes
and potential punishment. The deterrence framework is useful only given an individual has
an attitudinal predilection to perpetrate and is weighing costs and benefits at a particular
point in time.
Attention to impunity, the permissive factors that allow violence against women to
continue, has inspired and helped to coordinate a host of efforts to address violence against
women; but the frame also leads scholars and policy-makers to the conclusion that violence
is a problem to be solved from the top down, by criminal law (Houge and Lohne 2017).
However, impunity is not only legal, but social in nature. The legal and social realms are
interrelated and impact one another. The likelihood that an act will be punished depends
not only on what the law says but how it is implemented by society members more broadly.
Legal impunity occurs when breaking the law fails to elicit legal punishment. Social
impunity occurs when social punishment for engaging in a proscribed behavior (or not
concerns. For a summary see Sandmo (1993, 14–16).
12Six dimensions of five scenarios were randomly varied for each of 94 respondents.
13Those that are morally opposed to an act of violence against women will not be affected by varying the
costs of engaging in such violence - much as irrational individuals will not be influenced by such calculations.
However, and as will be discussed later, individuals that are morally opposed may respond to incentives or
potential benefits.
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engaging in a prescribed behavior) is absent or compromised. Individuals within communities
socially punish one another when they judge, stigmatize, or punish others for what they
consider to be deviant, unappealing, or dangerous behavior.14
The behaviors that the social realm seeks to regulate is broader than those of the legal
realm. Socially regulated behaviors may range from social niceties such as not covering one’s
mouth when coughing or cutting into a line, to social order regulation such as using social or
economic status to do something that others without that status would not be able to get
away with, to societal dangers such as pedophilia, incest, and rape. Social punishment might
be carried out in the form of a disapproving facial expression, a rumor mill that damages
one’s reputation, or complete ostracization. Levels of social punishment will vary across types
of behavior, across social groups, and over time.
Changes in the law may redefine what people view as socially desirable or permissible
over time. But at any moment in time, enforcement of the law remains constrained by the
social sphere. For example, social impunity will contribute to legal impunity when friends
and neighbors fail to alert authorities about crimes.
Social impunity differs from legal impunity in other important ways. It is limited by the
scope of what constitutes a set of society members that can sanction one another. As such, it
requires that group members envision themselves as part (or potentially part) of that society.
While sanctioning can occur over a long distance, its effects are stronger in closer proximity.
The legal realm relies mainly on negative punishments to deter behavior.15 When
considering the social realm, however, it is important to consider not only social costs, but
also social benefits or incentives that might accrue from engaging in an illegal behavior.
In an inquiry into the logic behind sexually aggressive behavior, Bouffard and Bouffard
(2011) asked 129 U.S. college men whether they would perpetrate a hypothetical scenario of
14Note that by behavior, I am including absence of an expected behavior - where the absence is considered
deviant, unappealing or dangerous.
15The law can define benefits to encourage behaviors (e.g. marriage) but this is less applicable to criminal
acts which are the focus of this study.
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date rape. They then asked the respondents to describe the potential costs and benefits of
undertaking the act. The men that said they would commit the date rape described both
the legal consequences and individual benefits (e.g. potential relationship with the woman)
of engaging in date rape. This underscores the need to account for perceived benefits in
addition to costs when considering the perpetration of violence against women.
Studies of rape on college campuses in the United States exemplify how men can accrue
social benefits through engaging in violence against women. Sanday’s (1992) landmark study
of rape culture on college campuses in the United States describes a campus environment
where young men become subjects of their fraternity group and then pursue sexual activity
with women that conforms with the standard of masculinity that the group has propagated.
By converging with the behaviors expected by the group, the members gain friends and
status, forming cohesive bonds with fellow group members that remain unchallenged by men
or women external to the group.16
Rather than impunity, a term that captures both the positive and negative incentives
inherent to understanding the perpetration of violence against women is social sanctioning.
Through a focus on social sanctioning, my approach emphasizes the importance of social costs
and benefits while acknowledging the interconnectivity between social and legal sanctioning.
Given an individual’s attitude, the perceived potential for social sanctioning will affect the
behaviors of rational individuals.
1.3.3 Bias in Violence Measures
The focus on the social sanctioning of violence against women in this study underscores
the need for wariness in interpreting statistical findings about violence against women. If a
variable affects the social sanctioning environment it also affects when, why and to whom
individuals within populations of research report incidents of violence - even in surveys.
16This idea of cohesion and bonding was usefully developed by Dara Kay Cohen (Cohen 2016) to explain
why armed groups with low social cohesion perpetrate gang rape during wartime.
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Biases in reporting can lead experimental evaluations to overstate an intervention’s effects
on violence. Respondents may report less violence against women after being “treated” with
a norms or informational intervention to reduce violence against women not because there is
actually less violence but because they learn that it is socially desirable not to experience
(and thus less often disclose) such violence. This social desirability - viewed as a confounder
in many studies - is indicative of an environment or an emerging environment that is less
tolerant of this violence.
I understand changes in social sanctioning and social desirability bias as important
outcomes in themselves. In the short run, social sanctioning may serve to deter or encourage
violent behavior. In the long run, social factors will affect attitudes and individual predilections
to perpetrating violence against women (Aoláin, Haynes, and Cahn 2011).
The need for numbers in order to understand and predict violence against women is
apparent, but the need to understand the social context - which gives insights for how
practitioners might address violence against women and to better understand the numbers
that exist is, in my view, more urgent. This study gives primacy to the empirical examination
of the social context of violence against women while drawing out theoretical implications for
violence against women.
1.3.4 Social Sanctioning
When someone chooses to socially sanction a perpetrator of a crime, he or she can choose
to encourage that perpetrator through positive social interactions such as invitations for
dinner, walking places with the perpetrator, or making explicit positive references to the
crime in conversation. Someone can also choose to do nothing, continuing to interact with
the perpetrator without reference to the crime in the way he or she has in the past. Or,
finally, someone can choose to negatively sanction that perpetrator, through counsel, gossip,
social ostracization, reporting to authorities, or even forms of extrajudicial punishment such
as beating. It is possible that someone may choose a mix of these behaviors over time. Each
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time that someone interacts with others in society about the perpetrator or crime (including
the perpetrator himself), a person makes a decision about how to socially sanction.
It is not surprising that social sanctioning is social. As described in the discussion of
individual and social factors that lead people to perpetrate violence (or not), people undertake
decisions about how they engage in social sanctioning by weighing the alternatives (costs and
benefits) in relation to the social context.
First, as part of this cost/benefit analysis, an individual’s attitude will influence how
they treat perpetrators of crimes. Attitudes or preferences are part of the social sanctioning
environment. Second, through social interaction, people learn about the attitudes and
expectations of others. Each time community members engage with one another about
the crime and/or perpetrator, they may update their attitude or preference for socially
sanctioning that person and/or that crime. Relating this back to violence against women and
the discussion about decisions to perpetrate based on descriptive and prescriptive norms, social
sanctioning - interactions with others in society about the perpetrator and about the crime -
is an important arena where these descriptive and prescriptive norms are communicated.
Norms are shown to be both a source of stability and a vehicle of fast and dynamic change.
Unlike attitudes, norms are perception-based. Paluck and Ball (2010) and Tankard and
Paluck (2016) describe how differences between attitudes and norms (perceptions of others
expectations or attitudes) are essential to theories of norm change (e.g. to discourage littering
or to increase individual contributions to environmental protection). People may be wrong
about the attitudes and beliefs of others. This discordance, known as pluralistic ignorance,
is a suboptimal social equilibrium where community members behave as if they prefer one
thing, but actually prefer another (Bjerring, Hansen, and Pedersen 2014). While attitude and
preference change is thought to happen only slowly, behaviors can change very quickly under
conditions of pluralistic ignorance - because behaviors can change without any accompanying
attitude or preference change (Mackie 1996; Kuran 1997; Mackie et al. 2015). When people’s
true attitudes or preferences are revealed, people are able to act in accordance with their
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own attitudes rather than against them. The expression of true preferences and the ability
to coordinate is the foundation for the idea that norms can change quickly when attitudes
and norms are out of sync.
The central theory of this dissertation - the theory of protective masculine norms -
describes how norm change associated with armed conflict can be the font of broad and
dynamic changes to preferences for social sanctioning. The theory describes a process of
preference change through the mechanism of norms. When communities are exposed to
armed conflict, exposure increases the demand for protective behavior on the part of men in
the community. When people in communities express a need and desire for protection by men
and communicate expectations that men act protectively, men adapt their preferences for
sanctioning. As a result, men prefer to punish crimes that they perceive pose a harm more
severely. In this way, the theory of protective masculine norms draws on norms theories to
explain how preference change occurs. In response to war, attitudes and norms move briefly
out of line with one another, but preferences for protection - and thus social sanctioning of
crimes - catch up.
However, as described, norms theories also posit that norm change can lead directly to
behavior change without changing people’s preferences. This dissertation explores such an
alternative pathway by examining theories of group dynamics. Armed conflict may affect
group dynamics directly, changing factors such as whose norms matter or whether norms are
more or less powerful. While consistent with theories of preference change, these theories
do not require preference change to occur. Group dynamics can be either norm specific
(e.g. specific only to violence against women), or relevant to social sanctioning more broadly.17
However, the direct effects of armed conflict on group dynamics are limited and weak. I
thus conclude that armed conflict affects social sanctioning through changes in preferences for
social sanctioning rather than through group dynamics. This preference change is theorized
17Analysis from Bauer et al (2016) shows that armed conflict affects social engagement consistently across
a number of studies. Increased social engagement could be due to changes in preferences for such engagement
or due to changes in group dynamics, but the studies do not weigh or explore these mechanisms.
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to occur because of protective masculine norms.
1.4 Armed Conflict
Thus far, I have referred to armed conflict in a very general way. In this section, I define
armed conflict - the independent variable in this study and review the literature on its
theorized effects on violence against women. How do scholars and policy-makers think about
armed conflict’s effects on violence against women? What evidence supports their claims?
This section demonstrates that there is significant room for advancements in this literature in
terms of theory and empirics, further motivating the outcome of social sanctioning in relation
to my approach to theorizing about and measuring armed conflict.
1.4.1 Theorized effects on Violence against Women
Scholars have made great strides in recognizing and explaining variation in violence perpetrated
against women during armed conflict, with a focus on armed group perpetration of sexual
violence (Cohen 2013a; Cohen 2016; Wood 2006; Wood 2009; Cohen and Nordås 2014;
Skjelsbaek 2001). But theories about how and why armed groups perpetrate violence against
women during war have begun to shape the way scholars and policy-makers approach violence
against women in the post-conflict space.
Zurbriggen (2010) describes how “we cannot get rid of rape until we get rid of war”
because of the violent masculinities that undergird both rape and militarization. Does armed
conflict militarize society and foster shared violent masculinities that have implications for
the conduct of violence after war as scholars suggest (Enloe 2000; True 2012, 137)? The
mechanisms that transmit these theorized effects to society remain macro-level and largely
unspecified.
Boesten (2010) suggests that the justice system can contribute to the proliferation of rape
in the aftermath of war. Her qualitative and interpretive work in Peru describes a justice
system that continues to view violence against women as legitimate and tolerable in the
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aftermath of war. Patterns of violence during the war are thus reflected in the patterns of
rape that follow. Her argument comes closer to identifying a specific institutional mechanism
by which armed conflict can transmit effects.
Ostby, Leiby and Nordas (2019) describe individual-level mechanisms by which armed
conflict affects violence in the post-conflict space. They describe how domestic violence can
increase in the aftermath of war when soldiers return home due to widespread post traumatic
stress disorder. Such individual-level arguments remain closely linked to theories about armed
group perpetration of violence, suggesting that armed conflict will affect domestic violence in
households of excombatants but will not have wider and broader societal effects (at least in
the short term).
Other scholars and policy-makers emphasize how armed conflict affects the structural
conditions that lend themselves to violence against women. Based on an overview of armed
conflicts worldwide, Bastick, Grimm and Kunz (2007, 10) summarize the state of knowledge
about the legacies of armed conflict:
“Armed conflict often has consequences in terms of sexual and gender-based
violence after the shooting has stopped. A number of countries emerging from
armed conflict report a very high and/or increasing incidence of criminal and
family violence. Impunity for acts of sexual violence committed during the conflict,
post-conflict poverty, lack of livelihood opportunities and the weakened rule of law,
may combine to foster increased inter-personal and sexual violence, and to make
women and girls particularly vulnerable to sexual exploitation and trafficking.”
Bastick’s summary highlights the structural drivers of women’s insecurity that results from
armed conflict. The argument is that women are subject to greater vulnerability in contexts
of internal displacement, infrastructural damage, and weak law enforcement.18 Women may
18For other examples of this approach, see Haglund and Richards (2017); Sigsworth (2008, 21); Hudson
(2006).
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also become more vulnerable when they are pushed into the informal economy where they
can be subject to violence and trafficking (Chinkin 2008).19
A focus on the social context, however, presents an important first order question for
theories about structure. What are the forces that lead people to perpetrate or not to
perpetrate in the face of infrastructural damage? The social context can provide insights into
when and why the informal economy poses greater potential for harm.
1.4.2 Evidence of Armed Conflict’s Effects
Does armed conflict have implications for how societies rather than armed group members,
treat women as posited by institutional, individual, and structural theories? If so, why?
Empirical research is emerging that lends some credence to the claim that women face greater
insecurity, including rape and domestic violence, in the aftermath of armed conflict.
In “Violence begets violence”, Østby (2016) combines Demographic Health Survey (DHS)
data and geospatial conflict data across Africa to show that intimate partner violence tends
to be greater in places where armed conflict has occurred. In Colombia, Noe and Rieckmann
(2013) show that individuals in areas that were exposed to higher magnitudes of conflict
are more likely to experience intimate partner violence and display attitudes conducive to
it. In Peru, Gallegos and Gutierrez (2010) show that intimate partner violence is higher in
areas that have been more greatly exposed to armed conflict.20 Østby, Leiby, and Nordas
(2019) provide the most comprehensive statistical examination of armed conflict’s effects on
intimate partner violence in Peru, drawing from DHS data on intimate partner violence and a
19Related statistical analyses suggest that armed conflict has important gendered repercussions. While
more men die during armed conflict, women’s life-expectancy and maternal health outcomes are significantly
and negatively affected in the long run (Plümper and Neumayer 2006; Li and Wen 2005; Urdal and Che
2013).
20The authors describe the transmission of violence during armed conflict through the space of the home
by applying Pollak’s (2004) model of intergenerational transmission of intimate partner violence. In this
model, a husband will be more violent if he grew up in a violent home; a wife will remain with a violent
husband if she grew up in a violent home; and these individuals from violent homes will tend to marry one
another. While proposing this framework, the authors do not design their study to trace the proposed process
of change.
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spatial estimate of wartime violence collected by a commission geared towards learning about
its distribution. The authors find that armed conflict has small but statistically significant
effects.
However, gender inequality is a strong predictor of war onset (Caprioli 2005; Cockburn
2010). Armed groups may target places with greater gender inequality and higher pre-existing
levels of domestic violence. The design of these studies cannot account for pre-conflict
characteristics that may affect both exposure to armed conflict and post-conflict violence
against women. Jhumka Gupta et al (2009) use a regression discontinuity design to help
account for potential selection. Based on a convenience sample of immigrant men in Boston,
the authors find that exposure to armed conflict, measured as migration just after the point
that armed conflict began, increases the likelihood of perpetrating intimate partner violence
in the past year and holding attitudes conducive to perpetration. The findings lend support
that armed conflict has causal effects on intimate partner violence and suggest that exposure
to conflict can lead to long-term effects on individuals that are not disrupted by subsequent
changes in locality.
While evidence is beginning to mount that levels of intimate partner violence increase after
armed conflict (Gupta et al. 2009; Noe and Rieckmann 2013; Gallegos and Guitierrez 2010;
Østby and others 2016; Østby, Leiby, and Nordås 2019); questions remain about how violence
translates from the battlefield into the home. The findings are also subject to questions about
survey reporting. The results show that men are more likely to report their perpetration or
women to report their experience of intimate partner violence as a result of armed conflict in
a survey. Actual levels may or may not be affected. For example, households may report
more domestic violence in the aftermath of armed conflict, because interventions geared
towards improving gender equality provide more security or encouragement for respondents
to report. In this way, more reporting of domestic violence could be a sign that violence is
better recognized and addressed as a result of the war.21 Conversely, if people are not secure
21For an explanation of this common problem in understanding the magnitude in human rights violations,
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enough to report, the threat of social sanctioning could underestimate war’s effect. The
framework of social sanctioning highlights variation in when and why people disclose violence
and suggests that studies of violence should be accompanied with accounts of attitudinal,
social and legal change.
The focus on the social sanctioning of violence against women in this study underscores
the need for wariness in interpreting statistical findings about violence against women. If a
variable affects the social sanctioning environment it also affects when, why and to whom
individuals within populations of research report incidents of violence - even in surveys.
The majority of empirical research on violence against women relies on questions about
domestic violence found in Demographic Health Surveys, which have been conducted across
many countries over time. But questions remain about how findings from the many studies
using this measure translate to other forms of violence against women such as non-intimate
partner rape. Yet, as datasets on rape have emerged to fill gaps in data availability, so have
empirical studies of rape in the post conflict space.
Haglund and Richards (Haglund and Richards 2017) examine the relationship between
armed conflict intensity and rape prevalence using aggregated state-level rape data from
WomanStats (a measure that aims to account for the context of reporting) in the post conflict
period. They find that levels of rape vary with the intensity of the previous armed conflict.
They also find that law enforcement helps to reduce levels of rape. Their findings fit the
picture that scholars and policy-makers have painted about impunity in the aftermath of
war, but leave questions about mechanisms and whether the observed effects are attributable
to armed conflict.
Overall, the evidence base paints a picture of worsening violence against women in the
aftermath of war. However, this evidence comes with few theoretical insights that describe
micro-level processes in a cohesive way. Few of these studies set out to look for improvements
in violence against women - and reporting more violence against women can actually indicate
see Clark and Sikkink (2013).
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Figure 1.2: Rape, Domestic Violence and Stealing
an improvement in norms. While some disparate findings exist, larger theorizing with focus
on mechanisms will inspire more confidence in the measures and the models on which the
findings are based to make a broader contribution.
1.4.3 Method
In research on violence against women, scholars have focused on armed conflict’s effects on
one form of violence or category of crime to make generalizations about violence against
women. But what does one category of violence tell us about violence against women more
broadly? Or about violence more broadly? If increases in rape and domestic violence occur
along with increases in other crimes, the findings may have less to do with gender than
scholars suggest. Findings from existing studies may be specific to the particular form of
violence against women, to violence against women broadly, or to violent crimes. In this
dissertation, I move away from this single outcome model to examine armed conflict’s effects
on two forms of violence against women and a third general crime, stealing, for comparison.
By examining armed conflict’s effects on several outcomes, this study can better assess both
the arguments and the mechanisms.
There is also a need to account for pre and post conflict determinants of violence against
women to reduce omitted variable bias that may drive the statistical relationships that the
models reveal. In this dissertation, I use a matched pair design to better evaluate and causally
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identify the effects of armed conflict along with integrated qualitative work and follow up
process tracing. My definition of armed conflict is geared towards tracing armed conflict’s
micro-level effects.
1.4.4 Definition
Conflict is essentially a difference in preferences. It means to be in opposition or to clash.
Armed conflict occurs when a difference in preferences takes the form of two or more competing
organized groups engaging in armed violence over a political or territorial goal.22
Definitions of armed conflict tend to be built around coding definitions for datasets,
requiring a minimum threshold of battle-related deaths for inclusion. By this definition, war
is said to end - not when violence ends - but when it dwindles or changes forms (Sambanis
2004). By other definitions, war is said to end when a peace deal is made or elections are held
(Fearon and Laitin 2003). Both definitions, however, miss important continuities between
war and peace as exemplified in the case of eastern DR Congo. Peace was declared in 2003
when a peace deal was made and levels of violence subsequently subsided, but violence by
armed groups has continued in DR Congo’s eastern regions at different levels and intensities
in the midst of this “peace”.
These definitions of war and peace lend themselves to distinct and sometimes arbitrary
units of analysis that can miss continuities and discontinuities in violence categorized as part
of war and as part of peace (Sambanis 2004). This has led some scholars to begin asking
questions about levels of violence in wartime and in the post-conflict peace (Suhrke and
Berdal 2013). At the local level, large-scale political violence and violent crime can manifest
in similar ways (Schuld 2013).
Studies are also emerging that highlight many of the calm moments and informal arrange-
ments within the spaces of larger conflict environments or wars (Staniland 2012). These
22The Peace Research Institute Oslo defines it as “a contested compatibility that concerns government
and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of
a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015).
28
moments in-between local episodes of violence are the same as those studied by counterinsur-
gency scholars interested in the effects of local violence or hearts and minds campaigns in
winning or changing the course of an overarching conflict (Eli Berman and Shapiro 2018).
This study moves beyond dichotomous definitions of war and peace to examine specific
incidents of insecurity associated with armed conflict and how those incidents or moments
of war affect local dynamics in its aftermath. When armed groups wage violence within a
particular community, that community has been exposed to armed conflict or war, terms
that I use interchangeably.
This approach relies on a local, spatial definition of armed conflict, but differs in an
important way from studies that identify conflict exposure based on an aggregation or count
of individuals that have been exposed. Rather than placing primacy on individual exposure
to violence, it considers communities as a whole to be treated with war exposure. The key
driver is not firsthand exposure but existing knowledge that a violent incident of armed
conflict affected their own household or other households in their community. This harm can
include pillage of households by armed groups when its inhabitants have fled, as they often
do in eastern DR Congo.
The definition of armed conflict as a shared community event is inspired by work on social
memory, suggesting that how people remember armed conflict matters for social outcomes.
Memories are shared, commemorated and remembered through social interaction with other
members of the community.23 Part of conflict’s effects stem from how people remember,
think about, and talk about incidents of armed conflict within their communities. Shared
knowledge and memory of local exposure to armed conflict can beget shared fears among
community members as well as shared changes in behaviors.
Through this definition and approach, this dissertation contributes both to literature
on the micro dynamics of war as well as the literature on post-conflict peace. It examines
23Rather than individual attributes, some psychologist and politic scientists emphasize that memories are
social - social and commemorated through oral histories and social practices. See for example Middleton and
Edwards (1990) and Bernhard and Kubik (2016).
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the microdynamics of armed conflict by examining what happens in the aftermath of local
violence. But, in the aggregate, it describes broadly shared social dynamics in the post-conflict
period where many communities have been exposed to incidents of armed violence.
While the local definition of armed conflict described here moves away from battle death
thresholds for defining what constitutes war, the findings from this dissertation are most
relevant to wars conventionally defined as internal or civil wars, both internationalized and
non-internationalized in nature. Civil wars tend to be fought within the territory of the
state and entail substantively different and often more intertwined interactions between
armed groups and local communities. Civil wars are accompanied by a looming local threat
associated with commitment problems and fears of recurrence even after the conflict ends
(Walter 2002).
The applicability of the theory to international wars, however, will vary since the location
of fighting may occur completely outside a state or set of states at war. Then, in communities
where fighting occurs, there may be different and/or fewer interactions between armed actors
and local communities. The state may also differ in how it seeks to protect communities against
an external threat in international as compared to civil wars. Even so, given the focus on local
exposure in this study, the findings are likely relevant to geographic locations or contested
zones where international wars continually recur and populations are left unprotected by
their states.
While this study begins unbundling armed conflict (as a treatment) by looking specifically
at local conflict exposure, examining different forms of armed violence remains beyond the
scope of this study. This decision is, in part, due to the single context in which the study
takes place. Armed groups in eastern DR Congo (particularly in the area of my study)
share many of the same repertoires of violence. This means that many of the areas will be
subject to a similar “treatment” of local violence. Yet, local exposure to violence that departs
substantially from the violence in this case may yield different findings from this study.
Additional implications follow from my focus on this case. People within all communities
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in this study live in a state of insecurity, subject to everyday, often violent crime. Thus,
claims made throughout this dissertation are in reference to episodes of armed conflict as
distinct from general insecurity associated with day-to-day crime. However, this differentiation
between general insecurity and an episode of local armed conflict is not meant to suggest
the inapplicability of the findings to other large-scale forms of violence that share similar
features, such as community exposure to gang warfare and terrorism.
1.5 Broad hypotheses about armed conflict
There are many claims in the scholarly and policy literature about armed conflict’s effects on
violence against women. While potential trajectories of change are numerous, mechanisms
about how and why armed conflict has effects tend to remain either untheorized or untested.
In addition, the causal identification of armed conflict is weak, again making it unclear what
components of war might bring about changed levels of violence against women.
This introductory chapter shifts the focus from violence against women to the social
sanctioning of this violence in the aftermath of war. Social sanctioning reflects how people
think about crimes and treat the perpetrators in their day-to-day lives. Social sanctioning
is normatively important, but also constrains the legal realm as ordinary people and law
enforcement decide whether and how to punish crimes.
Thinking about how armed conflict continues to affect violence against women in its wake
requires broader thinking about how armed conflict transmits effects. How might armed
conflict change preferences of ordinary people that are not directly associated with armed
groups?
To this end, I have introduced theories of norm and preference change and situated them
in relation to violence against women and the social sanctioning of this violence. I have
presented several broad processes, all based on theories of norm change, about how armed
conflict can affect social sanctioning of violence against women in the aftermath of war.
First, armed conflict may change individual preferences related to social sanctioning of
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Figure 1.3: Logic Chart
violence against women. As described in this chapter, and as I will argue further, changes to
preferences can occur because of changes in norms. But in my exploration of the mechanisms
that lead to preference change, I also examine the potential relationships beteween preferences
and institutional and demographic change.
Second, armed conflict may change group dynamics that affect sanctioning of violence
against women. Group dynamics describe how preferences aggregate in a social environment -
where social sanctioning actually takes place. This pathway is important to explore, because
group dynamics could render changes in preferences inconsequential for social sanctioning,
could have no effects, or could magnify the effects of preference change.
Finally, armed conflict may affect social sanctioning of violence against women in other
ways. I provide some evaluation of these alternative trajectories, but do not rule out changes
in social sanctioning that are not relevant to changes in attitudes towards that sanctioning
or to changes in group dynamics. In other words, structural explanations and institutional
explanations are set aside except as they relate to preference and norm change.
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For example, armed conflict may directly affect violence against women which, in turn,
may affect social sanctioning of violence against women. This may be because exposure to
violence against women leads communities to learn about the attitudes and beliefs of others
as they engage in social sanctioning. Because of its relationship with attitudes and norms, I
explore this trajectory. However, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, there is little evidence for
this theory.
This chapter has defined armed conflict as a local experience that can continue to affect
behaviors, attitudes and norms in its wake. How does community exposure to armed conflict
affect social sanctioning of violence against women in eastern DR Congo? How do effects
vary in comparison to other crimes?
This dissertation examines the effects of armed conflict on social sanctioning of two locally
perpetrated crimes against women: rape and domestic violence. As detailed in later chapters,
both crimes refer to crimes perpetrated by community insiders. Then, for comparison, I
examine armed conflict’s effects on a third local crime: stealing by a community insider. The
entire study is based on research in South Kivu, eastern DR Congo.
1.5.1 Chapter Outline
The central argument of this disseratation is the theory of protective masculine norms - a
theory about how social sanctioning changes when men are driven to protect as a result of war.
The theory of protective masculine norms is developed over the course of this dissertation in
several stages.
Because protective masculine norms are broadly shared across societies, but examined in
the context of eastern DR Congo, Chapter 2 investigates the nature of war, criminal and
family law, authorities, and punishment processes in eastern DR Congo to understand how
the theory and findings travel to other contexts.
Chapter 3 motivates the theory of protective masculine norms by providing the empirical
foundation for differentiating between forms of violence against women and placing them in a
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framework with other crimes. Contrary to prominent theories about empowerment, backlash
and violent masculinities; armed conflict fails to affect preferences for punishing rape and
domestic violence in a unidirectional way. Armed conflict increases how severely people prefer
to punish rape and stealing, but decreases how severely people prefer to punish domestic
violence. The qualitative evidence underscores the relevance of disaggregating crimes against
women in terms of public community threats and private crimes.
Chapter 4 explicates the theory of protective masculine norms, grounding it in the
literature and in the case. I examine the quantitative and descriptive evidence related to
alternative hypotheses that may account for armed conflict’s effects: exposure to wartime
crimes, security structures and demographic change. Finding little support for alternative
theories, I describe the design of and results from qualitative work probing central propositions
within protective masculine norms theory: Protection is gendered; people have shared
memories of conflict incidents; this affects their subsequent behaviors; and internal crimes
are related to perceived provision of protection.
Since sanctioning is a public act subject to group dynamics and norms, Chapter 5
examines the implications of protective masculine norms and the findings about preference
change for how groups choose to punish crimes. Armed conflict may affect how groups choose
to punish crimes by changing individual-level preferences, by changing group dynamics,
neither, or both. I find that armed conflict affects group preferences primarly through
individual-level preference change, underscoring the relevance of preference change for social
sanctioning in the aftermath of war. The data also show that group dynamics make people’s
preferences more extreme, suggesting the importance of norms to shaping preferences - a
central tenet of the theory.
Chapter 6 discusses the emerging research agenda of protective masculine norms and
its contributions. Questions remain about levels of violence against women after war. But,
already protective masculine norms has begun to unify a formerly disparate set of findings
emerging about armed conflict, domestic violence, and social and legal change.
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Chapter 2: The Case of eastern Democratic Republic of
Congo
2.1 Introduction
This dissertation examines the effects of armed conflict on social sanctioning of crimes in
eastern DR Congo, arguing that conflict affects community norms, preferences for, and
sanctioning of violence against women. The previous chapter introduced the case of eastern
DR Congo, developed the concept of social sanctioning, and described how I have chosen to
define armed conflict to study its effects in this case. However, attention to the specificities
of the case can yield insights into the extent to which the theory of protective masculine
norms and the findings related to social sanctioning travel beyond this case.
What are the sources of armed group violence and theories of why violence has developed
and continues in this way? What do the social and legal spheres of sanctioning rape, domestic
violence, and stealing - the outcomes of focus throughout this dissertaton - look like in this
case? This chapter provides an overview of the armed conflict, violence against women, law,
and social practice surrounding these issues.
My account of the history and development of armed conflict in eastern DR Congo draws
from my reading of secondary sources. I choose to rely on secondary sources to integrate
insights from scholars focused solely on explaining this vast and complex war. Less is known
about the social context of violence against women such as local processes of punishment
and preferences for punishing local crimes against women in eastern DR Congo. To provide
this social context, I incorporate data from elite interviews in 20 villages and original survey
research across 700 villages in this context.
These insights provide a framework for understanding the methods and findings in the
empirical chapters that follow (Chapters 3-5) and establish the centrality of social sanctioning
for the treatment of crime perpetrators in eastern DR Congo.
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2.2 Background
Much has been written about war, armed conflict, and violence against women, particularly
sexual violence in DR Congo. And, there are many frameworks for understanding the
complexities of violence that have taken place and the violence that continues (Prunier 2008;
Lemarchand 2012; Autesserre 2010; Turner 2007; Stearns 2012).
DR Congo (known as Zaire between 1971 and 1997) emerged as an independent state in
1960, after many years of repressive and extractive rule by Belgian colonizers. DR Congo is
a large vast land estimated to be the size of Spain, France, Germany, Sweden, and Norway
combined. Decolonized during the wave of ideological struggle against communism, a coup
left DR Congo securely in the pro-Western hands of Dictator Mobutu Sese Seko, who was
later “elected” into power.
During Mobutu’s reign, the economy plummeted from $377 per capita in 1958 in the hands
of the colonizers to $117 in 1993 (Van Acker and Vlassenroot 2000; as cited in Autesserre
2010). As the anti-communist struggle subsided, Western support for the dictator dried up.
The regime used corruption, violence and divide-and-rule tactics to maintain rule; at one
point Mobutu is estimated to have owned 95% of the country’s wealth (Reno 1999, 152–54).
Not only is DR Congo vast, but it is also ethnically diverse with over 200 identified ethnic
groups. Three of the four largest ethnic groups are Bantu, with the four major ethnic groups
comprising 45 percent of the population (Agency 2016).
With his rule threatened, particularly in the east, Mobutu sought to maintain power by
fomenting divisions between ethnic groups - divisions which set the grounds for the ethnic
character of the wars that were to follow. Importantly, “nonindigenous” “Banyanmulenge”
populations from Rwanda were increasingly excluded from society.24 Land and political rights
were expropriated (Autesserre 2010, 115:130–42). The military was allowed to pay themselves
by preying on these excluded populations (Autesserre 2010, 115:56–57).
24This “nonindigenous”, “Banyanmulenge” population had settled in the eastern regions either forcefully
during the colonization period or in response waves of ethnic conflict in their country of origin.
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Thus, when the Rwandan genocide occurred in 1994 and Hutu extremists and other new
“nonindigenous” “Bayanmelege” fled over the border, the stage was set for armed conflict to
erupt. The new Tutsi regime that took power in Rwanda after the Rwandan genocide became
concerned about the treatment of their ethnic kin just over the Rwandan border in eastern
DR Congo. In addition, the fledgling Rwandan government recovering from genocide now
had a security issue just over the border as Hutu extremists fed off the refugee/aid camps to
refuel with the ostensible aim to liberate Rwanda from Tutsi rule.
2.3 Wars in DR Congo
Between 1994 and 2003, DR Congo experienced large scale war, a war that was actually two
wars waged in a consecutive series. The situation became so complex that its second war is
referred to it as Africa’s World War. An estimated 5.3 million lives are estimated to have
been lost in this war largely due to indirect deaths such as disease and starvation.
In the First Congo War, Rwanda along with other neighboring African states intervened
to overthrow Mobutu Ses Seko through the AFDL rebel group. Despite foreign actors seeking
to negotiate a settlement, the AFDL was able to achieve military victory and install President
Laurent Kabila who was loyal to the Rwandan regime. However, when the legitimacy of
his rule was questioned by internal forces, Kabila turned on his foreign backers and sent
foreign military advisors and others out of the country. In response, Rwanda along with
several other African leaders fomented a second rebellion to overthrow the newly installed
president. This time, support for Kabila’s overthrow did not receive as widespread of support
and was actively opposed by several neighboring countries(Autesserre 2010, 115:48; Group
and others 2000). Without a preponderance of force, the result was a military stalemate
during which many outside actors were fomenting and backing rebel groups, rebel groups
were splintering, and wartime economies structured around mines had the opportunity to
consolidate. The international community worked to establish a peace agreement, installing
a transitional government in 2003 that ultimately reflected the distribution of power among
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armed groups.25 Finally, elections were held in 2006 and “peace” declared.
But to what extent can eastern DR Congo be characterized as “post-conflict” at all?
Despite peace agreements, two elections, and repeated references to DR Congo as a post-
conflict country, ongoing violence has continued in the eastern regions at various levels and
intensities throughout and since the transition and elections. By some accounts, in 2017, over
120 armed groups were estimated to be operating in eastern DR Congo alone - a proliferation
from an estimated 70 armed groups in 2015 from the same source (Stearns and Vogel 2017).26
Autesserre (2010) has shown just how inapplicable the “post-conflict” framework is to the
case of eastern DR Congo and described how the post-conflict frame has impeded international
efforts to address the sources of the continued armed conflict. In my references to post-conflict
throughout this dissertation, I refer to the immediate wake of exposure to violence by armed
groups at the community level. But, I do not consider DR Congo to be a country experiencing
peace in the aftermath of war. My study explores variation in exposure to armed conflict,
comparing the social context of armed conflict in communities recently exposed to war and
communities that have not been recently exposed. This study thus remains about violence at
the micro-level and does not address macro-framings of Congo as Congo at peace or Congo
at war.
Through this approach and in line with existing scholarship on DR Congo, this study will
highlight how armed violence continues to shape people’s everyday experiences and everyday
actions in-between local episodes of armed violence. By exploring variation in micro-level
exposure to armed conflict violence this study seeks to understand micro-level changes that
aggregate up to macro level change. To clarify, I do suggest that community level changes will
aggregate to affect the social environment in the peace that follows war. Thus, the findings
that emerge from examining local-level variation in conflict exposure will be relevant in war’s
25Prior to the transitional government, Laurent Kabilia was assassinated in 2001. He was killed by a body
guard. His son, Joseph took power following his demise.
26These estimates have been provided by the Congo Research Group based on local research of affiliates
located in North and South Kivu. These numbers include very small, splinter armed groups that appear to
operate with reasonable levels of independence.
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aftermath when exposure to violence across communities is broadly shared, but will be more
localized when exposure to armed conflict is not widely shared across locations.
Other specifics about armed violence in DR Congo are also important to consider.
For example, the conflict has both an international and a domestic character, which has
contributed to the complexity in determining the motivations for continued violence in the
war. Up to fourteen state actors are identified to have fought on the ground as part of Congo’s
Second War (Autesserre 2010, 115:49) after the ceasefire during the transition period (1999 to
2003) alone. Over the past 20 years, states have engaged in the armed conflict by initiating,
supporting, or aligning with rebel groups inside and outside DR Congo’s territory.27. In
addition, there is an extremely high proliferation of armed groups. As armed groups begin to
interact with local conflict dynamics, new splinter groups continue to emerge with different
loyalties and agendas depending on location (Autesserre 2010, 115:144).28
Two other actors bear specific mention in relation to the context. First, underscoring the
internationalized nature of the war, there has been a United Nations peacekeeping mission
(known as MONUC from 1999-2010, now MONUSCO) deployed in eastern DR Congo since
1999. Its long standing and robust presence leads it to be considered a relevant actor in the
conflict.
Second is the Armed Forces of of DR Congo (FARDC). The FARDC, often underequipped,
underpaid, and accused of human rights abuses, have aligned with different rebel groups (or
Mai Mai) to undertake operations over time. The FARDC has also absorbed many armed
groups. During campaigns to establish control in the east and gain a monopoly of violence,
the FARDC has incorporated members of many of these groups at different points in time.
In this process, there has been infiltration of norms from these independent group within the
FARDC. The loyalties of subunits are often questioned (Baaz and Verweijen 2013).
While there are many relatively autonomous armed groups operating in eastern DR
27Some armed groups are backed by Rwanda; some Uganda; fewer by Burundi
28The splintering of armed groups is also facilitated by the low availability and high cost of communication
and travel from area to area.
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Congo, there are also reasons to think of the violence that armed groups and the military
perpetrate as related. All parties in DR Congo (peacekeepers sometimes included) have been
characterized as behaving violently towards the Congolese population. In interviews in my
sample of villages in eastern DR Congo in 2016 and 2018 that asked about past notable
events that occurred in those villages, the main groups that people tended to differentiate in
the areas of my research in South Kivu were Rwandaese or Bayanumelege, the Mai Mai, the
military, or more specifically the FNL (the group for the liberation of the Hutu people).
Another important consideration is the the extreme brutality of armed groups towards
the DR Congo population.29 Indeed, over the course of the war, armed groups, including
the military, have extracted from, raped and abused the population. Most of the violence
associated with the armed conflict in DR Congo takes the form of armed group on civilian
violence rather than armed group on armed group violence.
As with the history and origins of the war, there are many accounts of why armed groups
perpetrate such brutal violence against the population. Focus group accounts suggest that
this practice emerged in response to perpetration of violence by Rwandaese residents and
refugees in DR Congo (Kelly et al. 2012). However, allegations that violence was imported
by Rwandan genocidaires and then replicated by other groups sit all-too-comfortably with
dominant modes of ethnic othering of “non-indigenous” populations that emerged over the
course of colonial rule and in the Mobutu era (1965-1997). Beginning in this era, the
government was unable to pay the military members adequately and allowed for pillage
and plunder as part of this pursuit, a practice that seems to continue today (Gordon 2016,
Chapter 2). In seeking to gain dwindling control over the eastern regions of DR Congo
in the face of a shrinking economy, then-President Mobutu facilitated the expropriation
of non-indigenous ethnic communities, Rwandease (Bayanmunelege) in particular - often
29I won’t recount the horrific stories easily found in media accounts, but I do note that stories of extreme
brutality of armed group violence is reflected even in randomly sampled interviews in my interview populations -
strongly suggesting that stories of extreme brutality are not outliers or cherry picked by advocacy organizations
seeking to improve victim services.
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allowing or encouraging the military to take what they need by preying on these unwelcome
ethnic groups (Reno 1999, Chapter 5; Autesserre 2010, 115:56).
In Weinstein’s (2006) framework for thinking about civilian abuse, brutal violence against
populations becomes more probable when armed groups are not dependent on the population
for support. The eastern regions of DR Congo are indeed resource rich, with reserves such as
gold, diamonds, cobalt, and columbo-tantalite (used in electronic equipment) and foreign
sources systematically contribute to the rise and sustenance of armed groups. Perhaps the
centrality of resources to the armed conflict supports an atmosphere conducive to brutal
violence against civilians. However, resource-driven conflicts are not unique to eastern DR
Congo. And in many cases, extraction here is dependent on civilian assistance, with the
civilian population being abducted as porters to help move goods. This does not align with
the characterization of an armed group devoid of reliance on the population (Baaz and Stern
2013, 68–71). The focus on extraction also seems to feed into the dominant characterization
of armed conflict in eastern DR Congo as criminal rather than a political exercise.30
What creeps into conversations time and time again about the nature of violence in DR
Congo is essentialism about a pre-existing or emergent culture of violence. The image of
savagery told in tales such as Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness shapes how people perceive
norms of violence in Congo today.31 The common understanding among Western societies
(or the Global North) is that violence in DR Congo has been normalized due to repeated
exposure to brutal violence throughout the colonial era, the Mobutu era, and then experiences
of two large-scale armed conflicts.
Autesserre recounts a conversation with a Western diplomat about the normalization of
violence: “It’s a human tragedy. . . but. . . it is a country that has been through, certainly
since 1996, a decade of pretty serious ongoing violence, and people become somewhat numb
to that. . . ” (2010, 115:75). Despite this widespread assumption, research continually fails
30In addition, considering eastern DR Congo as a “post-conflict” context facilitates the interpretion of
armed groups as criminal and devoid of political goals or grievances (Autesserre 2010, 115:72–74).
31See, for example, Dunn (2003).
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to show that violence has been normalized in Congolese society. Autesserre (2010, pg. 79)
describes:
All of my eastern Congolese interviewees regarded the ongoing bloodshed as being,
without question, out of the norm. Their reactions to incidents of torture, fighting,
and massacres clearly showed that they were far from habituated or “numb” to
such events. Even perpetrators did not consider the violence that they committed
as “normal” or “natural.
Research that seeks to understand perpetration of violence from the eyes of the perpetrators
also finds little evidence that violence is perceived as normal by the perpetrators. Baaz and
Stern describe how FARDC members have come to see the state and higher-ups as cheating
them and not giving them their due. They remain unpaid, hungry, and distrustful of their
authorities. They perceive that the population also fails to treat them with respect (Baaz
and Stern 2008, 81–82). They respond to abuse with abuse.32 Empirical work by Gordon
(2016, Chapter 2) suggests that, indeed, the perpetration of violence by FARDC members is
associated with failed receipt of pay.
Armed group members may be barred from achieving what society expects of them (and
what they aspire to) and perpetrate violence in response. Rather than violence becoming
normative, a sense of failed masculinities may account for the brutal nature of violence -
borne of suffering with the intent to cause suffering - on the part of armed groups (including
armed group members).
In line with this scholarship, this dissertation fails to find evidence that violence has been
normalized. People continue to be outraged by most violence. Rather than normalizing
violence, my interviews suggest that the alternative, peacemaking, is highly revered.
32For another example of the failed masculinities argument in the case of DR Congo, see Lwambo (2013).
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2.4 Violence against Women
Research on the war in DR Congo - and particularly research on its effects on violence against
women - cannot take place without attention to the widespread and brutal nature of sexual
violence perpetrated as part of the armed conflict. Armed groups including the miltary
have perpetrated sexual violence against members of the population. Studies have sought to
examine the motivations for rape. Based on narrative analyses of interviews with soldiers
that have perpetrated rape, Baaz and Stern (2009) describe how some rape is characterized
as “evil” rape representing active aberration with societal norms. But, another type of rape
that soldiers describe is “lust” rape, which is of a different character.
Irrespective of perpetrator motivations, it is evident that sexual violence is perpetrated
by many armed groups in this context. A quantitative account of armed groups perpetration
from the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict dataset provides an systematically collected
overview of the nature of this violence (Cohen and Nordås 2014). This dataset draws from
reports by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the U.S. State Department to
estimate sexual violence by armed groups in terms of 4 categories: Massive, Several/Many,
Some, and None reported.
The Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict dataset codes this information for conflict actors
in PRIO’s conflict actors dataset.33 It then continues to code mentions of armed group
perpetration in the 5 years following armed conflict.34
Figure 2.1 describes the distribution of armed groups accounted for in the SVAC dataset.
Table 2.1 presents the actor-specific levels of perpetration across the three different sources
for the same time period. The reports from Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International
and the U.S. State Department describe 10 of the 21 identifed actors as perpetrating sexual
violence - half of which are identified to perpetrate on a massive scale. All sources suggest
33For a description of armed conflict definitions and coding schemes see (Gleditsch et al. 2002).
34Because the time period after 2010 does not fit either of these criteria, the data only provide a historical


















Figure 2.1: Actors (State and Non-State) in SVAC Dataset by year
that the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo perpetrate sexual violence at
the highest level.
In the media, DR Congo is described as the quintessential case of sexual violence during
conflict.35 The influx of international aid and programming associated with this particular
form of violence presents important challenges to studying violence against women in eastern
DR Congo. First, when discussing violence against women, people assume that the focus of
my research is on sexual violence by armed groups, in line with the dominant frame. My
research agenda, however, seeks to consider violence perpetrated against women that is not
sexual in nature and to consider violence not solely perpetrated by armed groups. Each
conversation requires explicit effort to direct the discussion to the topic at hand.
Second, scholars have raised ethical concerns about the “fetishization” of studing sexually
violent acts such as rape, both in the context of armed conflict and eastern DR Congo (Meger
2016; Autesserre 2012; Baaz and Stern 2013). This dissertation confronts the ethical issue of
35Autesserre (2012) describes the trajectory of how international attention began to shift to the issue of
sexual violence and addressing it in eastern DR Congo. In 2002, Human Rights Watch drew attention to this
feature of the war and its brutality.
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AFDL 7 0 0 0
ALiR (Army for the Liberation of Rwanda) 10 0 0 0
Angola 10 0 0 0
BDK 3 0 0 0
Chad 7 0 0 0
Civil Guard 7 0 0 0
CNDP 4 1 3 1
Democratic Republic of Congo (Zaire) 17 3 3 3
FDD (Forces for the Defence of Democracy) 11 0 0 1
FDLR 12 2 1 3
FNL (National Liberation Forces) 11 2 0 2
Mai Mai (Mayi Mayi) 12 2 2 2
MLC 9 2 3 2
Namibia 9 0 0 0
RCD 9 3 2 2
RCD–ML 7 0 0 1
Rwanda 11 2 1 2
Special Presidential Division 2 0 0 0
Uganda 10 2 0 0
White Legion 6 0 0 0
Zimbabwe 9 0 0 0
further “fetishizing” rape in war narratives in three ways: by (1) shifting attention away from
perpetration by armed groups (2) asking about positive aspects of how societies choose to
punish this violence and (3) seeking to understand people’s preferences for punishing violent
crimes including crimes against women rather than superimposing norms about how people
should prefer to punish crimes.36
Given the potential for research and policy inundation in the area of violence against
women, I ask participants in 79 focus groups (which will be described in more detail later in
this study) about which crimes (if any) under discussion (rape, domestic violence and stealing)
the state should be more active. Sixty-one percent suggested that the state should more
36Congolese researchers that I worked closely with often commented offhand that asking people’s preferences
on this matter was a surprising and different approach.
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actively address rape.37 While there are many components to tease apart in this question
(e.g. potential beliefs about associations with aid combined with perceptions that the state
might learn their responses), the responses - at minimum - suggest that people are not averse
to programming on this issue. Rather, it seems that the influx of programming on rape is
encouraged by communities that have been repeatedly receiving such programming (all cases
in this sample of 20 villages).
Even while shifting the frame, this study continues to address violence against women and,
in doing so, highlights women’s insecurity and vulnerability in DR Congo. Indeed, violence
against women is a large issue that warrants attention. But it is also a large issue elsewhere
in the world.
The 2013-14 Demographic Health Survey found that 52 percent of women across DR
Congo had experienced physical or sexual abuse by their intimate partners in their lifetimes,
with 71.5 percent of women reporting that they were afraid of their partner most of the time.
Estimated levels of rape or sexual violence in South Kivu, where my study takes place, were
estimated at 48 percent in their lifetimes and 24 percent in the past 12 months (Ministère du
Plan et Suivi de la Mise oeuvre de la Révolution de la Modernité and International 2014, p
20-21).38 As described in the introductory paragraphs of Chapter 1, these estimates are not
much different than reported in other countries (Garcia-Moreno et al. 2006). In my focus on
DR Congo, I make no claims of exceptionality in this regard.
Some have suggested that the perpetration of sexual violence by armed groups has further
harmed the status of women in this society (CEDAW 2011, pg. 24), but this remains an
empirical questions in need of study - something that I examine indirectly in Chapter 3. While
DR Congo is a member of the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
of Women, women continue to be unequal members of society as evidenced in the roles that
37Eighty-seven percent of focus groups described wanting more state intervention in terms of stealing. In
contrast, only fifteen percent of focus groups suggested that the government should play more of a role in
addressing domestic violence.
38Citation for 71.5 percent was calculated using Demographic Health Survey Data (International 2012).
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Table 2.2: Example Developments in Family Law
1970 Family Law 2018 Family Law
Article 444 The husband is the head of household.
He must protect his wife; she must
obey her husband
Remains unchanged
Article 448 The wife must obtain the permission of
her husband on all legal acts which
require her to provide a service that
must be given in person
Any legal act requiring the
performance of an obligation may be
undertaken only with the agreement of
both spouses
Article 454 The wife is obliged to live with her
husband and follow him wherever he
sees fit to reside the husband is obliged
to accommodate her
The spouses undertake to live together
wherever they choose to reside in the
interest of the marriage
women play in the home. Women do all of the housework, care for the children, and are
responsible for meal preparation (Department 2018; Pierotti, Lake, and Lewis 2018; Slegh,
Barker, and Levtov 2014; Windt, Humphreys, and Sierra 2018). At the same time, women’s
labor outside the home is visible to anyone that visits eastern DR Congo; women can be seen
walking on the roadside transporting heavy sacks of grain and other goods on their backs to
the nearest market or city.39 These are the more fortunate women also; the less well off do
not have goods to sell.
2.5 Legal Codes
The Family Code of 1970 provides the basis for contemporary family law in DR Congo, both
reflecting and enshrining the gender inequality that I have described (Htun and Weldon 2015).
Table 2.2 provides an example of three laws from the Family Code of 1970 and how the laws
have been amended in the past 10 years.
Article 444 in Table 2.2 enshrines men as head of the household and stipulates that wives
must obey. To my knowledge, this article is still part of the body of law regulating marriage.
The state’s official explanation for keeping this law (in response to international investigation)
39Estimates suggets that women produce 75 percent of food in rural areas in addition to their labor in the
household (CEDAW 2011, pg. 18)
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is that “all ethnic groups share the differentiated perception of male and female roles. Family
relations between men and women are built on an underlying inequality between man, the
husband and father who is head of the family, and woman, the wife and mother who manages
the household”(CEDAW 2011).40.
The wording of Article 444, the centerpoint of family law, even uses the term protection
to describe the relationship between men and women. This gives initial credence to the claim
that I make throughout this dissertation - that there is a widespread belief that men should
act as protectors of women which I will develop further in Chapter 4.
Despite inequalities, domestic violence is defined as a crime under Congolese law. However,
it does not outline a specific penalty for domestic violence and it does not consider intimate
partner rape to be such a crime (Department 2018).41
Sexual violence (by non-intimate partners; presumably by armed groups) is treated very
differently under Congolese law. Since conflict’s onset in 1994, DR Congo has strengthened its
laws punishing rape and improved the legal system, even prescribing appropriate punishment.
An act of rape is punishable by up to 20 years in prison, with a minimum sentence of 5
years (Department 2018, Section 6). Scholars of international human rights have written
that the legal system and domestic trial proceedings produce “frequent and high-quality
judicial decisions” (Lake 2014b, pg. 515).42 While imperfectly applied and underreported,
rape sentences prescribed by law are frequently imposed (Lake 2014a; Lake, Muthaka, and
Walker 2016).
International investigators have recognized the gap between law and practice for punishing
domestic violence, suggesting that legal reforms have been undertaken but not implemented
40However, this is unclear. The CEDAW report DR Congo said that it was updating this portion of the
Family Code. In a series of investigations in relation to DR Congo’s CEDAW membership, investigators have
repeatedly raised questions about Article 444. DR Congo’s official response has been in support of keeping
Article 444 (CEDAW 2011; CEDAW 2012, 5)
41In such a case, they rely on “ordinary criminal code.”
42Lake argues that the puzzle of DR Congo’s high-quality judicial rulings can be attributed to the weak
nature of the Congolese state and the sizeable active presence of international actors that have worked to
install these developments without state obstruction (Lake 2014a).
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in DR Congo. The investigation committee of Committee for the Elimination of all forms of
Discrimination against Women demanded a response about domestic violence in DR Congo
(CEDAW 2018, pg. 3):
“Please also indicate what actions have been taken, in line with the Convention,
to educate and inform the public, including traditional leaders, teachers, judges,
defence and law enforcement forces, political figures and boys and men in particu-
lar, about the social impact and consequences of domestic violence in order to
make such violence an unacceptable violation of human rights.”
Such gaps between law and practice reflect the need to look beyond the legal system to
examine conflict’s effects on everyday punishment practices and norms, which might intervene
in top-down measures to address violence against women in eastern DR Congo.
2.6 Processes in Practice
How do communities manage local crimes in eastern DR Congo? What are the processes
involved in punishing people that perpetrate crimes? In order to understand how armed
conflict affects social sanctioning, it is necessary to understand the practices for punishing
rape, domestic violence, and stealing in communities in eastern DR Congo. Based on original
interviews with village leaders (Chiefs) across 20 villages held in 2016 and 8 elite interviews
with villagers that aid the chief in local conflict resolution held in 2018 (Elders/Sages); I
describe local processes, highlighting areas where law and practice fail to converge.
In villages in eastern DR Congo, traditional village chiefs and chiefs of the groupement
(one administrative level higher) are tasked with resolving inter-personal conflict within the
village. Both leaders can mete out punishment, with the chief of the groupement becoming
involved more often when issues are large or cannot be resolved by the village chief.
Chiefs play a quasi-state, quasi-traditional role. The organization of rural areas draws
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both from traditional structure and adapts them to the state’s needs.43 The village chiefs
and groupement chiefs are powerful authorities, particularly because they determine who can
stay in the village and who can obtain land (Autesserre 2010, 115:130–31).
The law prohibits extrajudicial settlements for crimes of rape, clearly defining prison
sentences as the appropriate form of punishment for this crime. Yet while outside the scope
of the law, extrajudicial punishments are commonplace in all of the villages that I studied in
eastern DR Congo.
There are cases in which extrajudicial punishment occurs from the bottom up. When
asked what would likely happen if villagers caught a thief, chiefs from the majority of 20
villages describe how it is almost unimaginable that the thief would be brought to their
doorstep without first being badly beaten. Villages chiefs tended to view part of their role as
keeping crime perpetrators out of the angry hands of villagers.
However, extrajudicial justice is not only carried out by villagers, but meted out by village
chiefs themselves. For example, when the chief demands that the perpetrator of a crime make
a payment to the family of a rape victim, this engagement falls outside the scope of what is
prescribed by law. In cases where a young unmarried woman is raped by a man from the
village, law prescribes a jail sentence for the perpetrator. Yet, forced marriage and fines paid
by the perpetrator to the family of the victim are commonplace (Department 2018, Section
3). In discussions with village chiefs, an overwhelming majority report that such a crime is
and should be handled locally through fines and marriage. Authorities describe how marriage
would bring responsibility to the male perpetrator and would make it such that he did not
perpetrate again.44
Part of the breakdown between law and practice seems to manifest (or at least legitimate
itself) through definitions. When asking village chiefs about whether rape was perpetrated by
43For example, the successions of Groupement chiefs do not go uncontested. In fact, some of the main
violence reported during the past 5 years within one of the territories that I worked in was in relation to a
groupment chief succcession dispute.
44Note that here, marriage is described more in terms of a social punishment as opposed to a social reward.
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villagers in the village, the first answer tended to be, “no”. Yet, this “no” was often followed
by a statement about this “other” related category that they considered to be early marriage
which also fit the account of rape described in our discussion. By defining rape within their
village as something else, chiefs are able to circumvent dissonance between law and practice.
For perpetrators of “real” rape, traditional leaders expressed that there was nothing that
they could do to protect a perpetrator from a jail sentence.
The village chief is advised or assisted by a group of elders (also known as sages) comprised
of around 4 men and 4 women to aid with conflict resolution. These elders attend the meetings
during which the chief renders judgement.45
I asked elders within each village to describe the typical local processes for handling
inter-personal conflicts.46. Villagers begin by taking issues to the chief. If the chief and elders
together are unable to resolve the conflict, then the issue goes to the chief of the groupement
(one level of jurisdiction higher and still within the traditional structure of rule). Following
that, villagers will take issues to the police - with the potential that perpetrators may at that
point be taken to jail.
While there is some role differentiation between the state police and local traditional
authorities, the elders tend to describe the interaction as an ordered process related to severity.
The police mainly use fines and jail as a form of punishment. The village chief can dictate
counsel, payments between parties, and expulsion from the village. The chief can also contact
the police in cases where a crime warrants jail. Thirty-five percent (248 of 709) village chiefs
interviewed in 2015 had worked with the police or a tribunal in the past 6 months alone.47
In cases where the police take a villager into custody, the chief can also attempt to intervene
to support a wrongfully accused individual.48 Unofficially through action or inaction, the
45Male elders also aid the chief of the groupement. Some female elders indicated that they help the chief to
resolve issues related to women but not other issues. It is unclear if men’s roles are delineated in such a way.
46In terms of conflict-resolution, a crime is conflict between the aggrieved party and the perpetrator
47This is based on a survey of 709 largely rural villages that were part of an evaluation by the International
Rescue Committee in 2015. For more details see (Laudati, Mvukiyehe, and Van der Windt 2016).
48My interviews with villagers conducted in 2018 describe accounts of Chiefs intervening on behalf of
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village chief can also choose to allow villagers to undertake direct vigilante justice against
crime perpetrators. Thus, the village chief is truly at the center of choices about punishment,
even if he must work with or through the police for outcomes such as jail.
However, villagers do have the option to go directly to the police. In interviews and focus
groups, villagers describe how calling the police is costly and fails to resolve conflict. Both
chiefs and elders consistently reveal a preference to handle problems locally if at all possible
and not to get police involved. Chiefs (and villagers) view the police as corrupt, external and
predatory towards the population.
“For a question that would require 2000 Congolese Francs at the level of the village
chief, the same question can require 100000 Congolese Francs [when brought to
the police]. . . When a question is handled by the police it always generates a clash.
Thus the conflict is aggravated and creates other conflicts (vengence, settling of
accounts, etc.).”" (Male elder Village 4)
If a villager brings an issue to the village chief, it costs that villager a round of beer.
Fines imposed by the police are much larger and, in the minds of the chiefs and others in the
village, fail to actually resolve conflicts between villagers.
“The problem is between the people of the community and is managed within the
community. It is how we say here”the dirty laundry is washed by the family." The
man did not pay us the money, he had just given a small case of Primus [beer]
which costs less than 10 dollars.“” (Male elder Village 1)
In a similar vein, one female elder describes the utility of counsel offered during meetings
with elders and traditional authorities for assuaging conflict.
“Resolving the conflict locally can avoid dispensing a lot of money to the state. . .
and people often give counsel to those persons in conflict.”" (Female elder Village
3)
individuals. This randomly selected interview sample will be described in Chapter 4.
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It is potentially not surprising that elders, so close in proximity to the chief, see benefits
of the very local conflict resolution process that they are involved in. However, it is also
important to note that elder advisory roles in the conflict resolution process are not their
“day” jobs. Most are agricultural workers along with their spouses, slightly more educated
than the majority of the population, but still relatively poor.
2.7 Social Sanctioning
The above description has provided an overview of how local processes of punishment take
place. Social sanctioning related to violence against women and other local crime, as described
in the previous chapter, also includes less formal behaviors, such as how people engage with
perpetrators socially and whether people will tell authorities about crimes that have been
perpetrated to begin with. What other positive and negative sanctions might perpetrators
consider when deciding whether to perpetrate crime?
In order to learn about norms of social sanctioning related to rape, I asked residents
across 700 villages in three provinces in eastern DR Congo about how they perceive social
sanctioning in their village. In particular, I asked for an estimation of the proportion of men
or male youths in the village that would engage in a range of sanctioning behaviors - both
positive and negative in nature.
The questions were asked in the context of a survey related to the evaluation of a large-scale
community driven development program in eastern DR Congo. The survey was implemented
in 2015 and allows for systematic observation of a wide range of villages that were randomly
selected from a large set of sites.49 Five randomly sampled respondents were surveyed in each
village in 2015.50
49These sites were mainly ‘off the beaten path’ of most aid work and surveys (other than the DHS). The
sample was determined in 2007 prior to the initiation of the community driven development program. For a
full description of the program and the evaluation in 2011 see Humphreys, van der Windt, and de la Sierra
(Forthcoming).
50Because this survey was a follow-up to a survey implemented in 2010-11, the randomly sampled
respondents were selected and surveyed in 2011 and surveyed again in 2015. Where respondents from 2011
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My questions that were included in the survey asked whether, in the hypothetical case that
someone from the village raped an unmarried woman from the village, what proportion of
villagers would take the following actions? To assess perceived social encouragement, I asked
about the proportion of men or male youths that would encourage someone to repeat the
behavior or laugh in response to learning about the crime. On a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 is
0% of the population (“almost no one”) and 5 is 100% (“almost everyone”) of the population,
the mean estimated proportion of villagers that would laugh falls just below almost half (1.8).
The mean estimated proportion of villagers that would encourage the perpetrator to repeat
the action is similar but closer to no one (1.3). Thus, people perceive little support in their
village for perpetrating rape.
Other punitive social behaviors that I asked about include beating the perpetrator (fight),
sending the perpetrator away from the village, telling the perpetrator not to repeat the action,
and making the perpetrator pay the family of the victim. Means for these questions all fall
between half of the population (3) and more than half of the population (4). Overall, people
expect that others in their communities disapprove acts of rape and will socially sanction
perpetrators in these ways.
Another form of social sanctioning linked closely with punishment processes is reporting
the perpetrator or event to traditional authorities or the police. On average, respondents
estimate that more than half of male or youth villagers would signal the incident to traditional
authorities or the police if they know about it. Overall, respondents believe that it is very
likely (but not certain) that the traditional authorities and police will punish the perpetrator.
People have confidence in both the traditional authorities and the police to punish rape.
They expect that the community is supportive of punishment.
Likely because the questions ask about estimations of men and male youths (rather than
personal attitudes), there are few differences between men’s estimates and women’s estimates
of proportions that would socially sanction. However, women believe that there is a slightly
could not be reached, replacement respondents were again randomly sampled from the village population.
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Table 2.3: Social Sanctioning Norms in eastern DR Congo
MIN MAX N MEAN SD N.F. MEAN.F. SD.F. N.M. MEAN.M. SD.M. P.DIFF. ICC
Prop. Social Reward
Laugh 1 5 3149 1.77 1.14 1558 1.74 1.11 1590 1.79 1.17 0.231 0.002
Say to repeat 1 5 3233 1.25 0.77 1602 1.23 0.73 1630 1.27 0.80 0.163 0.151
Prop. Social Punishment
Fight 1 5 3072 3.16 1.45 1514 3.21 1.45 1557 3.11 1.45 0.054 0.006
Leave Village 1 5 3064 3.46 1.39 1513 3.48 1.39 1550 3.43 1.38 0.356 0.040
Pay Victim Family 1 5 3039 3.76 1.26 1496 3.79 1.24 1542 3.73 1.27 0.215 0.083
Say Not to Repeat 1 5 3214 4.01 1.36 1588 4.00 1.38 1625 4.01 1.34 0.709 0.053
Not Speak to Him 1 5 3069 3.16 1.39 1519 3.16 1.39 1549 3.16 1.39 0.971 -0.030
Marry Victim 1 5 2907 3.02 1.43 1433 3.05 1.44 1473 2.99 1.41 0.217 0.153
Prop. Sociolegal Punishment
Signal to Authorities 1 5 3216 4.11 1.10 1595 4.12 1.11 1620 4.11 1.10 0.887 -0.129
Signal to the Police 1 5 3197 3.98 1.22 1586 3.98 1.21 1610 3.97 1.22 0.733 -0.127
Punishment Likelihood
Authorities will Punish 1 5 3244 3.89 1.13 1607 3.96 1.12 1636 3.83 1.15 0.002 0.192
Police will Punish 1 5 3213 3.77 1.13 1594 3.82 1.12 1618 3.73 1.14 0.031 0.046
greater likelihood of punishment by traditional authorities and police than men.
The intracluster correlation coefficients for the proportion of people that would make the
perpetrator leave the village, and the proportion that would laugh are all very low, less than
0.1. This suggests that people make different estimations of how their communities treat
perpetrators of these crimes. Estimations could instead depend strongly on an individual’s
reference group of friends or an individual’s own personal attitudes. There is a moderate
level of intracluster correlation within villages for signaling to authorities suggesting that
signaling is more of a shared quality at the village level than some other measures. As one
would expect, since referring to similar authorities, the intracluster correlation (ICC) for the
likelihood traditional authorities would punish is high, above .2.
2.8 Intra-village Crime
Do instances of within-village rape - rape perpetrated by villagers against villagers - happen
here? To what extent do people’s responses to hypothetical questions about rape by fellow
villagers and punishment of fellow villagers have basis in reality?
First, I ask about the last time a rape incident like this happened in the respondent’s
village. Across the 700 villages in the sample, randomly sampled villagers within 60 percent

















Figure 2.2: Most recent episode of local rape in village
concentrated in the 5 years prior to the survey. Sixty-five percent of 413 villages reporting
such an incident also report that it occurred betwen 2010 and 2015. Figure 2.2 describes the
number of villages with the most recent episode of local rape in that year as derived from
villager accounts.
I followed up with a question about whether and how village authorities (either the police
or traditional leaders) punished the crime that respondents recalled. Enumerators coded the
villager accounts of punishment in terms of several categories. Figure 2.3 describes villager
accounts of punishment for crimes that occurred in the past.
Most villagers providing accounts of past punishment recall authorities implementing a
prison sentence, but the second category is a much lighter reaction: a reprimand. People also
recall perpetrators of rape being hurt by authorities, being expelled by authorities, death
at the hands of authorities, and receiving no punishment. There is large variation to be
explained, variation which will be explored in later chapters.
In order to further motivate my focus on intra-village crime (again, with the focus in this




















Figure 2.3: Proportion of Respondents Reporting Punishments by Traditional Authorities
Table 2.4: Likely Perpetrator of Rape in Village by Group-type
MIN MAX N MEAN SD N.F. MEAN.F. SD.F. N.M. MEAN.M. SD.M. P.DIFF. ICC
By Villager 1 4 3014 1.85 0.91 1498 1.83 0.91 1515 1.87 0.91 0.209 0.245
By Outsider 1 4 3002 2.16 0.97 1484 2.15 0.98 1518 2.16 0.97 0.797 -0.005
By Armed Group 1 4 2895 2.32 1.05 1421 2.31 1.06 1473 2.33 1.05 0.654 0.036
By Excombatant 1 4 2879 2.36 1.06 1416 2.37 1.07 1462 2.34 1.05 0.499 0.000
perpetrate rape. If someone were a victim of rape in your village, what is the probability
that the person that committed the rape was a man from the village, from outside of the
village, an armed group or military member, or a former armed group or military member.
Table 2.4 describes the mean likelihood estimation for each perpetrator type.
Table 2.4 reveals that the probability that the perpetrator is an outsider, an armed group
member, or an excombatant (asked as non-exclusive categories) is indeed higher than the
probability that the perpetrator of the rape is by a village insider. However, the difference is
not as large as one would expect. The ICC for this response is also quite high, with a value
of .245. This means that people in particular villages are reporting reasonably consistent
responses about fellow villagers.
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2.9 Conclusion
Progress for women at the state level often fails to translate into improvements in the daily
lives of women (Berry 2015). This dissertation brings a focus to local crime and social
processes in order to examine how armed conflict continues to shape the everyday lives of
women. The local punishment processes described here highlight potential pathways by
which perpetrators might be punished. Individual preferences for punishment held among
villagers also influence whether and how perpetrators will be punished. These processes and
preferences describe the social context of violence agianst women, the focus of this study.
Social sanctioning is also relevant outside of DR Congo and to crimes more broadly.
Understanding the nuances of the context allows for its components - such as understandings
of punishment in terms of severity - to be developed in later chapters in a way that allows
for generalizable theory.
Armed conflict, as defined here, also takes on a distinctly local dimension. This chapter
has described the shared nature of violence that communities experience at the hands of
armed groups. While the nature of violence in DR Congo may be unique and is certainly
discussed as such in existing literature, exposure to this violence at the micro-level is largely
comparable within this case.
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Chapter 3: Preferences for Punishment
3.1 Introduction
How does armed conflict shape the security environment for women? One stream of literature
suggests that women are empowered to better defend themselves and provide their own
security after armed conflict (Tripp 2015; Mageza-Barthel 2015). Another stream of literature
suggests that women are disempowered during conflict and subject to increased threats in its
aftermath (Haglund and Richards 2017). One way that armed conflict may affect women’s
security is by affecting preferences for punishing crimes against them. This chapter derives
and assesses theories from established literatures by looking at the effects of armed conflict
on preferences for punishing rape, domestic violence and stealing in eastern DR Congo.
While social sanctioning inevitably includes both positive and negative sanctioning
behaviors, this chapter examines preferences for social sanctioning of crimes through the focus
on preferences for punishment. People may also hold preferences to respond to perpetrators
with social rewards. I set aside such preferences for social rewards to limit the scope of the
study and learn about armed conflict’s effects on preferences for punishment.
Because preferences for punishment denote levels of disapproval for harmful acts, they
reflect the broad, elusive repertoires of violence and discrimination that women experience
in their day-to-day lives. Preferences for punishing violence against women are, essentially,
attitudes. These attitudes enter into the social sanctioning framework for understanding
violence against women in two ways. First, attitudes represent an individual’s predilection to
perpetrate at a given point in time. One is not likely to prefer to punish a crime that one
would also prefer to engage in. Thus the distribution of preferences for punishing violence
against women are likely related to levels of violence against women.
Second, preferences for punishment are the first step in the social sanctioning process.
For an individual to engage in social sanctioning, that individual must first believe that the
particular crime deserves punishment. Only given a preference in favor of social punishment
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will people begin to weigh the social costs and benefits (e.g. group dynamics explored in
Chapter 5) of engaging in that punishment. In this way, preferences for punishment indicate
an individual’s willingness to either punish a crime themselves or to facilitate punishment by
reporting the crime to others such that they might carry out punishment.
Studies of criminal law and its effectiveness for deterring violent crime describe two
important dimensions of punishment: certainty and severity (Gibbs 1968; Gray and Martin
1969). Certainty reflects whether the prescribed punishment will be carried out. Severity
reflects the extent to which a punishment brings about inconvenience, suffering or harm to a
perpetrator’s life.51 Yet, in the social sanctioning framework, these dimensions are intertwined.
How severely people prefer to punish crimes influences whether and how punishment occurs.
In this study, I examine preferences for punishment in terms of severity. How severely
should rape, domestic violence, and stealing be punished? How much harm is reasonable to
impose on a perpetrator for harms caused? By examining punishments that are commonly
applied in the context of eastern DR Congo in terms of severity, this study can better speak
to armed conflict’s effects on punishment across different legal and social contexts.
This chapter derives three broad hypotheses from the prominent literature relevant to the
social context of violence against women in the aftermath of war. I describe the empirical
implications of theories about women’s empowerment, backlash, and violent masculinities for
how severely people prefer to punish rape, domestic violence and stealing. I then examine
the implications of these theories of armed conflict’s effects using both quantitative and
qualitative methods.
The quantitative analysis uses a matched pair design to help causally identify armed
conflict’s effects and improve upon its measurement in previous studies. This chapter also
presents the original protocols that I have developed for measuring people’s preferences for
punishing local crimes using hypothetical narratives in the context of focus groups. This
51My focus on severity in terms of harm does not mean that punishment serves the goal of bringing harm.
It may instead be undertaken to foster community security.
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method allows for the close integration of quantitative and qualitative data.
Analyses of these original data from 80 focus groups held across 20 villages in eastern DR
Congo alongside interviews with village chiefs in each village reveal no support for prominent
theories about women’s empowerment, backlash or violent masculinities. As a result, I use
the integrated, mixed-method nature of the study to probe the data for insights into armed
conflict’s effects. The insights from this analysis motivate the theory of protective masculine
norms that I present in the following chapter.
3.2 Literature and Theory
Scholars often theorize about rape and domestic violence together - as forms of violence
against women affected by similar determinants such as gender attitudes and the acceptability
of violence. Despite this, few studies examine data related to non-intimate partner rape and
domestic violence together.
At the same time, scholars often consider crimes against women such as rape and domestic
violence as distinct from crimes that are not targeted at women because of their gender. For
example, while domestic violence is thought of as “a concrete manifestation of inequality
between the sexes” (Garcia-Moreno et al. 2005), stealing is not thought about in the same
way. This conception leads scholars to specialize in violence against women research without
attention to other crimes.
But, a singular focus on violence against women inhibits learning about what uniquely
affects violence against women versus what affects violence against women similarly to other
crimes. This has important implications for theory. If armed conflict affects violence against
women similarly to other crimes, then the gender-specific nature of existing hypotheses needs
to be reassessed.
To address this limitation in the literature, I derive hypotheses for how armed conflict
may affect rape and domestic violence as forms of violence against women and stealing as a
third comparative crime. The comparison with stealing examines similarity and difference
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between a more gender-specific and less gender-specific crime in terms of who is directly
harmed. Stealing, particularly as measured in this study, directly harms both men and
women. Stealing also offers a comparison with non-violent crime - even though people often
perceive it as such.
I outline implications of several theories from the prominent literature: theories about
what happens when women are empowered after war, how society reacts to their empowerment
and the repercussions of violent masculinities developed over the course of the war.
3.2.1 Women’s Empowerment
Scholars have described the gendered social processes of civil war and suggested that -
counterintuitively - women may be more empowered after armed conflict than they were
before (Wood 2008; Tripp 2015; Hughes 2009). Empowerment arguments are based on the
idea that armed conflict generates a structural change that, in turn, leads to a change in
norms. Men tend to hold dominant positions across most societies and to engage in most of
the fighting associated with war. When men go off to war, women step in to fill gaps, taking
on new positions previously afforded only to men.52
The perspective that war brings opportunities to women emerged from the historical
literature describing World War II as a pivotal event that increased United States female
labor force participation (Goldin 1991; Schweitzer 1980; Clark and Summers 1982). While
centering less on the formal economy, a similar logic appears in descriptions of women’s roles
in contemporary wars. Conflict scholars describe how women are given more freedom of
movement than their male counterparts during wartime due to assumptions that women are
civilians while men play combatant roles (Carpenter 2005).53 The greater space and demand
for women’s contributions outside the home leads women to take on more daily tasks external
to the household that can persist in the aftermath of war.
52Men also die at higher rates than women during war so may not return to refill social or economic
positions (Hughes 2009).
53This widespread assumption can give women tactical advantages as well (Bloom 2012).
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Women not only contribute on the homefront, but also join armed groups and contribute
directly to fighting (Wood and Thomas 2017; Cohen 2013b). Their wartime involvement
challenges gendered assumptions about women’s ability to contribute to political and military
spheres (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007). In doing so, it disrupts patriarchy and can inspire an
emergent feminist agenda and lead women to participate in civil society (Cockburn 2010;
Tripp 2015).
Whether contributing to their societies at home or through direct involvement in war
fighting - during war - women have new and different opportunities. And, through their
newfound positions, women can garner respect for their actions and contributions.54
As people begin to hold women in more esteem and as women become better placed in
society, both men and women will better regulate the violence perpetrated against women.
This logic has roots in the literature relating inequality to violence - where people are more
likely to consider and accept violence against others when those others are lesser or less
human (MacKinnon 2007). When women are held in higher esteem, their claims of violence
will be heard and prosecuted more seriously. For example, when women report violence that
they experience to the police, the police will be more likely to file a report. When women
are better placed in society, women will have more power to identify, punish, and ultimately
deter perpetrators. This is one logic driving arguments for increased women’s security force
participation. Taken together, after war - when women are better placed and better esteemed
- women should find themselves in a community that increasingly chooses to punish crimes
against women such as rape and domestic violence.
Most of the scholarship on women’s empowerment after armed conflict has examined
women’s political descriptive representation (Hughes and Tripp 2015; Mageza-Barthel 2015;
Tripp 2015). This research shows substantial political gains for women in the wake of armed
54Women’s performance during wartime may transcend their return to work at home in the aftermath
of war. From a norms-based framework, new understandings of women’s abilities may lead them to be
more highly regarded and better treated based on their past rather than present contributions. Norms of
employment may not have changed in the long-run, but esteem of women may change independently.
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conflict across Africa, but it remains unclear whether descriptive representation reflects (or
translates to) women’s empowerment (Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers 2007).
Empirical studies are beginning to examine empowerment beyond descriptive representa-
tion. Garcia-Ponce (2017) uses a difference-in-difference design to show that municipalities
exposed to insurgency in Peru have more female participation after the imposition of a
national gender quota. Lazarev (2018) shows that women in communities exposed to conflict
in Chechnya bring more cases to legal institutions that favor women, suggesting that this
happens because male elder networks were destroyed by war. These studies show that armed
conflict shapes women’s engagement with the state apparatus, but cannot disentangle war’s
effects on local institutions from empowerment outcomes.
Two new studies examine women’s empowerment more explicitly. Analysis of wars between
1900 and 2015 by Webster et al (2019) demonstrates empirical support for the hypothesis
that armed conflict empowers women by changing their social roles. During and after war, a
compiled measure of women’s political power, social influence, and civil liberties is higher
than in other periods. Emerging work by Huber (2019) examines gender equitable attitudes
in Uganda and suggests that conflict’s efffects are conditional on aid and gender. Men in
areas exposed to conflict hold more gender equitable attitudes if they have also been exposed
to international aid. Women, however, hold more gender equitable views with or without the
presence of international aid.
Thus, there is an emerging evidence base for the idea that armed conflict can empower
women. But, whether armed conflict empowers women in its wake may depend on features
of the conflict. For example, if women become systematic targets of violence such as rape
during armed conflict, they may be further sheltered and removed from the public sphere
rather than afforded new opportunities. If women remain sidelined on the home front as
well as within armed groups during war, then they will not be presented with the same
opportunities to bring about the improved positions and community respect that are integral
to empowerment (Karim and Beardsley 2017).
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In sum, empowerment arguments suggest that people will punish violence against women
more in the wake of armed conflict because of the new roles and esteem afforded to women
by community members. As forms of violence largely targeted at women, rape and domestic
violence will thus be punished more in places exposed to recent armed conflict.
Yet, the same prediction will not apply to other crimes, because punishment preferences
for crimes such as stealing are not related to women’s esteem in the same way. Therefore,
armed conflict should have a unique effect on preferences for punishing crimes against women.
H1: Armed conflict increases the severity of punishment preferences for crimes
against women (rape and domestic violence), but not other crimes (stealing).
3.2.2 Backlash
The empowerment hypothesis is grounded in the idea that violence against women is a
consequence of women’s subordination; the theory describes how increased equality between
men and women leads to less violence against women (Whaley and Messner 2002). Backlash
theory builds on women’s empowerment, but emphasizes that violence against women is a
means that men use to enforce women’s subordination (Brownmiller 2013). If violence against
women is a means to subordinate women rather than a consequence of their subordination,
women’s empowerment will lead to more violence against women as community members react
against the closing gender gap. The relevance of empowerment or backlash to explaining the
effects of armed conflict ultimately depends on the purposes of violence in gender relations.
In large, backlash theory suggests that men and women will be differently affected by
changes to women’s status and esteem associated with war. For women, the implications
are consistent with empowerment theory. When their positions are improved, women will
have less tolerance for the violence perpetrated against them and will prefer to punish rape
and domestic violence more severely. Men, however, perceive women’s improved status as a
threat. As a result, they will accept more violence against women and punish perpetrators
less severely. As in empowerment theory, backlash has no implications for crimes that are
65
not linked to women’s status and esteem.
H2: Armed conflict increases the severity of punishment preferences among women
and decreases the severity of punishment preferences among men for crimes against
women (rape and domestic violence), but not other crimes (stealing).
The centerpiece of backlash theory is about men’s responses and how they tend to
differ from women’s. There may be some variation, however, in how women respond to
empowerment in the framework of backlash. As part of the social structure, some women
may support behaviors that contribute to their subordination. If a subset of women react to
empowerment by tolerating more violence against women as men do, the study may find null
effects among women for rape and domestic violence as is predicted for stealing.
3.2.3 Violent Masculinities
Feminist scholars argue that masculinities associated with preparing for and engaging in war
militarizes the lives of ordinary people and creates normative conditions for rape (Zurbriggen
2010; Enloe 1989; Enloe 2000).55 Harmful masculinities that emerge in relation to conflict
processes include idealizing violent warrior-like behavior and devaluing women and feminine
qualities such as emotions (Morris 1996; Zurbriggen 2010; Goldstein 2003; Whitworth 2004).56
Behind a theory of violent masculinities is the assumption that women are innately
peaceful caregivers who are averse to violence (or are socially constructed to this role and
aversion). However, men are not wholly violent either. As argued by scholars such as
Grossman (2014) and Hoover-Green (2016), men must be encouraged to overcome a human
aversion to violence in order to facilitate their engagement in warfighting and effectiveness on
the battlefield. In order to facilitate war fighting, societies thus encourage people that engage
55I define “masculinities”, which I use interchangeably with the term “masculine norms”, as ideas about
how people in a community believe a man should behave.
56Note that this set of theories directly contradicts the framework of empowerment. For example, under
threat of war citizens will see female leaders as less capable, with negative effects on female representation
(Schroeder 2017).
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or might engage in war to accept - even revere - violence (or particular forms of violence)
towards outgroups.
At the same time, societies discourage qualities - feminine qualities - that may impede
the conduct of this violence. Research has shown that the process of bonding and preparing
for war among male groups leads its members to denigrate feminine qualities and refer to
outgroups in feminine terms (Morris 1996).
When women and feminine qualities are devalued, this can lead crimes against women to
be tolerated or ignored. At the same time, revering violent male qualities can lend support for
men’s perpetration of what people deem to be masculine crimes such as rape and domestic
violence. This leads to a more permissive and even encouraging environment for violence
against women. Thus, there will be less punishment for crimes against women in communities
exposed to armed conflict.
The literature on harmful masculinities and war is concerned with masculinities that
emerge in preparation for and during war; whereas, the concern of this study is war’s aftermath.
Yet, wartime theories are relevant, because wartime changes in attitudes and norms can extend
into the post conflict space. Empirical research has shown that discriminatory attitudes
increase after exposure to armed combat (Grossman, Manekin, and Miodownik 2015); and
community trust is higher after war (Gilligan, Pasquale, and Samii 2014).
In sum, theories of violent masculine norms are intimately tied with how highly women
are valued and what forms of violent masculinities are revered. Because harmful masculinities
devalue women and feminine qualities while encouraging violent behavior among men, armed
conflict will decrease sanctioning of crimes against women in its aftermath. However, theories
of harmful masculinities have no predictions for sanctioning of other crimes.
H3: Armed conflict decreases the severity of punishment preferences for crimes
against women (rape and domestic violence), but not other crimes (stealing).
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Table 3.1: Summary of Three Hypotheses
1. Women’s Empowerment
Rape Domestic Violence Stealing
Men + + no effect
Women + + no effect
2. Backlash
Rape Domestic Violence Stealing
Men - - no effect
Women + + no effect
3. Violent Masculine Norms
Rape Domestic Violence Stealing
Men - - no effect
Women - - no effect
There are also channels by which armed conflict may increase or decrease sanctioning
for crimes more broadly (e.g. rape, domestic violence and stealing). For example, exposure
to armed conflict may lead to normalization and greater tolerance of rape and stealing as
individuals continue to mimic and tolerate behaviors that took place (and were not punished)
during the war (Boesten 2010). In this example, preferences for punishment change as a
result of armed conflict but are not specific to crimes against women since not explicitly tied
to women’s value.
Other theories have implications for sanctioning, but less relevance to changes in preferences
for sanctioning. For example, armed conflict may lead to institutional breakdown and
decreased potential for individuals to sanction or report perpetrators (Haglund and Richards
2017). This might decrease the ability to punish, but not because of preference change. Such
theories are, therefore, not the focus here.
In sum, as depicted in Table 3.1, each hypothesis derived from the established literatures
suggests that armed conflict will affect preferences for punishing rape and domestic violence
in the same direction: either increasing or decreasing together. In addition, armed conflict
should not have similar effects on preferences for punishing stealing.
I examine the evidence for each of the three theories in eastern DR Congo, a central
case for understanding the nature of armed conflict and its effects on women. Findings
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that empowerment, backlash or violent norms fails to explain armed conflict’s effects in this
context at this point in time will not have implications for the theories’ applications beyond
eastern DR Congo. However, failure of prominent theories to account for the findings will
demonstrate a need to build a new theory to explain this pivotal case while raising questions
for future empirical studies in both DR Congo and beyond.
3.3 Armed Conflict (Independent Variable)
To find out about how armed conflict affects preferences for punishing rape, domestic violence,
and stealing, I designed and implemented a data collection effort in South Kivu, DR Congo.
In this section, I describe the measurement of my independent variable and the survey on
which it is based. I then turn to my identification strategy which draws upon unique data
from a large-scale panel survey implemented in 2011 and 2015.57
3.3.1 Measurement
Armed conflict is a highly bundled treatment. It can be defined by location, by community
involvement, or by its looming threat. Reflecting my focus on community experiences and
community effects, I examine how recent village exposure to armed conflict impacts preferences
for punishing crimes by comparing villages that have and have not been recently exposed. By
this definition, armed conflict is the space in between episodes of local violence perpetrated
by armed groups.
A local definition of armed conflict facilitates not only learning about the immediate
aftermath of local violence, but also causally identifying the effects of armed conflict through
a matched pair design. In the experimental framework, my treatment is the effect of an
additional episode of armed violence within a community within the past 5 years.
I code community armed conflict exposure based on a survey administered to village
57The accounts of two waves of the survey are described in full in Humphreys, Wan der Windt, and de la
Sierra (Forthcoming) and Laudati, Mvukiyehe, and Van der Windt (2016).
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leaders in 2015. Village leaders were asked the year that the last episode of armed conflict
occurred in their village. If the leader notes a year of 2011 or after, the village is considered
to have been exposed to armed conflict. This measure takes local understandings of what
constitutes armed conflict at face value and removes error from imposing exposure based on
proximity to a reported event.
I validate this survey measure of armed conflict by conducting interviews with chiefs
from the villages in my final sample. When asked to describe recent events in their villages,
chiefs of villages that were exposed to armed conflict tended to describe recent events in their
village as pillage by armed groups, burning of houses by armed groups, and displacement
of the population. They speak of activity by armed groups and the military. Meanwhile,
chiefs from non-conflict villages tend to talk about more general insecurity, for example from
ongoing theft or murders by people that have arms (but not “armed groups” per se). Thus
the qualitative data confirms that conflict villages have been exposed to episodes distinct
from non-conflict villages - ultimately validating the survey measure.
Not only does the village chief recount the event on his own terms, but within four focus
groups conducted in each of the 20 villages (that I will describe in Chapter 4), participants
also recount the episode described by the village chief. The measure thus captures the
collective experience and collective memory of armed conflict and facilitates the interpretation
of the survey measure in context.
3.3.2 Strategy of Causal Inference
The effects of armed conflict are difficult to causally identify because so many factors can
be both the cause and consequence of exposure (Blattman and Miguel 2010). For example,
armed groups may choose to undertake operations where there is already little security,
little community cohesion or few weapons. Conversely, armed groups may target wealthy
villages when their goal is to amass goods. Factors that predict why armed conflict happens
in a village may lead researchers to attribute statistical differences between conflict and
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non-conflict villages to the effects of armed conflict when they are, in fact, due to the drivers
of armed conflict itself.
To account for such dissimilarities between conflict and nonconflict villages, I use a
matched pair design, creating a set of matched pairs of villages that were most alike based
on data collected in 2011 - prior to recent exposure to armed conflict. I then compare like
villages (matched pairs) to estimate the effect of armed conflict in order to better attribute
statistical findings to armed conflict.
Within two territories of South Kivu, DR Congo,58 I pair each village that has been exposed
to recent armed conflict with a similar village that has not been exposed to recent armed
conflict using a matching algorithm. The matching algorithm specifies a set of characteristics
relevant to both armed conflict and punishment preferences for violence against women.
These measures draw from household surveys and leader surveys administered in 2011 as
part of one of the largest community development programs in eastern DR Congo, notable
for its breadth and inclusion of hard to reach villages. Since research efforts (particularly
focus groups) tend to cluster near a few large cities, this study comes closer to the actual
distribution of villages in DR Congo.59
The following characteristics are summarized at the village level and employed in the
matching specification. Several village-level variables relate to the treatment of women:
attitudes towards women’s equality, attitudes towards mistreatment of women, and levels
of domestic and sexual violence (as measured in list experiments). These measures help to
account for how gender inequality and gender-related violence might predict armed conflict
exposure as well as social sanctioning.60 Community trust and ethnic fractionalization
may indicate pre-existing divisions within communities that increase the likelihood of war
58See Appendix A.2.1 for details on selecting Walungu and Uvira, territories with higher levels of recent
armed conflict.
59Detailed information on this survey and the sample can be found in Humphreys et al. (Forthcoming).
60Empirical analyses have suggested that gender inequality and conflict exposure are statistically related
(Caprioli 2005).
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exposure and decrease the potential for social sanctioning. I construct local measures of ethnic
fractionalization based on local demographic data from the 2011 survey, a local measure
based on the extent to which community members trust coethnics, and a comparison measure
of trust in non-coethnics. International development programming, widespread in eastern
DR Congo, may affect both whether a community is targeted and how communities prefer
to punish crimes.61 I include an indicator for whether the village did or did not receive the
IRC’s (randomly implemented) community driven development program in the matching
algorithm. Finally, I incorporate a set of variables that the literature establishes as important
predictors of armed conflict such as a locally relevant measures of wealth, security perceptions,
exposure to previous war, and proximity to conflict-relevant geography such as mines, forests
and mountains.62
Covariate balance is achieved or substantively improved along many important dimensions:
in terms of violence against women, attitudes towards women, community trust, and several
geographic variables. I retain all variables in the original matching algorithm for transparency.
Detailed description of the algorithm specification and balance on the full sample are included
in Appendix A.2.3.
After forming the full set of matched pairs, I randomly select 5 pairs (equivalent to 10
villages) from each territory to implement the measurement of my outcome variable. I use
this subset in all subsequent analyses.63 This random selection allows me to generalize my
findings to all conflict villages and their pairs in the larger survey sample within the two
territories.
61For example, if armed groups know the IRC is working in a village, more repercussions may result from
harmful attacks.
62See Appendix A.2.2 for further details on the matching procedure.
63One village was replaced in the final sample due to security conditions. Appendix A.2.4 includes details
and Appendix A.5.3 includes analyses that account for attrition.
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3.4 Private Preferences for Punishment (Dependent Variable)
Data on the outcome variable, preferences for punishing crimes, are drawn from a series of
80 focus groups conducted in August 2016.64 Four focus groups took place in each of the
20 selected village: 2 focus groups with women and 2 with men.65 In total, this research
component involved over 960 focus group participants.
I use focus groups to measure preferences for punishing crimes for two reasons. First, the
focus group setting allows for the close integration of my quantitative measures of preferences
with qualitative data informed by the social context. This qualitative data becomes central to
the development of the theory of protective masculine norms.66 Second, as will be described
in detail in Chapter 5, I use the same focus group context to assess alternative pathways by
which armed conflict may affect social sanctioning.
3.4.1 Participants
Between 11 and 16 participants attended each focus group. Focus group leaders worked with
village chiefs to create highly inclusive lists of potential participants drawing from lower and
upper strata of society.67 Tables 3.2 and 3.3 present summary statistics on characteristics of
the participants.68
An average female participant is 34 years old with 1 year of schooling,69 has lived in the
64While 80 focus groups were planned, one focus group did not take place since many men were working
outside of the village on the day that research took place.
65Male and female focus groups were held separately to reflect ethical standards for research on violence
against women, with male enumerators leading male focus groups and female enumerators leading female
focus groups.
66Importantly, the quantitative measures of preferences for punishment are taken in private with minimal
influence from the social setting of the focus group.
67Participants were not recruited randomly from the population. One threat to causal inference stems
from the potential that chiefs in conflict and non-conflict communities selected different types of participants
because of armed conflict. See Appendix A.3 for details on recruitment and Appendix A.3.4 for balance in
participant characteristics across conflict and non-conflict villages. I use models with individual-level control
variables to account for nonrandom selection.
68See Appendix A.3.3 for data pooling men and women.
69Education is coded based on the French education system levels 1-3 (differentiated by 1, 1.1, 1.2. . . 1.6
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Table 3.2: Summary Characteristics of Female Participants
MIN MAX N MEAN SD ICC
Age 18 90 537 34 13.61 0.10
Education 0 3 537 1 0.97 0.10
Years in Village (Categorical) 1 4 537 3 0.93 0.12
Frequency Meeting Others 1 4 537 3 0.97 0.27
Homogeneous Subgroup 0 1 537 1 0.48 0.04
Exp. Armed Violence (Ever) 0 1 537 1 0.31 0.09
Exp. Armed Violence (last 5yrs) 0 1 537 0 0.50 0.40
Table 3.3: Summary Characteristics of Female Participants
MIN MAX N MEAN SD ICC
Age 18 100 458 40 17.01 0.10
Education 0 3 457 2 0.96 0.09
Years in Village (Categorical) 1 4 458 4 0.74 0.16
Frequency Meeting Others 2 4 458 4 0.62 0.46
Homogeneous Subgroup 0 1 458 1 0.50 -0.01
Exp. Armed Violence (Ever) 0 1 458 0 0.50 0.24
Exp. Armed Violence (last 5yrs) 0 1 458 0 0.39 0.23
village around 10 years,70 and meets with others in the community most days of the week.71
Eighty-nine percent of women report having ever seen violence by armed groups in their
village while 50 percent report seeing violence in their village in the past 5 years.72 Male
focus group participants have a slightly higher mean age of 40 years. Men also have higher
levels of education, meet others slightly more frequently, and have lived in villages much
longer than women (averaging almost 20 years). Fifty percent of male participants report
ever having seen violence in their village while 19 percent report seeing violence in their
etc), with 0 indicating no education.
70Years in village is coded categorically, where 1=less than 5 years, 2=between 5 and 10 years, 3=between
10 and 20 years, and 4=more than 20 years or born here.
71Frequency of meeting others is coded as 4=each day, 3=several days per week, 2=several days per month,
1=less.
72Individual measures of violence are not used in analyses.
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village in the past 5 years.73
Both male and female focus group participants are mostly farmers. Some, however,
identify as traders, teachers, nurses, students, and drivers. Around 20 men and 20 women
self-identify as being out of work.
3.4.2 Measurement Design
To learn about preferences for punishing rape, domestic violence and stealing, I build focus
groups around hypothetical crime narratives that closely match the context. The hypothetical
approach helps to ensure the safety and well-being of subjects by mitigating potential for
trauma or stigma associated with recounting real events.74 The design directed conversation
away from the event described in the narrative itself and towards ways people prefer to punish
other community members for engaging in these crimes, emphasizing agency rather than
victimization. The hypothetical approach also provides two methodological advantages: (a)
holding variation in definitions and scenarios as constant as possible across villages and (b)
capturing preferences for sanctioning in non-event cases.
One crime narrative is about rape, another about domestic violence, and another about
stealing.75 Each is an example of actual crime under Congolese law.
Rape: A married man from the village was driven by his sentiments towards a
young woman. One day he is overcome by his passion, takes the young woman
from the field, and rapes her. She is hurt and has to go to the hospital. Her
mother and father are upset.
Domestic Violence: A man from the village returns after being away for his
job. Now, this man hits her often. Yesterday, she left the house without telling
73Appendix A.3.3 includes statistical tests of differences between women and men.
74Ethical protocols are summarized in Appendix A.3.1.
75In the few focus groups that enumerators presented the crimes in an order other than the randomization,
the order that was actually implemented is coded.
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Figure 3.1: Crimes
him and he hurt her very badly when he found out. She is in the hospital. Her
mother and father are upset about her treatment.
Stealing: A man had two goats that he had been saving to give as a gift for his
son’s marriage. But, a man from the village steals the two goats. The man who
steals the goats uses one goat to feed his family and the other to pay a debt that
he owes to another man. The goats are now gone. The family that lost the goats
is upset.
I commissioned a local artist of Bukavu, South Kivu to create the illustrations based on
the narratives. The illustrations were presented along with each crime to further concentrate
the discussion and decrease definitional variation (Figure 3.1).
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There are several motivations for the narrative designs. First, perpetrators are always men
from the village, because this study means to capture how armed conflict affects preferences
for punishing everyday crime rather than crimes perpetrated by armed groups as part of the
conflict. This component of the study is key to learning about how armed group violence -
violence by outsiders - affects internal community dynamics. This means that any effects that
I find are not due to insider-outsider distinctions. The focus on married male perpetrators
also mitigates the possibility that populations would excuse this behavior as coming from a
misdirected and disadvantaged youth.
Second, the crimes of rape and stealing are aligned to be comparable in local monetary
value. For stealing, two goats is a low, but sometimes accepted, bride price to give to a
groom’s parents. Two goats is also a low amount that parents might demand if their daughter
has been raped. A crime that results in the loss of two goats and a crime that results in the
loss of a daughter (to rape) can lead to similar compensations.
Finally, the injured women in the rape and domestic violence narratives both end up in
the hospital; and, the mother and father bring forward the complaints. The parallel outcomes
and complainants make the narratives on violence against women comparable.
Focus group leaders describe five punishment options: (1) counseled by a fellow villager,
(2) told to pay a sum to the victim by the chief of the village, (3) expelled from the village,
(4) sentenced to prison for 20 years, or (5) physically beaten to near death. Participants
circle their preferred punishment (Figure 3.2) for each of the three crimes.76
The five punishment options serve as examples of true punishments available in this
context. As described in the previous chapter, randomly sampled respondents to a large
scale survey report that these punishments have been implemented in their communities. In
interviews within these communities, chiefs and elders also describe many of these punishment
76Participants choose their single most ideal choice. To ensure privacy, participants are asked to fold their
response card and not to show their responses to other members of the focus group or to the enumerator.
The illustrations, drawn by the same artist in Bukavu, South Kivu, also helped to facilitate the inclusion of




The punishment options are constructed and ordered to reflect punishment severity.
Changes to severity of preferences rather than a focus on specifics about punishment enhances
the generalizability of these findings to other contexts.77 Yet, because of the importance of
the ordinal severity scale, I also wanted to validate this ordering as part of the study.
To this end, I asked focus group participants to rank the severity of the punishments in a
group exercise following the quantitative measurements. Figure 3.3 summarizes the mean
responses given in the 80 focus groups, with lines indicating standard errors of the means.78
Figure 3.3 shows that, on average, women believe that prison is a slightly more severe
punishment than beating. Men, however, believe that prison and beating are equally severe.79
In order to reflect perceived severity across the sample population, I collapse the outcome
measure to fall on a scale of 1 to 4 for all analyses, where the 4th level of the scale is equivalent
to choosing prison or beating until near death.
77See Appendix A.5.5 for analyses of dichotomized outcomes.
78The mean is calculated as the percent of 80 focus groups.























































Figure 3.4: Distribution of Private Punishment Preferences
3.4.3 Descriptive Sanctioning Data
Figure 3.4 depicts the distribution of preferences for punishing the three crimes in eastern DR
Congo, a set of preferences given scant attention and previously unknown to researchers.80
Across all participants, the modal categories for rape and stealing are the same. Most
participants select (4) prison or beating, the most severe punishment option, as their preferred
punishment. Domestic violence looks different with the least severe punishment, (1) counsel
80Distributions of raw responses are provided in Appendix A.4.1.
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by a fellow villager, as the modal level of punishment.81 This distribution is already suggestive
that people are thinking about the crimes of rape and stealing as being more similar than
rape and domestic violence.
Figure 3.4 shows consistency but not uniformity in preferences among both men and
women across the measures. For both domestic violence and stealing, mean punishment
preferences are statistically higher in severity among men. But there is no difference in
preferences between men and women when it comes to punishing rape.82 This convergence
could be due to ceiling effects and the widespread advocacy efforts in eastern DR Congo that
have been working to develop a more punitive environment for rape.
3.5 Results
How does community exposure to recent armed conflict affect preferences for sanctioning
rape, domestic violence, and stealing in eastern DR Congo? I use quantitative evidence to
establish armed conflict’s effects, describe how the results speak to the theoretical frameworks,
and then harness qualitative evidence to provide contextual support.
3.5.1 Quantitative Evidence
I estimate two fixed effects OLS regression models to examine the effects of armed conflict
on punishment preferences for each of the three separate crimes.83 I pool data from men
and women.84 The first model is a basic model that includes a control for whether or not
a respondent is female. The second is an interacted model that adds an interaction term
to test for whether armed conflict affects male and female preferences for punishing crimes
81Some villagers do not consider counsel by a fellow villager to be a form of punishment. But, this
underscores what the severity scale aims to capture: a range from very low or non-punishment to very severe
punishment.
82See Appendix A.4.3 for statistical tests of difference.
83I present OLS regressions for ease of interpretation. An ordered logit model is included in Appendix
A.5.4.
84Models disaggregated by gender are included in Appendix A.5.1.
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differently.
All models include individual level control variables.85 Education level proxies for an
individual’s wealth and social status. A categorical variable of the years an individual has
lived in the village controls for an individual’s integration within the community. I also
include a measure of the frequency that individuals engage with others to proxy for social
knowledge and social power. Finally, a homogeneity variable accounts for a design component
not analyzed in this study, which is whether an individual’s subgroup is homogeneous in
terms of education.86 I also include the order of the crime narrative associated with each
outcome (e.g. whether the narrative of rape was presented 1st, 2nd, or 3rd for preferences on
sanctioning rape etc.). To account for clustering within villages, standard errors are clustered
at the village level. I use pair fixed effects to implement the matched pair design.
Table 3.4 (Model 2) shows that community exposure to recent armed conflict increases
how severely men prefer to punish other men from their communities for perpetrating rape
(.448). Using OLS estimation, exposure to armed conflict is estimated to increase the severity
level of punishment from a mean of 2.4 to a mean of 2.8 among men. On a 4-point ordinal
scale, this is substantive and could translate into a 1-point change in severity.
Model 2 also reveals that armed conflict affects men’s and women’s preferences for
punishing rape differently. The interacted model for sanctioning rape (Model 2) shows that
armed conflict has a precisely estimated zero effect on women’s preferences (.448-.450=.002),
an effect which differs significantly and substantively from the estimated effect for men.
Failing to account for the gender difference leads to null results about the effects of armed
conflict in the basic model (Model 1).
Armed conflict’s effects on preferences for punishing stealing look similar to armed
conflict’s effects on preferences for punishing rape. Model 6 in Table 3.4 shows that armed
85I emphasize models with controls to help account for the nonrandom recruitment of focus group
participants. Fixed effects models without controls are consistent and provided in Appendix A.5.2.
86When dividing participants of a focus group into subgroups, enumerators formed some heterogeneous
and some homogeneous subgroups based on education level.
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Table 3.4: Private Preferences for Punishment (Pooled Data)
Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime
Rape Domestic Violence Stealing
Basic Interacted Basic Interacted Basic Interacted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Armed Conflict 0.205 0.448∗∗∗ −0.230∗∗ −0.191 0.209 0.356∗∗
(0.131) (0.133) (0.111) (0.215) (0.177) (0.176)
Armed Conflict * Female −0.450∗ −0.067 −0.260
(0.272) (0.249) (0.276)
Female 0.173 0.407∗∗ −0.321∗∗∗ −0.285∗ −0.199 −0.059
(0.146) (0.206) (0.120) (0.172) (0.139) (0.239)
Education 0.174∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ −0.058 −0.059 0.101∗∗ 0.099∗∗
(0.055) (0.055) (0.041) (0.040) (0.048) (0.047)
Frequency Meeting Others −0.014 −0.011 −0.015 −0.012 −0.091 −0.086
(0.072) (0.078) (0.066) (0.064) (0.087) (0.087)
Homogeneous Subgroup 0.070 0.081 −0.018 −0.016 −0.068 −0.065
(0.120) (0.123) (0.093) (0.092) (0.139) (0.140)
Years in Village −0.019 −0.012 −0.029 −0.028 −0.043 −0.039
(0.030) (0.031) (0.041) (0.042) (0.044) (0.045)
Narrative Order: Rape 0.177∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.069)
Narrative Order: DV 0.124 0.132
(0.102) (0.112)
Narrative Order: Stealing 0.169∗∗ 0.141
(0.085) (0.087)
Constant 2.472∗∗∗ 2.291∗∗∗ 2.688∗∗∗ 2.646∗∗∗ 3.270∗∗∗ 3.224∗∗∗
(0.455) (0.409) (0.269) (0.311) (0.405) (0.415)
PAIR Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 992 992 992 992 992 992
R2 0.112 0.121 0.069 0.069 0.057 0.059
Adjusted R2 0.098 0.105 0.053 0.053 0.042 0.043
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)
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conflict increases how severely men prefer to punish stealing (0.356). The estimated effect
on preferences among women is substantively less than the effect among men, though not
statistically different. However, alongside the basic model (Model 5), the interacted model
(Model 6) shows that it is important to account for male and female differences when
estimating armed conflict’s effects.87
In sum, the findings on rape and stealing outcomes are similar. Men prefer to punish rape
and stealing more when their communities have been exposed to armed conflict. Women’s
preferences for punishing rape and stealing are either less affected or not affected at all by
community exposure.
But the findings of armed conflict’s effect on preferences for punishing domestic violence
look very different than its effects on rape and stealing. Model 3 shows that armed conflict
decreases how severely both men and women prefer to punish domestic violence (-.230), so
conflict affects preferences for punishing domestic violence in the opposite direction from
rape and stealing. Model 4 shows that this effect does not vary by respondent gender.
Both men and women want to punish domestic violence less severely in communities
recently exposed to armed conflict. While men are given less free reign to perpetrate rape
or stealing against other community members in the aftermath of war, they are given even
more free reign to abuse their wives.
Returning to the four norms-based theoretical frameworks outlined in this paper, how do
the findings adjudicate between the theories in the case of eastern DR Congo?
Empowerment theories (H1) suggest that armed conflict should increase how severely
people prefer to punish rape and domestic violence, because these crimes are linked to
women’s status and esteem. If empowerment were well describing the effects of armed conflict
in DR Congo, the effects of armed conflict on rape would not be gendered. But armed conflict
increases how severely men prefer to punish rape while, for women, there are zero effects. In
87These pooled regression models do not account for how control variables might be functioning in
gender-specific ways. Results are largely consistent when disaggregating data by gender in Appendix A.5.1.
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addition, armed conflict has opposite effects on preferences for punishing domestic violence
than suggested by empowerment theory.
Backlash theories (H2) have a similar prediction to empowerment theories, but suggest
that men will respond negatively rather than positively to women’s improved status. Because
they feel threatened by the diminished gender gap, men will prefer to punish crimes against
women less in communities exposed to armed conflict. But, men prefer to punish rape
more in communities exposed to armed conflict - contrary to the theorized direction. I also
find similar effects for stealing, which should remain unaffected if backlash associated with
women’s increased status were driving the findings. Lastly, backlash theory fails to account
for why women prefer to punish domestic violence less after armed conflict. On each account,
backlash theory does not map onto the findings in this study.
Violent masculine norms theory (H3) suggests that armed conflict decreases how severely
people prefer to punish violence against women, because male violence becomes more greatly
revered while women and feminine qualities are devalued. But, like the previous theories,
violent masculine norms theory is not supported by the data. Instead of decreasing how
severely men and women prefer to punish rape and domestic violence, armed conflict increases
how severely men prefer to punish rape - opposite the direction suggested by the theory. A
theory of violent norms also fails to explain armed conflict’s effects on stealing. However,
violent masculinities theory is consistent with the findings on domestic violence.
DR Congo is also a case where many women have been subject to rape as part of the
armed conflict and where women have been minimally involved in fighting within armed
groups. As such, the conflict context makes DR Congo a less likely case where we would see
women become more empowered as a result of the war, so the findings against empowerment
theory are potentially less surprising in this case.
Yet, an important contribution that emerges from the empirics is that shocks such as
armed conflict can affect preferences for punishing rape and domestic violence in opposite
ways - even though they are both crimes against women. All good things do not always move
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together. Addressing rape in the aftermath of armed conflict will not necessarily translate
into reducing other forms of violence against women such as domestic violence.
3.5.2 Quantitative Insights
Theories of women’s empowerment also suggest that gender attitudes should improve in the
aftermath of war. The theory of women’s empowerment describes a process by which women
become more highly valued and esteemed as a result of their empowerment. The theory
that I derived extends this argument to describe implications for preferences for punishing
crimes against women. However, gender attitudes may or may not be related to preferences
for punishing crimes. If men choose to punish rape but continue to conceive of women as
their property, then empowerment has probably not occurred (Huber 2019, footnote 6). Does
armed conflict improve gender equitable attitudes in my sample of 20 villages in eastern DR
Congo?
Analyses of armed conflict’s effects on gender attitudes in the 20 matched pairs in this
study show that armed conflict’s effects on preferences for punishment are not the result of
women’s empowerment. My analysis draws from survey data gathered in the same 20 villages
as part of a survey in the World Bank’s evaluation of a program by the International Rescue
Committee (IRC). The survey draws from a random sample of 4 or 5 residents in each village.
The small sample of survey respondents within these 20 villages makes the power of the
models weak in comparison to my analyses of the focus group data.
First, correlations between gender attitudes and the proportion of the villagers that
accept wife-beating as an appropriate response to the standard range of DHS questions show
that acceptance of wife-beating and gender attitudes are positively correlated among men
(.45) with a p-value of .06, which approaches statistical significance in this small sample.
This means that villages with men that are more accepting of domestic violence also have
men with more gender equitable attitudes, which is not an expected relationship. Among
women, the village-level correlation is estimated in the negative direction, which is more
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consistent with expectations that more equitable gender attitudes lead to decreased tolerance
of violence (-.28), however the relationship is statistically insignificant with a p-value of .24.
Both directional relationships hold at the individual-levels as well.88
While there are many questions that these correlations raise about gender attitudes and
their relationship to violence, it is clear that gender attitudes, as measured here in this sample,
is not a strong proxy for the acceptability of violence.89
Second, as depicted in Table 3.5, regressions of gender attitudes on armed conflict,
respondent gender and their interaction (using the same matched pair design clustering
standard errors at the village level) fail to yield statistically significant results.
Table 3.5: Effects of armed conflict on gender attitudes
Gender Attitudes
(1) (2) (3)




Armed Conflict * Female −0.106
(0.325)
Constant 2.427∗∗∗ 2.507∗∗∗ 2.482∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.101) (0.120)
Observations 96 96 96
Adjusted R2 0.0001 0.002 −0.010
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Pair Fixed Effects (10 Pairs); SEs clustered at village level
Given the low power of the models, it is important to consider the magnitude of the
88However. women’s individual-level estimates approach statistical significance while men’s do not.
89Respondents were asked if they disagree, have no opinion, or agree with a statement that women should
have the same rights and responsibilities as men in society. The mean response of the entire sample was 2.23
on the scale from 1 to 3, thus there is a moderate level of gender equitable attitudes in eastern DR Congo as
measured in the survey.
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coefficients despite the null finding of statistical significance. The direction and magnitude
of the coefficients suggest that conflict, if anything, might improve gender attitudes among
men which is inconsistent with theories of backlash. At the same time, armed conflict has
indeterminate effects on gender attitudes among women, but could range from being less
positive (than the effects estimated for men) to worsening women’s gender equitable attitudes.
Taken together, the data fail to show clear support for backlash or empowerment.
The effects of armed conflict on gender attitudes, if anything, seem to be independent of
the effect of armed conflict on punishing these forms of violence against women - bolstering
the findings here that the empowerment and backlash channels are not driving the effects.
These findings also suggest a need to turn to specificities of punishment in the aftermath of
war rather than considering gender attitudes as a useful proxy.
3.5.3 Qualitative Evidence
The quantitative evidence fails to support theories of empowerment, backlash or violent
masculinities; but to what extent does the qualitative evidence converge with the findings? I
draw from closely integrated qualitative evidence collected from the same 20 villages. This
work includes focus group discussions that followed the quantitative measures as well as
semi-structured interviews with each village chief and a social worker from each village.90
The analysis seeks to gauge the theoretical plausibility of protective masculine norms by
exploring how people perceive each crime.
In this examination of how people perceive rape, domestic violence and stealing, I make
no claim about the source of these perceptions or that these perceptions are, at root, local.
Working in a post-colonial (or decolonizing) context with very high levels of advocacy around
the issue of violence against women, people’s understandings of rape and domestic violence
are undoubtedly shaped by outside actors.
An important empirical question for my analysis is whether outside actors are shaping
90The same crime narratives and illustrations focus and relate the responses.
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perceptions differently in conflict and non-conflict communities. In interviews, local female
advocacy workers from each of the 20 villages report between two and three advocacy
organizations working in each community - and within Walungu and within Uvira the active
organizations are reportedly the same. The widespread nature of advocacy across my sample
suggests that changes in perceptions from advocacy initiatives alone are not driving empirical
differences in preferences between conflict and non-conflict communities.
Do people describe rape, domestic violence, and stealing in ways consistent with empow-
erment, backlash or violent masculinities? Then, do discussions shed light on alternative
theories? I take the existence of the perceptions themselves, rather than their origins, as
relevant to understanding how armed conflict will shape punishment of rape, domestic violence
and stealing.
Perceptions of Domestic Violence
Domestic violence is a widespread behavior in eastern DR Congo and is considered a
legitimate tool by which men discipline or educate their wives. In the 20 villages where I
conducted focus groups, there is a 70 percent acceptance rate of wife beating.91 When asked
whether rape, domestic violence or stealing were least likely to be punished in their village,
95 percent of focus groups listed domestic violence.
Domestic violence is considered a private matter best dealt with by the couple and their
families. When village chiefs hear about domestic violence, it tends to be in their capacity
as fellow villagers rather than in an official capacity. In the rare event that a complaint
is brought to the chief, he will speak with the family, preferring to handle disagreements
between villagers locally rather than call upon a higher outside authority.
Villagers are unlikely to socially punish perpetrators of domestic violence, also viewing
91This statistic is drawn from the 2015 survey associated with the IRC evaluation and is calculated as
the unweighted mean of the village means. A respondent is coded as accepting domestic violence if he/she
agrees that it is acceptable for a man to hit his wife if she leaves without telling him, refuses sex, neglects the
children, burns the food, contradicts him, has relations with another man, takes contraception without his
knowledge, or drinks alcohol.
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it as a private matter. When female focus group participants were asked how they would
respond if their friend perpetrated domestic violence, one woman explained, “It is not our
business, I must continue to act as a friend because he is not my husband. It is his wife that
must handle this” (V1, FG1). Another woman described: “Here, we are not interested in
this, our husbands can hit us without worry” (V1, FG1). Still other women suggested that
there should be no punishment of domestic violence since the root cause of the incident could
not be known (V13, FG1).
Men also consider domestic violence to be a non-issue. Most said that they would continue
their friendship with someone that perpetrated domestic violence (V21, FG3). Some men
consider domestic violence an “accident”, so not something that warrants punishment. Others
suggest that domestic violence is caused by the actions of the wives that are being beaten,
rendering it inappropriate to punish the man for his action.
Some men, however, note a strategic dimension, noting that there is a risk to ending
friendships with perpetrators of domestic violence: “If not, we risk having no friends in
the village, because everyone perpetrates domestic violence in their households” (V1, FG4).
Men think about their relationships with other men in the community when considering
punishment. Thus there seems to be a strategic element to preferences for punishing domestic
violence that are not emphasized by theories of empowerment or violent masculine norms
theories. And, the theory of backlash suggests a different strategic logic - centered on keeping
women in subservient positions rather than thinking about men’s relationship with other
men.
Women also think strategically about punishing perpetrators of domestic violence. Women
note their dependence on others when thinking about punishing perpetrators of domestic
violence. One woman explained, “I cannot go to complain because if they take him to prison,
I will be left alone suffering with the children. I must forgive him” (V1, FG1). To punish a
perpetrator of domestic violence severely was to put an end to the family (V8, FG3). One
woman stated, “Even if my husband hit me each day, I would not bring it [to authorities] as
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a crime, because we are alone responsible for our acts. Even if he is at fault, I will forgive
him always because we are united for better or for worse” (V13, FG1). Informal discussions
also suggest that women have nowhere to turn if their husbands are taken away and that a
fine on one of them damages the lives of the entire family.
Interviews with female social workers from the village suggest that women see domestic
violence as part of their culture – passed down through many generations. People that I
interviewed were unwary when describing their own experiences of domestic violence (even
though no direct questions were asked). Domestic violence is repeatedly described as a
shameless custom in focus groups as well. When asked about whether domestic violence
happens in the village, men from one village laughed in unison, saying that “this habit rages
here” (V1, FG3).
Despite its widespread acceptance, perpetration of domestic violence does not elicit social
approval either - as one might expect from a theory of violent masculine norms or backlash.
Women said that eventually, a perpetrator of domestic violence risked losing the respect of
each of the women in the community (V21, FG1). Some suggested that women must consider
someone that perpetrates domestic violence to be a dangerous person. They would hope
their husbands would not befriend such a man for fear that their husbands would copy his
behavior (V21, FG1).The fact that domestic violence does not foster widespread respect,
gives less credence to theories such as violent masculine norms, which suggest that people
herald men that perpetrate violent masculine crimes like domestic violence and rape.
Focus group discussions suggested that neither men nor women consider domestic violence
to be a crime to guard against. In cases where participants describe domestic violence as a
problem, it is one relevant to the family but irrelevant to the community as a whole. It is a
private matter to be dealt with by the family.
Participants often stated explicitly that it should not be grouped with rape and stealing.
Those that did view domestic violence as an incident that should elicit a community response
viewed counsel as the only appropriate response: “This is the punishment” (V1, FG1). If
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there were any community intervention, one aid worker said that 100% of the male population
would support the man. Others suggested that villagers tried not to take sides, but instead
would advise the man to think about the needs of his wife and advise the woman to remember
that a woman can never be equal to a man.
This latter statement suggests that women’s empowerment and backlash theories could be
relevant in cases where women become empowered from war: people do think about domestic
disputes as stemming from uncharacteristic female behavior or women overstepping their
bounds. However, in the case of DR Congo, women’s status has not substantively improved
as a result of the war. Women are considered wholly unequal and often instigators of the
domestic violence against them.
Perceptions of Rape
Rape, however, is on the other end of the spectrum in terms of its severity as a crime and
its deserved punishment. While domestic violence is cited as least likely to be punished in 95
percent of focus groups, rape is listed as the most likely to be punished in 73 percent of focus
groups.92
Focus group participants describe rape as the most severe crime, completely destroying the
victim. Rape generates concern among villagers for several reasons. It could spread disease; it
fosters social stigma against the women; and it can leave women infertile or pregnant. In line
with other research in this same context, rape essentially lowers women’s value and reduces
their future life prospects (Kelly et al. 2011).
Participants described their responses to rape very differently from domestic violence,
mainly noting the danger that rape presents to themselves and other community members.
One female participant stated that it is important to send a rapist to prison, because “he
could do the same thing to me in the future” (V6, FG1). Women suggest, “We cannot
pardon him, because he is a criminal and a bad person. He may also turn against another
92Some of these focus groups cited both rape and stealing as the most likely to be punished.
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person“ (V1, FG1). Another participant noted the importance of resolving the issue only if
the perpetrator presented danger: “If the rapist is a neighbor and a friend, I could pardon
and counsel him, but I can take him to justice when he becomes dangerous” (V1, FG1). This
latter statement reveals that women understand the new legal channels available to them to
help resolve issues of rape, which again is very different from their beliefs or willingness to
use the legal system to address domestic violence, despite that option being available.
While 70 percent of people accept domestic violence within the 20 villages in my study,
only 3 percent of people will allow a former rapist to move to their village, underscoring the
difference in how these crimes are viewed.93 Men openly admit to the common practice of
domestic violence, but do not admit to engaging in rape. Instead, men make efforts to frame
stories of rape in their communities as fiction: “Rape does not exist here. This is only a new
method that girls use here. When a girl notices that you have money, she falls in love with
you because of your money. Once pregnant, she will say that she has been raped. This is
not true.” (V1, FG3). Beliefs that rape stories tend to be false accusations also becomes
apparent in interviews with village chiefs.
Women, however, say that men do perpetrate rape within their villages, but at the same
time emphasize that soldiers also perpetrate rape: “For young girls 10-17 years of age, men
often damage their lives, but so do the soldiers” (V6, FG1). Some chiefs and social workers
acknowledge the occurrence of rape in their villages – however, rape is presented as becoming
a problem mainly when local conflict resolution cannot address the situation (e.g. through
marriage between the perpetrator and victim). When chiefs from the village are asked about
rape, they say that there is no rape in the village - but then add that there is this “other”
category of early marriage.
Overall, people suggest that if the state does not punish a perpetrator of rape, they would
punish the rapist themselves or at minimum denounce the rapist (V6, FG3). In interviews,
93As in the statistic for accepting domestic violence, this is an unweighted analysis of village level means
associated with the 2015 IRC evaluation within these 20 villages. The question asks whether respondents
would accept that a man who perpetrated rape could live in their village.
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village chiefs made it clear that villagers often take punishment into their own hands, beating
a criminal before being brought before them.
What stands out in discussions is that men are not proud of rape in their villages or
about perpetrating it. At most, men are flippant about rape, indicated by laughter in some
of the male focus groups about the scenario presented in the rape narrative. Men’s reticence
to discuss rape and haste to deny rape directly diverges from discussions of domestic violence,
which both men and women openly describe as a custom and as a form of violence that
women deserve because of their behavior. This occurs even though they can be brought to
the police and prosecuted for both rape and domestic violence in this context. If people
heralded violent masculine norms, one would expect to find more evidence of support for
(or nonchalance about) rape among villagers and particularly among male villagers. If men
became more tolerant of violence against women in order to help preserve or re-establish the
gender hierarchy upset by war (as in backlash theory), one would expect men to tolerate more
rape because women step out of line. But rape was consistently and vehemently opposed.
Perceptions of Stealing
While respondents characterize rape and domestic violence in opposite ways, they charac-
terize rape and stealing similarly. In both male and female focus groups, participants often
cannot decide whether stealing or rape warrants the greatest punishment of the three crimes
– even while it is a clear consensus that domestic violence warrants the least punishment.
Participants associate the risks of both rape and stealing. One female focus group member
explains that she is afraid of stealing and thinks it is most important to address because her
husband had been killed in her home by thieves (V6, FG1). Participants speak about how
stealing “can destroy the whole village” (V16, FG1). When a thief steals, “his father and the
whole population from here misses out on peace. . . . He is a person who impoverishes the
family and risks our children starving and becoming street children” (V19, FG3). People view
stealing as damaging to the village economy hurting the community and its development as a
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whole.
When asked to rank order the severity of the three crimes and to talk about appropriate
punishments, women and men point out that rape often occurs in the context of stealing;
A thief “is capable of killing, stealing, and raping at the same time” (V16, FG1). In
discussions about which crimes participants hoped that the government would work to
address, participants who suggested that the government focus on stealing also said that, if
you punish one of these crimes, you punish both. While these crimes often occur in the same
context, there is also a close link between how rape and stealing are perceived. When women
are conceived as a form of male property, rape becomes akin to stealing from men and from
communities.
Men also expressed the opinion that current methods for punishing stealing were not severe
enough: “Because of democracy, we refuse to kill the thieves; this is why theft increases here
in our country” (V1, FG2). As I will expound in later chapters, follow-up work demonstrates
that people believe that the state is completely ineffective in punishing perpetrators of stealing
- but quite effective in punishing rape. Thus, even while rape and stealing are perceived
similarly and armed confict has similar effects, both male and female evaluations of state
effectiveness at punishing these two crimes run in opposite directions.
Men are also more likely to describe their personal ability to take action against thieves.
For example, they could chase thieves from the village so that thieves were no longer able to
steal from them (V2, FG3). While some men impart that if the state finds a perpetrator
not guilty that he is not culpable and should be set free, most men in male focus groups
suggested to kill or to expel a perpetrator of rape or theft (V6, FG4). Others suggested that
if the state did not punish a perpetrator of rape, their role as villagers was to denounce the
rapist, which is a form of social sanctioning (V6, FG3). In interviews, village chiefs made it
clear that villagers often take punishment into their own hands, beating a criminal before
being brought to them.
There seems to be a gendered dimension to punishment, however. Women in focus groups
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were more likely than men to state that they would not punish a perpetrator of domestic
violence because it was not their role. Instead, it was the role of the leaders (V8, FG1). When
women made statements about punishments during the discussions, they would present their
statements as “if I had the power, I would do X” suggesting that they did not really see a
role for themselves in sanctioning.
Women also express more hesitance than men to take an active role in punishment. When
asked how they would respond if authorities did not punish a thief, their response suggests
a standpoint of disempowerment, a group one female participant responded: “I cannot live
with him as a friend because he is a thief. [And] I cannot complain to authorities because
my neighbor pardoned him from punishment - even though I am afraid of him.“ (V1, FG1).
In reference to a crime of domestic violence, a woman hesitates whether it is her place to
counsel or punish: “I can only stay friends with him if we were friends before. Maybe I can
force myself to advise him not to do this again” (V1, FG3). Another group also expressed
deference to authorities for sanctioning: “We will follow up with authorities to understand
why they did not punish, if not [in agreement] we will make peace with the perpetrator”
(V16, FG1).
Thus, discussions about participant perceptions of stealing reveals not only that people
think about rape and stealing as threats to their communities, but also that punishment may
have an important gendered dimension. The gendered dimension of punishment might be
accounted for by the theory of violent masculinities, because men might be driven to punish
in more violent ways. However, violent masculinities cannot account for why this is not the
case for domestic violence.
The gendered dimension also raises questions for theories of empowerment and backlash,
which do not account for punishment as being gendered. Instead, empowerment and backlash
consider the gendered nature of the crime. An understanding of the quantitative results will
need to account for why armed conflict has greater effects on men’s preferences for punishing
rape and stealing than on women’s and consider the gendered nature of punishment rather
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than the gendered nature of the crime.
3.5.4 Qualitative Insights
Counter to theories that link rape and domestic violence theoretically, the qualitative evidence
highlights key differences in how people perceive domestic violence and rape. Domestic violence
is a common, everyday, wide-spread and private crime that does not warrant punishment
and does not impact communities. As a private crime, neither the crime nor its repetition is
perceived to impact others in the community.
At the same time, the data show similarities between how people perceive rape and
how people perceive stealing. Rape and stealing are harmful to communities, damaging
to property, perpetrated by bad or untrustworthy people, and warranting punishment by
communities. As a public crime, the crime and its repetition are perceived to impact others
in the community.
Insight 1. A context-informed theory should differentiate between crimes that
are perceived as private and unthreatening to communities and crimes that are
perceived to be public community threats.
Second, focus group discussions bring important dynamics of punishment into the purview.
People think strategically about whether they will socially punish perpetrators of crimes.
Men will continue friendships with perpetrators of domestic violence or, as they say, risk
having no friends in the village. Women describe their and their family’s reliance on men
that perpetrate domestic abuse.
Insight 2. A context-informed theory should integrate strategic tradeoffs that people
face when punishing perpetrators of crimes.
Third, the discussions revise theories of empowerment, backlash and violent masculinities
by moving away from the focus on the gendered nature of crimes to highlight the gendered
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nature of punishment processes. Women express more reticence than men to engage in
sanctioning acts themselves, so armed conflict may not affect their sanctioning in the same
way.
Insight 3. A context-informed theory should account for the perceived dominant
role that men play in punishment.
Depictions of community harm, strategic tradeoffs and the gendered nature of punishment
provide insights into why the quantitative findings fail to support existing theories (H1-3).
Together, these findings and insights motivate a new theory of protective masculine norms
that will be presented in the following chapter.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter assesses one avenue by which armed conflict can continue to affect women’s
security: through changes in preferences for punishing crimes. I begin with theoretical
implications from the prominent literature on violence against women, describing how armed
conflict is theorized to affect preferences for punishing crimes against women in terms of
empowerment, backlash, and violent masculinities. The chapter then uses a matched pair
design and novel data on private preferences for punishing rape, domestic violence, and
stealing to examine the relevance of these theories in eastern DR Congo.
The findings show that armed conflict increases how severely men prefer to punish rape
and stealing while decreasing how severely both men and women prefer to punish domestic
violence. The findings challenge conventional wisdom on gendered norms, which suggests
that women become either empowered or disempowered as norms improve or worsen after
war. Most theories link rape and domestic violence theoretically as forms of violence against
women and suggest that improvement in one will lead to improvement in the other. But
I find no such link: people within my focus groups do not think about rape and domestic
violence in the same way. And, armed conflict affects these outcomes differently. Women’s
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security is far more nuanced than the literature portrays.
The quantitative approach demonstrates the utility of looking across sets of outcome
variables when assessing the applicability of theories. If, for example, this study had focused
solely on preferences for punishing domestic violence, the conclusion may have been that
armed conflict had further engrained violent masculine norms; but this is inconsistent with
the findings on preferences for punishing rape. This study serves as a call for researchers to
consider broadening approaches to theory rather than narrowing.
Finally, this chapter motives the theory of protective masculine norms through the
integration of both quantitative and qualitative approaches. After demonstrating armed
conflict’s effects quantitatively, I draw upon data gathered in the same focus groups to assess
the qualitative evidence base for these theories and gather insights from which to generate a
new theory. Evidence from the focus group discussions about each of the crimes reveal three
central insights that will contribute to a contextually-informed theory of protective masculine
norms in the following chapter.
98
Chapter 4: Protective Masculine Norms
4.1 Introduction
In the wake of local exposure to armed conflict, people in eastern DR Congo prefer to punish
rape and stealing more severely, but domestic violence less severely. Given that the theories
derived from the prominent literature - empowerment, backlash and violent masculinities -
are irreconcilable with the findings, can other compelling theories account for the effects?
This chapter advances a new argument, a theory of protective masculine norms, to explain
the observed effects of armed conflict on communities in eastern DR Congo. The theory
generating process was informed by the three qualitative insights described in Chapter 3,
so is context-specific in derivation. Rape and stealing are perceived as threatening crimes
to communities while domestic violence is considered a private and unthreatening crime.
Punishment is described as a gendered and strategic process.
While informed by the context, the theory draws on a wealth of literature that reveals
broadly shared phenomena across societies related to norms of male protection. Feminist
scholars have described how problems and social attitudes are shared even while their
“manifestations” vary (Bunch 2012, 30; Richards and Haglund 2015, 2–4). Embeddedness in
this literature suggests the relevance of the concept of protective masculine norms in many
situations and contexts. I derive the specific theory of protective masculine norms as one
manifestation of this concept: Explaining armed conflict’s effects on communities in weak
states that are struggling to provide local security.
Following the theory’s explication, I review several alternative explanations and the
evidence for those theories. Finding little support for alternative explanations, I describe a
qualitative research design to probe essential elements of protective masculine norms theory
in the context of eastern DR Congo. Combined with the empirical findings of armed conflict’s
effects on preferences for punishing rape, domestic violence and stealing, the qualitative
evidence gathered from 4 villages lend weight to and further develop the theory of protective
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masculine norms.
4.2 Protective Masculine Norms
4.2.1 Literature on Masculine Protection
Protective masculine norms are related to the concept of chivalry that upholds men as
protectors of vulnerable populations, particularly women and children (Chinkin and Kaldor
2013). The idea that men are expected to protect women seems antithetical to theories about
violence against women, which suggest that women are targeted with particular forms of
violence precisely because they are women. Are women protected because they are women?
Or do women face more violence because they are women?
This conundrum is one reason that masculine protection has received scant attention
within the literature (Chafetz and Dworkin 1987; Hunnicutt 2009). The fact that patriarchal
ideology can both encourage harming women and protecting them is what Hunnicut (2009)
refers to as the paradox of protection. Patriarchy, she explicates, can simultaneously encourage
both protection and vulnerability:
Chivalry renders women powerless because accepting protection implies neediness
and vulnerability; meanwhile the threat of being victimized requires acquiescence
to the protection that men offer. (Hunnicutt 2009, 565)
Armed conflict can accentuate the gendered dimension of protection and vulnerability.
During armed conflict, men are perceived as protectors with power and agency and women
as vulnerable and in need of protection (Karim and Beardsley 2017; Goldstein 2003; Chinkin
and Kaldor 2013; Hunnicutt 2009; Carpenter 2005). This has implications for women’s status
and security after war. Chinkin and Kaldor describe:
During conflict soldiers are deemed “heroes,” and this gives rise to a dichotomy
between the images of “protector” (men) and “protected” (women). . . The
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terms “protected” and “victim” used to describe women imply weakness and
subordination, which, in turn, perpetuate women’s lack of empowerment in
peacetime situations and mask the reality of women’s experience of violence and
insecurity. (Chinkin and Kaldor 2013, 168)
Women’s subordination, victimhood and described need for protection in war reflects
their widespread and shared subordinate role in peacetime contexts (Pateman 2016). War
highlights differences in men’s and women’s status in society as men are called to the service
of the state in the name of protection.
While conflict and security scholars have explored associations between the warrior image,
militarized masculinity and war (Morris 1996; Goldstein 2003; Zurbriggen 2010; Duncanson
2013), very few have integrated the concept of masculine protection and none focus on it
alone.
Karim and Beardsley (2017) draw upon the norm of masculine protection to help explain
why security institutions fail to integrate women into their forces. When women are thought
of as individuals to be protected (rather than as protectors), female security force members
are rarely put on the front lines and thus devalued within security institutions. Goldstein
(2003) argues that men are motivated to fight, in part, to protect women who represent
the home and normalcy. Carpenter (2003) describes how the concepts of protection and
vulnerability in war affect the international community’s approach to evacuating warzones.
By defining women and children as victims and men as warriors or defenders, international
evacuation protocol leaves men behind to be slaughtered even in situations where men are
most vulnerable.
This literature describes broad systemic processes where gender roles and war are mutually
constituted. Research on norms and war rarely move from the macro to the micro level to
outline and test specific micro processes.94 I propose a testable micro-level theory that brings
94An exception is Karim and Beardsley (Karim and Beardsley 2017).
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the concept of male protection to the forefront.95
4.2.2 Micro-level Theory of Masculine Protection
As Enloe (1989) once described, “men are expected to be protectors of the world.” In armed
conflict, men tend to be tasked with the role of protector. Men make up the majority
of defense group members, armed group members, state military, and heads of household
across most contexts. Protection can involve violence, but may entail other actions such
as overseeing evacuation, emergency work, and guarding agricultural or household property.
Whether the goal is to protect one’s property, one’s family, one’s community, or one’s armed
group, protection provision tends to fall on men.96
Whether or not men actually provide protection to their property, families, and communi-
ties (which may comprise other armed group members) when faced with armed conflict, people
sense a greater need for protection. The collective experience of armed conflict reveals the
dependence that community members have on one another for protection and demonstrates
the reality of outside threats.97 Because men are perceived protectors in war, protection is
expected to come from men in the community. As a result, demand for male protection grows
in the aftermath of war.
With increased demand for male protection in the wake of armed conflict, people calculate
new tradeoffs when deciding whether to punish male community members for engaging in
crimes. This idea draws upon Insight 2 from the qualitative work presented in the previous
chapter: A context-informed theory should integrate strategic tradeoffs that people face when
punishing perpetrators of crimes.
95While male protection inevitably coexists with male violence in armed conflict, this theory is explicated
to isolate the protective norms logic.
96While chivalry has positive connotations, protection is not always altruistic in intent. Men may be
motivated to protect their wives for multitudinous reasons, including because they view wives as a form of
property.
97Even if individuals themselves did not experience violence firsthand (for example, if they were away
from the village), the experience is part of the collective village memory and relevant to individuals.
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Community members want to preserve the supply of male protection within their com-
munities to prepare for conflict recurrence. This forward-thinking calculation means that
men, as perceived protectors, are given greater license to perpetrate crimes, as long as those
crimes are of a private nature and not perceived to harm the community. In this way, conflict
- an interaction between a community and outsiders - changes internal punishment dynamics
within communities.
But, this tradeoff is contingent on the nature of the threat a criminal poses. As demand
for male protection increases in the wake of armed conflict, protection becomes a more highly
revered masculine quality that all community members more greatly value and esteem. Men,
wanting to live up to masculine ideals heralded within their communities, will prefer to act in
a more protective way - preferring to root out crimes that pose a public threat to a greater
degree than before.98 After exposure to armed conflict, men will thus prefer more severe
punishments for crimes perceived to harm their communities.
Norms driving men to behave more protectively and punish more after war introduce a
gendered dimension to punishment in the aftermath of war, drawing from Insight 3 in the
previous chapter: A context-informed theory should account for the perceived dominant role
that men play in punishment.
Women may actively seek and encourage protective behavior on the part of men. Like men,
they may prefer to punish crimes that threaten their communities more after armed conflict.
But, because of gender role differentiation common in war, conflict’s effects may be gendered.
Women will not be subject to the same normative pressures as men to provide protection
to their communities. As a result, armed conflict may not affect women’s preferences for
punishing internal community threats to the same extent as it affects men’s. Some women
may prefer to accept the risk that male criminals from their communities pose in order to
maintain access to protection by insiders from outsiders. In the face of perceived vulnerability,
98This logic parallels insights from evolutionary models and simulations, which show that contributions to
public goods games increase when games are structured to include in-group punishment alongside out-group
competition (Sääksvuori, Mappes, and Puurtinen 2011; Abbink et al. 2010).
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the devil that women know may always be better than the devil that they don’t know - even
when insiders themselves pose a community threat.
In this micro-level theory of protective masculine norms, I have explicated how armed
conflict brings about increased supply of and demand for protective behavior by men. The
logic suggests that, in the wake of armed conflict, community members will be less likely
to punish men that perpetrate crimes because they want to safeguard men in their midst
to serve as future protection providers. But men will also prefer to act more protectively
in accordance with masculine ideals after war and will want to punish men whose crimes
threaten their communities.
But what crimes are considered public community threats? How do these theoretical
claims map onto preferences for punishing rape, domestic violence, and stealing? The
theoretical implications are tied to how people perceive these crimes in context.
4.2.3 Context-specific Implications
The described dynamics of intra-community punishment should generalize to other conflict
contexts as communities react to bolster protection in the wake of war. From context to
context, however, precisely how these dynamics map onto preferences for punishing rape,
domestic violence and stealing will vary. This is because communities may have different
perceptions about whether these crimes constitute public community harms to protect against.
The crime-specific theoretical implications outlined here are thus specific to eastern DR Congo.
This section describes a typology of crimes suggested by Insight 1 in the previous chapter:
A context-informed theory should differentiate between crimes that are perceived as private
and unthreatening to communities and crimes that are perceived to be public community
threats.
As described in the previous chapter, rape and stealing are considered public threats that
harm communities. A crime of rape negatively impacts the victim, her husband and her
family. If the crime is repeated, it will harm another woman, her husband and her family.
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Table 4.1: Typology of Crimes
Unthreatening Crimes to Communities Threatening Crimes to Communities
- Private in nature - Public in nature
- Repetition of the crime does not
impact others in the community
- Repetition of the crime will impact
others in the community
Ex. Domestic Violence, Intimate
Partner Rape, Beating One’s Children
Ex. Rape, Stealing, Assault,
Manslaughter
The crime of rape is perceived to threaten the public; it is a public crime. Other crimes in
the same category include stealing, assault and manslaughter. Each of these crimes impact
(a) people outside the home and (b) both men and women.
Domestic violence, however, is considered a private matter, widely accepted as a form
of education and discipline for wives. The crime of domestic violence and its repetition
impacts the victimized woman, but generally stops there. It does not threaten women in
other households or men in other households in that community. The closest evidence to
spillover effects from domestic violence is that women in eastern DR Congo consider the
possibility that men that perpetrate domestic violence may influence their friends to do
the same. Thus, women prefer that their husbands do not associate with men known to
perpetrate. Thus the crime of domestic violence (a) usually remains within the households
and (b) threatens only women - never men.
This raises important questions about who is considered a citizen or community member.
Whose harm is relevant to communities? Social contract theorists such as Hobbes, Locke and
Kant describe the foundation of government from a hypothetical state of nature, describing
how people rationally give up some freedoms to government and, in turn, rely on that
government to protect their interests. Yet, as explicated by Pateman (2016), women appear
as citizens in social contract theories only through marriage and familial relations with men.
Each social contract is thus tied up with a “sexual contract” whereby men govern women in
the context of the patriarchal modern state.
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The “sexual contract” relegates women to be less-than-full members of the community
and, in this structure, women’s harm remains secondary. In this framework, women’s harm is
not community harm per se. Thus, there seems to be a gendered logic behind the distinction
between private crimes that fail to impact communities and public crimes that do.
However, the theory of protective masculine norms does not ask about the origin of the
distinction between private crimes and public crimes, but takes local understandings and this
typology as given in order to understand armed conflict’s varied effects on crimes.
Because domestic violence is not considered harmful to communities, people in communities
recently exposed to armed conflict will prefer to safeguard future male protection that domestic
violence perpetrators in their communities can provide. They will thus prefer to punish
domestic violence, notably widespread among men in their communities, less after their
communities are exposed. Women, even if the perpetrators are their husbands and they
themselves are being victimized, will want protectors to escape punishment so that they can
and will provide protection.
H4a: Armed conflict will decrease the severity of punishment preferences for
domestic violence.
Because rape and stealing are perceived as harmful crimes to the community, people
in communities recently exposed to armed conflict - particularly men that are expected to
engage in protective behavior - will prefer to punish rape and stealing more severely.
Women, perceived primarily as protection seekers rather than protection providers in
conflict, are not subject to the same normative dynamic as men. Women may thus respond
to these perceived community threats no differently.
H4b: Armed conflict will increase the severity of punishment preferences for rape
and stealing, particularly among men.
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Table 4.2: Summary of Theoretical Implications
1. Women’s Empowerment
Rape Domestic Violence Stealing
Men + + no effect
Women + + no effect
2. Backlash
Rape Domestic Violence Stealing
Men - - no effect
Women + + no effect
3. Violent Masculine Norms
Rape Domestic Violence Stealing
Men - - no effect
Women - - no effect
4. Protective Masculine Norms
Rape Domestic Violence Stealing
Men + - +
Women + - +
Table 4.2 summarizes the theoretical implications. Unlike theories of empowerment (H1),
backlash (H2) and violent masculinities (H3), the theory of protective masculine norms (H4)
can account for the findings of the quantitative research project. Protective masculine norms
theory implies that rape and domestic violence will be differently affected by armed conflict
because what matters about crimes is not whether they are crimes against women but whether
the criminal is perceived to pose a public threat to communities. Because it increases the
value of community protection, armed conflict will increase how severely people prefer to
punish rape and stealing - crimes that threaten communities (and this will be particularly
true for men since men are subject to normative pressure to engage in community protection).
But armed conflict will decrease how severely people prefer to punish domestic violence,
because of the lesser, private harm and the potential protection that community perpetrators
of domestic violence can provide.
Specific features of the armed conflict in DR Congo may make it a likely case to find
evidence of protective masculine norms. As elucidated by Baaz and Stern (2009), men in
DR Congo sense that they have failed in achieving what communities expect of them - for
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example, by failing to provide protection during a recent conflict episode, by failing to provide
means for their families, by failing to find gainful employment and by failing to marry.99
Men want to live up to ideals heralded in their communities. A sense of failed masculinity
associated with recent armed conflict can lead men to act in more hyper-masculine ways;
thus, men compensate for perceived failures by preferring to behave more protectively.
Yet much of the framing around violence against women and backlash in DR Congo
suggests that this reactive process leads to violent masculinities and backlash against women
- neither which finds support in the data. Protective masculine norms provides a corrective
interpretation of male behavior that can better explain the findings of the previous chapter.
Again, the theoretical implications of protective masculine norms for rape, domestic
violence and stealing will differ from context to context depending on how people view these
crimes. The scope conditions for the theory’s generalizability refer to armed conflict’s effects
on punishing crimes, with the theorized direction of change depending on how those crimes
are perceived to threaten (or fail to threaten) communities in that context. This means
that, in communities where domestic violence is perceived as a public community threat
(unlike in eastern DR Congo), the theory of protective masculine norms remains relevant for
understanding armed conflict’s effects, but suggests that armed conflict will increase (rather
than decrease) how severely people will prefer to punish domestic violence as it does for rape.
In communities where domestic violence is not perceived as a public community threat (as in
eastern DR Congo), the theoretical implications for the effects of armed conflict on domestic
violence will be the same as those outlined here.
Given this framework, there are two central scope conditions to consider: First, communi-
ties feel the need to provide protection for themselves because of the shared experience and,
second, there is a male bias in understandings of who should provide this protection. Male
protection may be pertinent to non-conflict events such as gang warfare and terrorism. The
99In part as a result of war and the destabilization of the economy, men in DR Congo find it difficult to
pay the bride price that would allow them to marry.
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theory will be relevant in the aftermath of such events where communities feel the need to
provide their own security against repeated episodes and believe that security should come
from men.
Contrary to the claim that war-related protection is a predominantly male activity, recent
literature has highlighted the substantive role that women play in waging and responding
to war (Sjoberg and Gentry 2007; Cohen 2013b). Initially, this may suggest that responses
to armed conflict are not gendered in the way described. However, despite their role in
fighting and protecting communities in response to war, female contributions may fail to
overturn engrained conceptions about their roles. And it is engrained conceptions of these
roles that drive the dynamics theorized in protective masculine norms. Short of overturning
this engrained bias towards prizing men’s protective role, the dynamics outlined in the theory
of protective masculine norms will hold.
4.3 Alternative theories
What other explanations can account for the finding that armed conflict increases how
severely people prefer to punish rape and stealing but decreases how severely people prefer to
punish domestic violence? While no parsimonious theories can explain observed changes in
punishment preferences for all three crimes, it is important to consider that different factors
account for armed conflict’s effects on domestic violence, rape and stealing.
Perhaps places exposed to recent armed conflict are less secure and subject to more
crime from outsiders (rape and stealing) and thus people want to punish rape and stealing
(even when perpetrated by insiders) more because these are the crimes that they experience
everyday. The continued insecurity argument is not inconsistent with the theory of protective
masculine norms. The continued insecurity argument, however, begs two important questions.
First, why do people want to punish rape and stealing when they are more greatly exposed?
Second, why are armed conflict’s effects more relevant for men’s preferences than women’s?
The theory of protective masculine norms helps to fill these gaps. People want to punish
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rape and stealing because they face insecurity and desire more security or protection. Men’s
preferences are more affected by armed conflict because they are perceived as (and perceive
themselves as) providers of this protection and are compelled to react to this insecurity.
Despite theoretical weaknesses, the continued insecurity argument raises important ques-
tions about the relationship between levels of rape and preferences for punishing rape, between
levels of stealing and preferences for punishing stealing, and between levels of domestic vio-
lence and preferences for punishing domestic violence. This will be further examined in the
conclusion of this dissertation when asking about the implications of protective masculine
norms theory for detering violent crime. However, there is no statistical evidence from these
communities that levels of rape are higher in communities recently exposed to armed conflict
in this sample of 20 villages. In fact, theories about deterrence would suggest lower rather
than higher levels of rape and stealing since there is more support for punishment.
The review of the literature on domestic violence after armed conflict (provided in the
introductory chapter) also suggests that domestic violence increases in the aftermath of war
(Østby, Leiby, and Nordås 2019). If the continued insecurity argument is just about increased
levels of a crime and domestic violence increases as does rape and stealing, then communities
should respond by punishing all of these crimes more. Yet, people prefer to punish domestic
violence less. The raw magnitude of a crime does not explain the observed variation in
preferences for punishment.
Another variant of this reasoning is about conflict-related crime. If people experience
rape and stealing as a part of their exposure to armed conflict - as something that happened
to them or their communities in the past, but is no different from non-conflict villages in the
present - then they may react more severely to rape and stealing because this is part of their
past experience. By this logic, men are simply more fed up with rape and stealing and want
to punish these crimes more because of their past conflict-related effects on communities.
But, as in the continued insecurity argument, the logic of previous conflict-related community
exposure alone cannot account for the gendered nature of the findings for rape and stealing.
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The findings on domestic violence are less problematic for a theory about conflict-related
crime. Domestic violence is not experienced as or perceived as a conflict-related crime, so
the effects of armed conflict on preferences for punishing domestic violence are not due
to perceived associations with past conflict.100 While not conflicting, the theory about
conflict-related crime, cannot explain the findings.
However, as described in the previous chapter, my qualitative work suggests that people
think about rape and stealing as harmful in both conflict and non-conflict communities.
Exposure to armed conflict does not seem to affect the extent to which communities perceive
rape and stealing as a threat or a problem. Rather than understandings of the harm, it is
the preferred punishment of the crime that changes as a result of armed conflict.
There is suggestive evidence that little difference exists between conflict and non-conflict
villages in how they define community problems. In the 80 focus groups that took place
across 20 villages in 2016, participants were asked which of the three crimes that they would
like to see more government intervention to help with the crime. While related to the quality
of interventions by the government, focus group responses to this question provide insights
into whether respondents in conflict and non-conflict villages view rape, stealing and domestic
violence as problems in the first place. Figure 4.1 describes the proportion of focus groups
that mentioned stealing only, rape only, domestic violence only and then combinations of
these crimes as problems that warrant further intervention.
The data show that groups from both conflict and non-conflict villages indicate that rape
and stealing are problems in their community and at roughly similar levels. In non-conflict
villages, a higher proportion of focus groups suggest that rape and stealing are the only
problems that warrant further government intervention. But focus groups in non-conflict
villages tend to mention only stealing or include domestic violence slightly more often. Overall,
the figure fails to reveal systematic differences between conflict and non-conflict villages in
100Even if domestic violence occurs during an armed conflict and is conflict-related (e.g. as a result of
PTSD), people do not perceive it that way because it it not perpetrated by outsiders as part of the conflict.
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Figure 4.1: Preferences for More Intervention by Issue Area
perceptions of rape and stealing as problematic.
While the focus group discussions were narrowed to discussions of rape, domestic violence
and stealing, participants could easily choose no response, only one area, or all areas as
warranting further interventions. Even while, the ethical procedures associated with the
study indicated that the study was not linked to receipt of aid, it is possible that respondents
might say that they want more from their government in every dimension because there is no
cost to doing so. Yet, focus groups participants rarely choose all three crimes and often say
there is no role for the state in addressing domestic violence.
Can state effectiveness in addressing crimes explain armed conflict’s effects on preferences
for punishing rape and stealing or domestic violence? A theory of state effectiveness suggests
that village-level conflict exposure changes the effectiveness of state interventions or aid in
addressing crime in those villages. People will prefer more punishment by the state for crimes
that the state is effective at punishing. This is related to a vast literature on state building;
where states are effective people will gain confidence and give more authority to the state
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(Lake 2010; Levi 1997). Perhaps villages exposed to armed conflict prefer more punishment
of rape and stealing because the states proves its effectiveness in handling these crimes in the
aftermath of local exposure to war.
There are two sources of evidence that run against a theory of state effectiveness. First,
when dichotomizing the outcome variable from the last chapter (severity of preferences for
punishing rape, domestic violence and stealing) and examining armed conflict’s effects on
prison and beating separately, one can see that armed conflict’s effects on preferences for
punishing rape are largely driven by preferences for prison while the effects of armed conflict
on preferences for punishing stealing are driven by preference for beating to near death by
community members.101 It is thus unlikely that the findings of armed conflict’s effects on
rape and stealing are linked to the effectiveness of the state.
Second, as part of the follow-up study described in the next section, I convened focus
groups with elites in 4 villages to help interpret and understand the quantitative findings from
the 2016 study. Participants were recruited on the basis of their involvement in local conflict
resolution. In these focus groups, participants almost uniformly described the state as very
effective in punishing rape but completely ineffective in punishing stealing. If people turn over
thieves to the police, they will be out again in a matter of days. Conversely, elites understood
the state as holding perpetrators of rape to account - and keeping them in jail. Because
these differences in the perceived effectiveness of the state in punishing rape and stealing,
an argument about state effectiveness would suggest opposite effects of armed conflict on
these crimes. But, armed conflict affects rape and stealing similarly, suggesting that state
effectiveness can’t well explain the findings.
Finally, an argument about demographic change suggests that people that died or left the
village as a result of community exposure to armed conflict tended to prefer less punishment
of rape and stealing than those that stayed behind - or, relatedly, that people that tended to
101Again these categories were collapsed into one point of the scale to reflect how participants viewed
punishment severity.
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prefer more punishment of domestic violence died or left the village. Does armed conflict
change the distrubution of characteristics in a society in a way that affects preferences for
punishing local crimes?
Analysis of balance between treatment and control villages in the previous chapter already
shows reasonable balance on respondent characteristics of age, education, years living in the
village, and ever being exposed to armed violence at the individual level. This suggests that
neither demographics nor the recruitment process for focus group participants in the 2016
study were affected by armed conflict. The claim is that armed conflict did not fundamentally
affect the participant recruitment process is further bolstered by data from the follow-up
study that will be described in the next section as well. The distribution of respondent
characteristics among randomly sampled respondents are not very different from the focus
group participant characteristics described in the previous chapter.
4.4 Design of follow-up study
Given the weaknesses in alternative theories and the potential contributions of the theory
of protective masculine norms, I designed a qualitative study that took place within four
villages of eastern DR Congo. The study investigates the plausibility of masculine protective
norms theory and seeks to discover more about its processes in the context of eastern DR
Congo.
4.4.1 Questions
Focus group discussions from the previous study provide the foundation for the theory of
protective masculine norms by revealing how people perceive rape, domestic violence and
stealing in terms of threatening and unthreatening crimes. Empirically the data also show
that armed conflict affects how severely people prefer to punish rape and domestic violence in
opposite ways - contrary to existing theories. But the 2016 study did not ask about protection
during armed conflict or trace community responses to armed conflict exposure. So, I needed
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to return to these communities to ask questions about protection, community protection and
processes of change.
I design this 2018 study as a plausibility probe or “illustrative case” in order to contribute
to developing the theory of protective masculine norms and to assess its applicability in this
case (Eckstein 1992, 148–52; Levy 2008; Beach 2017). This study probes the existence of
necessary conditions for armed conflict to have the effects proposed by protective masculine
norms theory:
1. Protection is gendered.
2. Armed conflict increases local demand for protection.
3. People consider security tradeoffs when deciding about punishing local crimes.
Using hypothetical questions about punishment and protection networks alongside people’s
accounts of their experiences and behaviors, this component of the project explores the
relationship between crime, protection and community security in eastern DR Congo -
elements not explored prior to this component of the study. It also uses process tracing to
learn how communities have responded to incidents of insecurity, a different apporoach than
the comparison between conflict and non-conflict villages in the preceeding chapter.
4.4.2 Sample
The qualitative data draw from interviews with a random sample of the population in 4
of the 20 villages as well as elite interviews with one man and one woman that engage in
conflict resolution from each of the four villages. By randomly sampling respondents within
four village populations, the design is able to incorporate diverse perspectives from each
community. Through the inclusion of elite interviews, the design elicits detailed insights into
crime and sanctioning decisions in each community.
The set of 20 villages described in the last chapter were selected by matching all villages
exposed to armed conflict with a village not exposed to armed conflict and then randomly
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selecting 10 pairs of villages (20 villages). Security conditions impacted the selection of the 4
of these 20 villages as sites where in-depth qualitative research would take place. Many of the
20 villages were not secure enough for teams to travel to due to heightened tensions associated
with the upcoming 2018/19 elections. Thus, the sample of 4 villages in this component of the
study are less remote and more secure than some of the other villages in my potential sample.
Of the four villages in the qualitative sample, only one was categorized as a village recently
exposed to armed conflict during the 2016 study. Its matched pair, Village 3 is also included
in the sample of villages for this study. New conflict-related incidents were recounted in
interviews in Village 1 and 3, revealing the necessity in analyzing processes rather than relying
on a comparison across villages. I use process tracing rather than a comparison on conflict
and non-conflict villages to better account for conflict incidents that occurred between the
2016 study and the 2018 study.
The 4 villages are heterogenous in terms of population, with Villages 1 and 3 having
a larger population of 2,000 and 3,000 respectively; and Villages 2 and 4 having smaller
populations of 400 and 500 respectively. These villages are also heterogeneous in terms of
their main source of external protection or security. In one village (V1), the majority of
respondents refer to the FARDC or Bukavu officials as the main source of protection. In
Village 2, however, the main source of outside protection cited is the church and NGOs.
Community members in Village 3 refer to a self-defense group, the Mai Mai, as their source
of external protection. In Village 4, community members describe only one another (if
anything) as a source of security or protection for their community. One man from Village 4
attributes the current security of his village to a man that helped to keep the population
from joining the Mai Mai - demonstrating that in this matched pair, Mai Mai were actively
operating in both villages but not as dominant in Village 4 after this man’s intervention (M3;
Q6b). This variation in the perceived source of external security provision provides greater
weight to findings about internal protection that hold across all four villages and suggests
































































Figure 4.2: Respondent Characteristics
4.4.3 Respondent Characteristics
Figure 4.2 describes the mean age, education level and years living in the village of male
and female respondents across the four villages. As a random sample of the population, the
respondent characteristics are representative. Across all villages, the mean education level
is 3.6 years among women and 6.25 years among men, reflecting a substantial and known
gender gap in education. The mean age among men and women is similar, with a mean age
of 41 years for women and 44 years for men. Women, on average, have lived in the village
around 20 years, spending around half of their lives in the village. As expected for patrilineal
structured households, men have lived in the village for a longer amount of time, on average
33 years.
Agriculture is the predominant form of work, with 18/20 female respondents and 13/20
male respondents describing their current work in agriculture. When asked to describe the
work of their spouse, 17/20 women describe their husbands as being in agriculture and 14/20
describe their wives as being in agriculture. Consistent with a random sample, the male and
female accounts of work and spousal work reflect one another well. Other work includes brick
layer, carpenter, teacher, motorbike or tractor driver, trader, selling palm oil, and selling
corn. Household size ranges from 4 to 10.
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Respondent characteristics do not differ substantially from the previous study (where
focus group participants were not selected randomly. The similarity among the population
samples give greater confidence that the focus group sampling procedure in the previous
study was inclusive, drawing on broad samples of the population.
4.5 Evidence from Qualitative Interviews
This section presents the interview evidence in the logical progression indicated by protective
masculine norms theory. First, protection is a gendered process. Second, armed conflict
has effects on behaviors and norms because of these gendered dynamics. Finally, there are
security tradeoffs for punishing community members for their crimes.
I approach the analysis of the quantitative data with an eye to its representative nature.
This also offers greater transparency in the extent of support for theorized mechanisms (Beach
2016). Quantitative examination of the qualitative data was facilitated by the use of coding
schemes within NVivo 12.
4.5.1 Protection is gendered
Nature of protection
The theory of protective masculine norms begins with the assumption that the nature of
protection is gendered, with men being perceived protectors of communities and individuals
within it. The gendered nature of protection is widespread across the world and shared even
among animal populations (Drews 1993). But what does protection look like in eastern DR
Congo? Is it, as protective norms theory would expect, clearly gendered?
Randomly sampled interviews of four villages populations provide insights into the
gendered nature of protection in these areas. I asked men and women about the gender
distribution of their ideal network of community protection. Most men and women (70%)
choose a security network mainly comprised of men.












































































Figure 4.3: Gender Distribution of Security Networks
protect your village. Figure 4.3 describes the gender distribution of responses. Responses
below the forty-five degree line are biased towards men. There are some outliers where
respondents chose more or less than five individuals, their responses are also included in the
distributions.102
Across the four villages, only two female respondents and one male respondent chose a
protection network solely comprised of men. All suggested that they chose men, because
women were “not capable” of assuring security in the village (L210). A woman from Village
102While outlier responses tend to come from female respondents, this could be due to enumerator differences
in implementation rather than characteristics or background of the respondents.
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1 explains that “it is men that are capable of assuring the security of the community because
of their physical force” (K8).
A man from Village 3 goes beyond physical capacity to explain:
“Women are not made for security. They always have fear. And further, they do
not keep secrets; they tell all that they see.” (L32)
The 4 respondents choosing 1 woman and 4 men describe a similar logic, pointing out
that women could counsel the men - who were created or ordained to provide security (K3,
L22, M1, K1). A man from Village 4 describes:
“It is men who assure security. The Bible is clear. A woman is created feeble in
comparison to the man. Even in the home, in bed the man sleeps in front and
the woman behind, so that if there is danger the man will be the first to defend.”
(K3)
Some add that while men are built for the “real work of security”, women play a role
by providing counsel and encouragement (L22, K1). Others described how, in addition to
differences in terms of physical capabilities, women are too easily deceived to depend on for
security (M1 and K1).
Nearly half of all respondents (19/40), however, would comprise their ideal security network
with three men and two women. By design, the interview question enforces inequality in
the gender distribution of one’s security network by asking about a hypothetical network of
five individuals. To what extent does this numerical distrubution indicate that protection is
gendered?
The reasoning that respondents provide for choosing this modal outcome reveals a gendered
nature of protection that extends further than raw numbers. Table 4.3 describes several
categories of respondent reasoning and provides the frequency distribution of respondents
providing that reasoning.
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Six of these 19 respondents do not provide a reasoning for their choice (L24, L25, L310,
L35, L35, M10). But, of the 13 accounts given, 6 respondents explicitly describe women as
serving a supportive, counseling or encouraging role to men in security provision (K2, K4,
L21, L28, L31, M2). A woman from Village 2 describes:
“Men are more courageous and flexible in matters of security, women are only
there to accompany them.” (L28)
A man from Village 4 provides a similar account of women’s role:
“Men are naturally made to secure women and the entire family. Women can also
do this but mostly in the case of surveillance.” (M2)
Among respondents that describe women as doing a better job in the arena of security
than men, women’s role is still described as merely supportive. Two men from Village 4
describe.
“Each time a man will direct and a woman will assist. A woman makes fewer
mistakes and people can count on her to advise the men. A woman brings more
security than men. She observes, analyzes and and knows quickly how to approach
an enemy. An organization where one finds women also directly inspires trust”
(K2).
“Women help while men work. Women keep secrets, are calm and help men make
plans” (K4).
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One man from Village 2 openly rejects the sex distinction presented in the question,
saying that “securing a place is not about sex” and that “women do this better in comparison
to men” (L21). Even so, the respondent favors men in his security network.
In these discussions about security networks, several men also point to broader ideals for
why they included women: equality (M4, L34) or acknowledging women’s capabilities and
the need for working together (L33, L23). This logic resonates with many efforts by outside
actors in the region to improve women’s roles outside the home. Women, however, tend
provide a concrete security logic to including women, emphasizing their role in to ensuring
the security of women (M8, K6, M6). As described by a woman from Village 4 and a woman
from Village 1, respectively:
“Men will assure the safety of the community while women will ensure the security
of women.” (M8)
“. . . women should be represented because the two respected women will respect
the rights of other women.” (K6)
The prevailing logic described by the respondents support the starting assumption in
protective masculine norms theory that community protection is a gendered. But there
are also five respondents that chose to include more women in their security network than
men. Does their logic conflict with this assumption? The logic described by these outlier
respondents is not dissimilar, but reflects previous discussions about women’s inclusion being
key to women’s security (K10) or women having distinct capabilities, such as being less
corrupt or having better bargaining skills (L37, M5, M3).
In 6 cases, female respondents chose a protection network that included fewer than 5
people.103 Four of these 6 respondents chose an equitable distribution, perphaps making a
statement about equity than goes beyond the respondents that chose a 3:2 ratio. Potentially
103Unlike the few that chose more than 5 people, the interview question allowed for this possibility.
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some respondents prefer a smaller and tighter network of security. One woman laments her
disbelief in achieving security (L39).
“I choose one man and one woman, only because I am obligated to choose. I do
not know a person that can assure the security of the community here” (L39).
The disbelief that this woman communicates suggests that - despite efforts to achieve
security - people might not think that achieving community security is a real possibility or
rely on security networks. While it is important to ask about hypotheticals to understand
abstract internal biases (Finch 1987; Mitchell et al. 2006), the biases in hypotheticals only
become relevant if and when they express themselves in real behavior.
Protective behaviors
In order to examine whether and how the gendered nature of protection manifests in
behavior and to learn about how protection happens, respondents were asked to recount
stories of protecting others and being protected.104
The interview questions about protection ask about times when respondents have helped
to protect someone from danger or someone has helped them in a dangerous situation. This
has two implications for analysis. First, not all responses are relevant to armed conflict. Many
feature discussions of monetary help or sustenance in times of famine. Second, respondents
are not explicitly asked to think about protection at the community level. Thus, descriptions
of protective acts provide an overview of the types of protective behaviors that men and
women engage in, but does not confine the discussion to acts relevant to community security.
This approach leaves the conversation open to learn about the circumstances under which
protection happens in terms of individual experiences, rather than pre-defining protection in
terms of its relationship with armed conflict.
104Note that this question was asked prior to the questions about hypotheticals to avoid biasing responses
towards expressed norms.
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Of 40 responses to these questions, 25 stories of protection could reasonably be related
to a conflict incident such as stealing, rape, kidnapping, and armed violence by someone
that was not explicitly from the community. Descriptions of these protective acts include
informing others of threats, informing authorities of threats and negotiating or arranging the
release of neighbors or friends held captive by armed groups in the forest. People also tell
stories of how fellow villagers have pleaded on their behalf when wrongfully accused of armed
group membership or formed patrols to guard their homes when threatened individually.
The experiences that people recount aligns with how respondents characterize women’s
role in hypothetical security networks, supporting the proposition that protection is gendered
in practice.
Of these 25 conflict-relevant stories, only three respondents described a woman helping
them to avoid a dangerous incident. A man from Village 1 described how a woman from his
village warned him of suspected danger along a route. Heeding her warning, he remained
where he was rather than traveling further. Moments later, shots rang out from the location
the woman had described (K5). Another woman described a similar story about women’s
role in information sharing to avoid dangerous conflict situations. A female neighbor came to
her house to warn her of impending pillage by the FNL. This gave her time to gather some
goods and flee (K7). Another woman describes how she avoided a potential incident of rape
based on information a woman that returned from the fields shared with her (L27).
To probe further about the gendered nature of protection, there were also explicit questions
about whether there were examples of women protecting others in the village. Thirty-six
respondents answered this question, with one-third of respondents reporting either that
women do not protect (7 respondents) or could think of no examples (5 respondents).
When probed, respondents tended to describe incidents in a similar logic to that given
when discussing hypothetical security networks. Women play an important role in helping
and protecting other women. Eight of the 36 respondents described examples of women
intervening in cases of domestic violence (M10, K2, L23, K3, L34, M5, L36, L27). These
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responses come from both men and women across villages. Three of the 36 respondents,
two women and one man across 3 villages, described situations where women intervened in
cases of rape (L28, L31, M8). Two additional stories described protecting other women or
resolving conflicts with other women (L37, M4, L21). The perception that women primarily
serve as protectors of other women rather than communities carries over to the experiences
and stories that people recount.
Of the 36 responses to the explicit quesiton about women’s protective behaviors, there
are only 4 examples of women providing security not only for other women but for other
households (L25, K5, L37). One man described how women took part in security rounds or
patrols (L25) while another described how women provide information about armed groups
from their travels to and from work in they fields (K5). Finally, respondents recounted
stories about women intervening to help keep the homes of others safe from fire (L32) or
from bandits (L37).
The interviews also entailed questions about what people did personally to help protect
others in their community. Both male and female respondents tend to describe instances in
which they made noise to scare thieves from neighboring homes. They often achieved this by
hitting their cows so that the noise scare the thieves away. Respondent also describe their
interventions in situations of domestic violence. But, importantly, this is framed in terms of
helping neighbors individually rather than in terms of providing community protection.
These descriptions reinforce the idea presented in the previous section that both women
and men see women as integral players in ensuring the safety of women; however, women are
perceived to play less of a role in community security more broadly. Even in the strongest
example of women providing community security, the male respondent underscores that they
do this alongside men.
“Yes, women protect also. Certain women from this village participate in the
patrol. They do this with the men, but all intervene to protect the population.”
[L25, emphasis mine]
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4.5.2 Armed conflict increases demand for protection
Having established the gendered nature of community protection, I now turn to the evidence
of armed conflict’s effects. If armed conflict affects demand for male protection in the way
proposed by the theory of protective masculine norms, (1) people will remember or know
about an incident of armed conflict in their communities (2) people will react or express a
desire for protection in response to such an incident and (3) people will highly revere men
that have engaged in protective behaviors towards their communities.
Armed conflict and perceived insecurity
In an environment of ongoing insecurity and general crime, how important is an incident
of armed conflict to communities? An open-ended question at the beginning of all interviews
asked respondents to list situations that they view as dangerous. More than half of all
respondents (22/40) refer to armed conflict directly when describing situations that they view
as dangerous. Five additional respondents refer to violence more generally, amounting to
almost 70 percent of respondents refering to violence in their communities as a dangerous
situation. Armed conflict is second only to sickness in terms of the number of respondents
that mention it as a dangerous situation or event. Other widely-shared categories include
death, famine, rape, poverty, and sorcery.
Evidence suggests that people remember and respond to episodes of armed conflict. In
2016, the village chief in each of 20 villages recounted notable events that occurred within the
village during the past 10 years. Following each chief interview, participants in 4 focus groups
were asked to describe the notable events that the chief had mentioned, including events of
armed conflict. In all 80 focus groups, participants easily recounted the notable events. Two
years later, interview respondents recount the same events. Because questions were asked in
an interview context (rather than a focus group context), this follow-up study also shows
that people recount these events individually (rather than as groups). Respondents that did
not live in the village at the time of the event were also able to recall the event, underscoring
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the relevance of community level exposure.
During recent incidents of armed conflict, almost all respondents report having fled the
village to the forest, another village, or another country for days, weeks, months or years.
Prayer was considered the central source of protection during such a dangerous incident.
People’s story about protection during episodes of armed conflict was a story of “every man
for himself (or family for itself).” When asked whether respondents were assisted by fellow
villagers, their answer tends to be a strong and repeated “no, no one helped” or “only God
could help me, I prayed.”
So, if people do not protect one another during incidents of armed conflict, when and how
does community protection take place?
Protective behavior that respondents report tends to happen in-between episodes of armed
conflict. Armed conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo is not a context where
people stay at home to defend themselves and others in their village against incoming armed
groups. However, there is some evidence, even in this data, that some respondents have
joined armed groups in response to insecurity. For example, one respondent in my sample
describes joining the Mai Mai, a group originally formed as a self-defense group (that is often
now considered a party to the conflict) in response to an incident of insecurity.
Generally, these communities do not have the means (or guns) to defend themselves.
People are concerned about protection from armed conflict (avoiding or escaping it) rather
than protection during episodes. Thus, local protective behavior tends to take the form
of information provision, patrols, and forming relationships with outside security actors to
avoid armed conflict episodes. With timely information, people can flee and/or inform the
appropriate authorities to help stop such an incident when their lives are threatened.
When asked about villagers helping one another, the response is a resounding “no.”
However, respondents continually underscore that family, very close friends, and church
members do help one another. When asked about why someone has helped them in the past,
most respondents say that this person was part of their family, a friend, or a fellow church
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member.
This reliance on networks means that, during times when people expect repeated incidents
of insecurity, people may seek to further embed themselves in (or at least not alienate) their
social networks. For example, in this context standing up against an act of domestic violence
may damage one’s network, but engaging in socially-approved protective behavior such as
punishing a thief or a rapist may solidify one’s network and enhance one’s security network.
Such social networks can serve as an important source of protection from armed conflict.
Armed conflict and behavior change
In order to trace processes of how people respond to incidents of armed conflict, and to
better understand if and how demand for protection increases in the aftermath of armed
conflict, I asked respondents whether they were prepared for the first incident of insecurity,
how they prepared for any second incident of insecurity as well as how they prepared today.
Almost all respondents suggested, initially, that they were not prepared and could not
be prepared for an incident of armed conflict. Because one cannot know when and where
such incidents would happen, one cannot prepare for them. One woman summarized that
such an incident was “pufu” (K2), which in the local language means unpredictable and
surprising (K7). All respondents suggested they were not prepared for the first incident of
armed conflict. For example, a male respondent said, “I was thinking that me and my goods
were totally secure” (K2).
People describe how they were fearful in the aftermath of an incident of armed conflict
and suggested that they adjusted their behaviors accordingly.
After the war, there was misery among the population and we were afraid of
another war. Here at home I no longer raised cattle because I was afraid that we
would be looted. We spent two months with our clothes packed. . . because we
were fearful of another war. Our preparation had to be different because now we
had the experience of war. (M2)
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This respondent goes on to describe the uncertainty of the environment and the importance
of war memory for security.
Today, we have already forgotten the experience of the war. We only have fear of
thieves and the current regime. If Kabila does not let go of power, I have fear
that more people are going to die. (M2)
While the respondent from Village 2 describes “forgetting” about the war, the war is
clearly on the forefront of his mind - informing the fear of what will happen in the future. A
respondent in Village 3 echoes this fear of the future, underscoring the importance of conflict
memory and its tale of caution.
In 2004, war was a surprise. No one was prepared. Life begins to resume shyly
despite the fact that the Kabila regime risks plunging us back into war (L32).
Both respondents frame war remembrance in a positive light as a note of wariness as
people protest the regime.105
In the progression from talking about the first incident of insecurity associated with
armed conflict to how people prepared for future incidents in its wake and in the present day,
respondents began to reveal how they as individuals and as communities have responded
to incidents of armed conflict. Figure 4.4 shows the number of respondents that describe
preparation for recurrence of armed conflict in terms of several categories. These coding
categories were revealed through conversations and were not asked about directly.
It is clear that people think about and prepare for future incidents of insecurity. They do
so in several ways: preparing to flee, joining information networks, and collaborating with
security forces. Only 1⁄4 of respondents say that they do not prepare in any way.
Many respondents preparing to flee described how their past experience fleeing the village
informs what they plan to bring with them when they flee again. A recurrent theme was
105While there was a large amount of insecurity associated with the elections, at the time of writing,
















Figure 4.4: Responses to incidents of insecurity
that people prepare to flee from incidents of armed conflict, which occurrs often in eastern
DR Congo, by selling their goods. If they leave their goods behind, the goods will only be
pillaged and they are not able to bring many heavy goods with them during their escape.106
Whether or not people prepare to flee depends largely on means and family context.
A woman from Village 4 described that, because she did not have enough money to flee
and already had many children, she prepared by gathering enough goods for her family for
sustenance during a future incident of insecurity (M8). An older man also said that he would
not prepare to flee but to stay because he was now too old and without means to flee.
Whether preparing to flee or preparing to stay, the discussions about preparation under-
score that people respond to past episodes of armed conflict by making preparations for the
future. These preparations are inextricably linked with community exposure to armed conflict.
People describe how their experiences inform their fears and behaviors. It is reasonable to
conclude that demand for protection from armed conflict grows.
What forms of protection do people demand? Respondents describe the key to protection
106This contrasts with how they discuss their preparation for incidents of insecurity such as famine where
they prefer to keep their goods so that they can have nourishment during the difficult time.
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as avoiding an incident of armed conflict - an incident where no one can help them. This
requires having the information to respond before the event presents itself.
In the face of insecurity, people rely on information; but this information is given and
received under risky circumstances. Respondents often ask themselves what motivated people
to risk their lives in order to offer the information that saved them from harm. Information
provision is protective, because it gives people time to notify external security forces or to
flee. When one individual heard that he would be directly targeted, networks of men circled
around his home to deter the violence.
In several villages (Village 1, Village 2, and Village 3) communities have responded to the
increased demand for protection by formalizing nightly patrols. These patrols allow people
to have the information that they need to protect themselves and warn their communities of
danger. One man from Village 1 describes:
We started to be vigilant. People go around at night to get information on
suspicious movements during the day. Before these FNL soldiers come here, there
is at least one person who will see unknown people here. . . this information allows
us to flee to save our lives. (K5)
However, respondents also note that because these patrols are formed of civilians, the
people within them are not well armed and it is difficult for them to protect themselves from
armed groups and armed thieves (L25). In the case of this village a higher level authoritiy
(Chef de Groupement) had implemented or required the patrols in the villages it oversaw
and the respondent expressed some discontent with this requirement without provision of
equipment.
Again, members of these communities do not have the means to protect themselves, so
protection takes the form of information gathering and collaborating with external security
forces in between episodes of armed conflict. Notably, villagers described either how they had
reinforced their collaboration with external security forces (which security force depended
on the village loyalties) in response to armed conflict incidents while a man from another
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village described how such an incident led him to join a group engaging in security provision
personally.
The foregoing discussion suggests that armed conflict affects communities and leads people
within them to take on new behaviors to prepare for future episodes of insecurity. Sometimes
it leads them to prepare to flee, with close attention to information provision that would be
useful for making such a decision. To aid with information, three of the four communities have
formally implemented a system of patrols, which also changes dynamics of security provision
in the community. These patrols can also reinforce bifurcated gender roles in the provision
of security. As described by one woman in Village 1 in her discussion of the hypothetical
security network, women could not take part in night patrols because of the demands women
face at home (K6).
Perceived and real differences between genders in contributions to community security
become more greatly felt in the wake of community exposure to armed conflict when people
are fearful of future conflict recurrence and are preparing for its recurrence.
Armed conflict and masculine norms
Norms are beliefs about how men in a community should ideally behave. How does
increased demand for protection in the wake of armed conflict affect masculine norms?
Because women, like men, hold ideas about how men in a community should behave, both
men and women uphold and propogate masculine norms.
In order to assess the claim posited by protective masculine norms theory - that armed
conflict has implications for how people think men in a community should behave - I included
an open-ended interview question about the characteristics of an ideal man. I coded all
responses to this question as providing help, access to information, or security.
Table 4.4 shows that about half of all men and slightly less than half of all women describe
ideal masculine qualities as inclusive of access to help, information provision or security more
generally. A man from Village 2 provides a concrete example:
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Table 4.4: Respondent Descriptions of Masculine Qualities
Men Women Total
Help, Information, or Security 10 8 18
No Help, Information, or Security 10 12 22
Total Respondents 20 20 40
I will give you the example of the head of the groupement (upper level authority).
This is a wise man with solidarity towards the population. He has means, money,
a vehicle, fields, and cows. When there is a problem with stealing. . . he always
looks for a good solution. He is the one that organized the patrols at night.
During incidents of insecurity, he collaborates with the police and military and
knows how to do this even if the police are abusive towards the population. This
is a man that does not have fear. (L23)
This man is influential and collaborates with the authorities in Kinshasa. . . in a
case of insecurity, he knows in advance what will happen and asks us to begin to
prepare to flee or asks us not to panic and stay calm in our homes. (L23)
A woman described a man in her village that “resolves conflicts, and gives counsel. . . this
ideal man assures security against the thieves at night. . . ” (L38) Another woman from the
same village describes a man that is “wise, kind with all of the people in the community, that
helps the others and has a good heart” (L39).
After describing the qualities of an ideal man, respondents were asked explicitly how
this individual (or the described characteristics) would aid in their protection in a time of
insecurity and whether or not the individual that they envisioned would change. Table 4.5
depicts whether and how people chose to update the individual or the individual’s ideal
qualities.
Very few respondents said that they would change the characteristics or identity of an
ideal man under conditions of insecurity. Those that did choose to change made a practical
argument for it; for example, in cases where a respondent was referring to an ideal man that
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Table 4.5: Respondents Changing Qualities under Conditions of Insecurity
Men Women Total
Yes, different 3 4 7
No, but adds characteristics 11 10 21
No, no different 5 2 7
No answer 1 3 4
Total Respondents 20 20 40
lived outside of the village or that had passed away, the respondent would choose someone
nearby. It also became evident from this question, however, that many women felt constrained
in their responses, indicating that they do not feel comfortable talking about men that were
not their husbands. Because of this dimension, I focus mainly on men’s responses to this
question.
Most men describe how the person that they had been considering in their ideal description
would help them during an event of insecurity. These descriptions included how this ideal
person would give information to the local authorities, the military and other villagers about
the incident. Others emphasize how such an individual must be “influential” (L32) or “listened
to by the population” (M3).
Importantly, this discussions of ideal men and how ideal men in a community behave
provides no evidence of violent masculine norms. A theory of violent masculine norms
suggests that people become conditioned to or even revere violence as a result of war. This is
inconsistent with the findings from the previous chapter, as well as the qualitative evidence
here. Both male and female respondents describe how ideal men avoid conflict and help others
in the community. The majority of respondents cite peaceful relations between husband and
wife in the home as an ideal quality. These findings run counter to claims in the literature
about the normalization of violence in the home (Kelly et al. 2018).
The discussion about ideal men also provides insights into the importance of a man’s role
or contributions to the community, suggesting that ideal men act not only for themselves but
for the community. They give good counsel and “advocate for the entirety of the village not
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for his private interests” (K3). Another man from Village 1 describes: “This [ideal] man lives
with his family without problems and has love towards his community. . . (K4)
In sum, not only do people revere nonviolent men - men that work to mitigate conflict
through counsel - but also men that contribute to their communities. In the aftermath of war,
one key contribution is towards community security. A substantial number of respondents
mention security contributions in their descriptions of ideal men without priming. Others are
quick to describe how ideal men aid in community security when primed. People highly revere
men that have helped their communities and that have helped to protect them personally.
Taken together, this paints a picture consistent with the theory of protective masculine norms.
Both men and women, in the wake of exposure to armed conflict, expect men to behave
protectively towards their communties as demand for male protection grows.
4.5.3 People consider security tradeoffs when punishing crimes
Thus far, the qualitative evidence suggests that people demand more community protection
in the aftermath of war. This demand is plausibly related to masculine norms, e.g. how
ideal men behave towards their communities. However, a key component of this theory of
protective masculine norms is that external threats, realized through exposure to armed
conflict, changes how community members choose to punish one another for crimes.
The theory of protective masculine norms suggests that people consider security tradeoffs
when deciding whether to punish male community members for their crimes.
Having established people’s perceptions of particular crimes as threatening or unthreaten-
ing in nature in the previous chapter and in the exposition of the theory, this section turns
to an examination of how the security tradeoffs differ for threatening and non-threatening
community crimes.
Tradeoffs between punishment and protection



























Figure 4.5: Proportion adding crime perpetrators to security network
whether and how to punish local male perpetrators of crimes, people also think about the
perpetrator’s potential contributions towards community protection. It is because of the
theorized relationship between punishment of internal crimes and tradeoffs to protection that
exposure to armed conflict affects how communities choose to punish crimes.
Consistent with the theory of protective masculine norms, do people consider security
tradeoffs for punishing crimes? Do people perceive increased security costs for punishing
perpetrators of domestic violence as compared to rape and stealing?
To learn about how people perceive the relationship between intra-community crime
perpetration and community security, I asked respondents whether they would add a male
perpetrator of rape, domestic violence, and stealing (in turn) to their security network of 5
community members. Respondents then provided the reasoning behind their decision.
Figure 4.5 describes the security network data. Only 5% of respondents would add a
perpetrator of rape, but 53% would add a perpetrator of domestic violence and 17% would
add a perpetrator of stealing. Men are even more likely than women to add a perpetrator of
domestic violence to their security network with 80 percent of male respondents choosing to
add this perpetrator in most (3/4) of the villages but only twenty or forty percent of female
respondents choosing to add the perpetrator of domestic violence.
Both men and women that choose to include a perpetrator of domestic violence suggest
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that its perpetration does not bear on an individual’s capability to contribute to community
protection. There are many reasons that men may hit their wives, such as being drunk and
women’s mistakes at home. Some men even suggest that perpetrators of domestic violence
may provide better community security than others (K5, L3, L5).
He may have good ideas to plan how to secure the community (K5)
A man that hits his wive is not a model for everyone, but since he commits this
infraction inside his home, this does not exclude that he will be able to render
service to the community in times of insecurity. For example, a man in this village
beats his wife, but one day armed thieves came in the village and it was him that
took the lead for chasing him and mobilizing the youth. (L3)
Yes, I can add him, since beating his wife takes place in his home, but protecting
against armed groups is in the community and for the community. He can be a
bad man at home but be useful for all the village. He can participate in patrols,
he can inform the Chief of the Groupment if he sees movements of insecurity in
the village. (L5)
The set of respondents that chose not to add a perpetrator of domestic violence suggested
that a perpetrator of domestic violence would not protect women’s security or would not be
good at establishing peace. Others empasized that “one charged with security should be an
artisan of peace even in his home” (M1).
Conversely, almost all respondents refer to perpetrators of rape as people that cannot
be trusted for community security, with many describing how their inclusion in community
security networks will negatively impact the security of their community.107 A perpetrator
of rape may hurt the person and community that they are tasked to protect. They are
considered “dangerous” people.
107The two respondents that indicated they would add a rapist to their security network also commented
on capability, concluding that rape did not impact the ability of someone to contribute to the protection of
their community (L24, M8).
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Impossible to add him. This is an un desirable person. He will not work for the
community (K4).
He is a very bad person and can reinforce insecurity rather than fighting against
it. The same spirit behind this act can lead him to associate with armed groups
and rape our women and children (L35)
There is resounding agreement on this point: A rapist is “a dangerous man for all of the
society” (L21) who can “take advantage of [his role in] security to rape more” (M1).
While not referred to as “dangerous” people as in the case of rape perpetrators, perpetrators
of stealing are judged in relation to whether respondents believe an individual that steals
can be reformed. All 7 respondents that include a perpetrator of stealing suggest that this is
conditional on counsel and reform such that the perpetrator no longer steals. For respondents
that believe a thief is always a thief, they are are not included in protection networks (L25,
M3).
He is one with a heart of a thief and will always stay a thief and an element of
insecurity for the population (L23).
The thief will stay a thief all of the time. Armed groups provide him an opportunity
to even better practice stealing. (L35).
I think this is contrary to security - this thief. I cannot count on him. (M3)
Women are less steadfast in their belief that people that steal cannot be reformed. Many
respondents describe how they might add thieves to their security network if this is the first
time to steal or depending on the scale of the crime.108
There is also evidence that people consider the tradeoffs between punishing perpetrators
of domestic violence due to the sheer number of men that perpetrate domestic violence within
108Men in elite focus groups within the four villages suggested that women punish thieves less because they
have a soft heart and their sons might be the thieves being punished. Men believe that women are more
likely to shelter thieves.
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their communities (K6, L210, M8). When speaking about how an ideal or respected man
would react to a situation of domestic violence, a woman from Village 1 said:
Counsel the man who beats his wife, because most men beat their wives and if
people put all of them in prison, there would be very few men in this village. (K6)
In the same vein, a woman from Village 2 suggested to counsel a perpetrator of domestic
violence “because many men do this and we cannot emprison all of them” (L210).
In conversations about including perpetrators of rape and stealing in security networks,
respondents draw upon what they have learned from seeing the devolution of armed group
behavior in their own backyard - that recruiting people that behave badly can backfire, with
negative effects on safety and protection to individuals and communities. In one community,
an early experience of local violence during the era of Mobutu responded to this experience
by helping to build the Mai Mai group as a local self-defense group. This group, even while
its origin was to protect this very community, continues to prey upon the population.
The qualitative evidence from these discussions of hypothetical security networks and
whether people would include crime perpetrators reveal tradeoffs between punishing com-
munity perpetrators of crimes and the protection that crime perpetrators might be able to
provide. But how do discussions of hypotheticals translate into the everyday connections
and power structures within communities? To what extent do hypotheticals carry over into
reality?
Respondents were asked how they would respond if a specific individual that had aided
them in the past were accused of each of these crimes. When people think about punishing
people that have helped them in the past for hypothetical crimes the same logic prevails:
they are most lenient for domestic violence, slightly less lenient for stealing, and steadfast
against excusing people that have aided them for rape. Perpetrators of rape must go to jail;
but respondents will visit their former benefactors there. The data suggest that personal
connections do not override decisions to exclude perpetrators of rape and stealing from
security networks.
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Consistent with the theory of protective masculine norms, people consider tradeoffs to
community security when deciding about how to punish internal community crimes. Because
people do not want to include rapists and thieves in their security network, the cost to
community security for punishing perpetrators of rape and stealing is low or non-existent.
However, because people do want to include perpetrators of domestic violence in their security
network, the cost to community security for punishing perpetrators of domestic violence is
high.
4.6 Conclusion
The previous chapter presented evidence that armed conflict increased how severely people
prefer to punish rape and stealing but decreases how severely people prefer to punish domestic
violence - but these findings were unexpected and remained unexplained by theories posited
ex-ante. This chapter responds to the quantitative findings and qualitative insights with the
presentation of a new theory of protective masculine norms as well as several alternative
explanations.
Combining context-informed insights with a broad feminist literature on masculinities, I
build a theory of protective masculine norms in eastern DR Congo with an eye to its future
generalizability. When a community is exposed to armed conflict, people demand more
community protection, a form of protection generally supplied by men. Wanting to safeguard
male protectors in their communities, people prefer to punish perpetrators of common,
private crimes (such as domestic violence) less. Wanting to guard their communities from
harm, people - particularly men - prefer to punish criminals that pose a public community
threat (such as rape) more. In this way, the gendered nature of conflict and protection
has gendered repercussions, fostering a less permissive environment for rape but a more
permissive environment for domestic violence.
My previous work, however, had not asked about protection. To further develop the
theory and assess the theory’s applicability in eastern DR Congo, I needed to learn more
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about protection, armed conflict and strategic security considerations associated with crimes.
Interviews from follow-up fieldwork in a sample of four villages confirm the basic tenets of
the theory
1. Protection is gendered.
2. Armed conflict increases local demand for protection.
3. People consider security tradeoffs when deciding about punishing local crimes.
Beyond adding to the theory’s plausibility by confirming these points, this follow-up
research provided an opportunity to trace processes of insecurity and protection more explicitly.
This work revised my understanding of when protection happens. I had expected that people
would talk about protective incidents during armed group attacks. But, people described an
“every man for himself” logic during incidents of local insecurity.
Protection happens in the space in-between incidents of armed conflict. It happens day-to-
day through the formation of security networks and information sharing within communities.
Instead of preserving the supply of protection for communities to use during armed conflict
incidents, activity is geared directly towards daily protection from armed conflict incidents
where no one can or will help. The centrality of protective behaviors to daily life in the
aftermath of armed conflict is even stronger than originally described.
Having established how preferences for punishing local crime change in the aftermath
of armed conflict and having provided an account of why, the next question is about the
implications of this preference change. To what extent do these changes in preferences shape
the decisions communities make about punishing crimes?
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Chapter 5: Group Dynamics
5.1 Introduction
Armed conflict affects preferences for punishing local crimes. But, do these changes in
preferences have implications for how community members choose to punish perpetrators
of rape, domestic violence, and stealing? Does armed conflict’s demonstrated effects on
preferences matter for how perpetrators are treated in the public sphere?
There are many ways in which preferences influence the punishment of crimes against
women. Police are more likely to file a report of rape if they hold more gender equitable
attitudes and do not believe that the victim is to blame for her victimization. People are
also more likely to tell authorities about a crime if they believe that a perpetrator should be
punished for his or her crime. These examples show that punishment is inevitably a social
process; each involves someone revealing their preference for punishment to someone else
in the community. Even in cases where someone chooses to ostracize a perpetrator by not
inviting him to his or her home, he or she is revealing a preference - at minimum - to the
perpetrator.
While the social nature of punishment has informed my focus on preferences for punishment
in the previous chapters, this chapter brings the investigation of the social nature of punishment
one step further by examining the relationship between private and public preferences and
then examining the effects of armed conflict on preferences for punishment in the public
sphere. To this end, I delineate three types of preferences - private, public, and group
preferences - and measure them in the context of focus groups.
Focus groups aim to overcome the bias towards the private sphere in survey research
and learn directly from social processes by engaging with people as groups. Focus group
leaders can note who is silent, who contributes, who overpowers others and who makes whom
uncomfortable – and then ask “why” (Fujii 2017). Yet, focus groups do not directly disclose
how people’s private views on the same subject may differ from those that they express.
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Inattentiveness to this private dimension leaves important ethical questions about the effects
of focus groups on the private sphere unanswered - and unanswerable.
Drawing upon data collected within the same 80 focus groups described in Chapter 3, I
examine how armed conflict affects each type of preference, exploring whether armed conflict
affects group dynamics directly, through individual preferences, neither or both. My analysis
shows that public and group preferences are measurably distinct from private preferences
and often more extreme. The evidence supports the argument that armed conflict affects
public and group preferences for punishment through its effects on private preferences. This
shows that armed conflict can have effects on the treatment of perpetrators in the public
sphere - suggesting the relevance of protective masculine norms to actual social punishment.
The findings in this chapter also provide insight into the social nature of preferences, a
key tenet of the theory of protective masculine norms. I demonstrate, using a within subject
experiment, that people update their private beliefs to be closer to expressed group norms.
While I fail to find support for theories that armed conflict affects group dynamics
directly, there is some evidence that armed conflict affects the extent to which community
members, particularly male community members, internalize group norms. Among men,
armed conflict increases convergence with expressed group norms for punishing domestic
violence but decreases convergence for stealing. The effects among women are statistically
significant but substantively approximate zero. In sum, armed conflict’s negative effects on
preferences for punishing domestic violence may perpetuate through interactions with others
in the public sphere, particularly for men.
5.2 A Model of Preferences in Public and Private Spheres
Researchers often take the average preference derived from private survey questions with
individuals to reflect a population’s preference, noting some standard deviation. Yet, we
also know that the average preference does not necessarily reflect a community’s preferences,
because averaging is only one of a multitude of ways in which preferences may aggregate
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Figure 5.1: Process Model
when people act as groups (Austen-Smith and Banks 1996; Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1998).
Studies of deliberation show that – far from coming to moderate, average preferences – group
decisions or preferences can be highly polarized aggregations of their component parts (Roux
and Sobel 2015).
In order to learn about the nature of preferences for punishment and consider how armed
conflict shapes not only the private but the social sphere, I categorize preferences in terms of
three types: private, public, and group preferences. This section introduces a 3-step process
model grounded in the rich literature describing how and why public and private preferences
may differ.
As described in Figure 5.1, the process model begins with an individual’s private “true”
preference. It then asks how that original preference adapts to the social world by describing
how it is related to the preference that an individual is willing to share with others. This
is the first arrow in the model (Private to Public). Then, the process moves from public
expression of a preference to a group decision that reflects shared preferences (Public to
Group). Finally, the model examines how group norms, as expressed in the group decision,
affects private “true” preferences, coming full circle (Group to Post-discussion Private).109
109There are additional pathways relevant to this model that are not fully explored here. It may be the
public expression of preferences (Step 2) that drives private preference change rather than the expression of
group preferences (Step 3). For example, an influential person within a group may be more pivotal to driving
private preference change (Step 1) than a larger group consensus (Step 3). Additionally, private preferences
may influence group preferences (Step 3) directly rather through the public preference channel (Step 2). The
process model, however, provides a framework for thinking about how these preferences not only differ but
change. However, the circular process does not capture all potential pathways of how the private sphere
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5.2.1 Private Preferences
It is the contention of this dissertation that no measure of preference is completely private
or asocial. Once a preference is disclosed, some element of it becomes social. Despite this
understanding, researchers seek to approximate private preferences in their research to the
fullest extent possible because understanding them is essential to tracing the process of
preference change.
By implementing a survey experiment in Kenya, Cloward (2016) shows that, even in private
surveys, the preferences that people reveal can be highly dependent on who respondents
believe will receive the information. If respondents believe that an international aid donor
will receive the information, their responses are more likely to conform to international donor
expectations; whereas, if respondents believe that their local community will receive the
data, their responses will be more likely to conform to local expectations. This shows that
even responses to private survey questions are not viewed as private, but are informed by a
respondent’s understanding of the audience.
Beliefs about the privacy of one’s responses to survey questions has also been shown
to affect the responses that one gives. In a study that varies levels of privacy to elicit
sensitive information, Scacco (2010) finds that respondents disclose more engagement in
sensitive behaviors simply by erecting a physical barrier between enumerators and respondents.
Another method for imparting greater privacy is to ask respondents to record their responses
on a slip of paper only later to be examined by the enumerator (Humphreys, Khan, and
Lindsey 2015). List experiments are also widely used in order to get closer to the truth without
individuals having to reveal sensitive information to researchers (Corstange 2009; Aronow et
al. 2015). In research particular to violence against women, women are often coupled with
female enumerators – with the understanding that shared characteristics among enumerator
and respondent will generate an environment of comfortability and better approximate an
individual’s private or true preference (Organization and others 2001).
affects the social sphere and vice versa.
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In sum, existing research demonstrates that levels of privacy and understandings about
the intended audience have implications for what information a survey respondent reveals in
surveys. The more privacy assured to respondents and the less that respondents know about
the preferences of the audience, the closer the revealed preferences will be to “true” private
preferences. As such, private preferences are distinct and potentially differentiable from the
preferences that people will express in the public sphere.
5.2.2 Public Preferences
In the process model that I explicate here, the first step in any group discussion is bringing
preferences from the private sphere into the public sphere. In a focus group setting, this means
sharing one’s preference with the focus group leader and all other participants in the session.
In shifting to the public sphere, people may choose to reveal a different preference than their
“true” private preference, a process which Timur Kuran (1997) refers to as dissimulation.
The divergence between an individual’s private belief and the belief that the individual is
willing to express in public is an important subject in the social norms literature (Tankard and
Paluck 2016; Miller and Prentice 2016). Kuran (1997) outlines three factors that determine
whether an individual will express his or her real private preference in public: individual
benefits, reputational benefits, and expressive benefits. Because similarity is often highly
prized among groups, individuals thinking about their reputations may choose to hide their
true preferences and characterize them as similar to those of respected individuals in the
public sphere. But an individual will also weigh this reputational concern against the value
that he or she expects to gain from revealing his or her true preference (such as moving
a group decision towards this true preference) or the value that he or she expects to gain
directly from self expression.
When many people dissimulate their true preferences in the public sphere, a suboptimal
social equilibrium can emerge where community members are largely behaving as if they prefer
one thing, but actually prefer another. This discordance is known as pluralistic ignorance
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(Bjerring, Hansen, and Pedersen 2014). In a setting of two potential preferences under
pluralistic ignorance, most people (or everyone) prefer option A, but believe others prefer
option B. Because their beliefs about others’ preferences are incorrect, people act as if they
prefer option B even while they prefer option A. This behavior confirms people’s incorrect
beliefs, generating a remarkably stable suboptimal equilibrium.
Even while stable, theories of norm change suggest that behavior can change very quickly
when a community’s true underlying preference for option A is revealed, because people begin
to act in accordance with their true preferences. In some cases, such as the eradication of
foot binding in China, communities were able to move away from the behavior fairly quickly,
by pledging alongside other families that they would not engage in foot binding or allow
their sons to marry women whose feet had been bound. By changing incentives posed by
the marriage market, people were able to act on their true preferences within a generation
(Mackie 1996).
Thus, social norms theories suggest that people will attempt to predict the preferences of
others in their community and will adapt their own preference accordingly when interacting
with others. Thus, if members of a focus group expect the preferences of powerful members
of their group to be more extreme, they will adapt their preferences to be more extreme. If
they expect the preferences of other powerful members of their group to be more moderate
they will adapt their preferences to be more moderate. Where there is uncertainty about
the preferences of others, people will have difficulty making predictions and will likely adapt
their preference less when expressing their preference in public.
Yet, even while the norms framework suggests that people will reveal a different preference
in public than in private, other frameworks suggest otherwise. Some scholars contend that
people do not hold private preferences as distinct from public preferences. One reason is that
respondents often believe that researchers are asking about what happens in a community
rather than about personal preferences or what they believe should happen in a community
(Schuler and Islam 2008, Ellsberg et al. (2001)). In many societies, respondents do not think
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in the same individualistic way as researchers often assume, so respondents may not believe
that individual preferences are (or should be) distinct from community preferences (Smith
2004). Additionally, a large psychological literature suggests that people tend to believe
others think like them (Ross, Greene, and House 1977).110 In this case, the difference between
public preferences and private preferences given by the same individual should be minimal.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the first step in understanding the social
nature of preferences in focus groups is accounting for how individuals portray their beliefs
to others. There are many reasons why an individual’s private and public preferences may
differ – as well as reasons why they may not. By empirically assessing whether or not people
hold private beliefs that are distinct from the beliefs that they express to others, researchers
can refine their approach to interpreting silences within focus groups.
5.2.3 Group Preferences
Group preferences are important because groups, rather than individuals acting alone,
determine the social context in which decisions are made. In focus group settings, it is
common to ask people to work together to make decisions as a group. For example, focus
group leaders may ask participants to rank the importance of different issue areas while
noting how the discussion ensues to give context and social meaning to the final ranking. If
the first step in the social nature of preferences is sharing preferences with others in the focus
group, the next step is making decisions with others in the focus group.
Several theories provide insights into dynamics of focus groups. As described in the
previous section, social norms theories highlight how, within groups, individuals often feel
subvert or overt pressure to conform to the opinions of others in their groups, ultimately
decreasing the diversity of opinions for group members to consider. People with social power
sway decisions to their preference, sometimes acheiving this by doing no more than voicing
their preference. Social power can also be wielded in more direct ways, such as through a
110This theory is known as the false consensus effect.
148
glance of disapproval or a reminder about a participant’s relative status (e.g., mocking fellow
participants for speaking in a language associated with lower social strata). In sum, social
norms theories suggest that group decisions can be driven by a few dominant individuals.
Group polarization occurs when group discussions lead to more extreme rather than more
moderate preferences (Myers and Lamm 1976). If the dominant group members hold more
extreme preferences, group preferences may become more polarized as others conform or
adopt those more extreme preferences. There may also be diffusion of responsibility for
decisions among groups, leading people to take more extreme decisions than they would take
individually (Kogan and Wallach 1967).
The key component of group polarization as defined in social psychology is that there
is movement towards an an “already preferred pole” (Myers and Lamm 1976, pg. 603-
604). In this usage, polarization stands in contrast to “extremization” which describes how
people, when acting as groups, become less neutral. Thus, polarization as used here suggests
movement in the same direction, but beyond the average preferences of individuals.111
Group composition can also affect the nature of group decisions (Kroon, Van Kreveld,
and Rabbie 1992). More heterogeneous groups may begin with more diversity of opinion,
but – at the same time – this diversity may be offset as people conform to perceived social
pressures imposed by more dominant group members. Group composition is one area where
research on the effects of gender composition has been particularly important – showing
that inserting one woman into an otherwise all male group has no effects. Instead, women’s
preferences are only heard and accounted for in group decisions when a critical threshold of
female participants is met (Karpowitz and Mendelberg 2014).
In sum, research shows that group preferences are not simply the mean preference held
by individuals within a group. The social sphere leaves ample space for social norms to affect
preference expression within focus groups. The same set of underlying private preferences may
yield different outcomes in different social settings according to group composition. Norms
111Thus polarization is not necessarily describing a cleavage inducing process (Lamm and Myers 1978).
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theories posit channels by which public and group preferences will become more extreme.
5.2.4 Post-Discussion Private Preferences
The next step in the social preference process is how the public sphere, in turn, shapes
the private sphere. When others’ preferences and arguments become known and a group
preference is voiced in the context of a focus group, how does that knowledge, in turn, affect
“true” private preferences that individuals hold? This step in the process describes a channel
by which social norms, as expressed within focus groups, affect preferences that people return
home with after the focus group concludes.
The constructivist literature on norms recognizes that the social sphere and the private
sphere are mutually constituted. In Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) model of international
norms cascades, people internalize international norms as a third and final step of norm
consolidation. When norms are internalized, people follow the norm unthinkingly and this
leads to more consistency between preferences in the private and public sphere.
However, the process of internalization can be a long road and social norms are not
always internalized. When people do not align their private preferences with those of their
social group, a gap will remain between public and group preferences on the one hand and
post-discussion private preferences on the other. Take for example the case of religion. When
a group expresses a norm against religion within a focus groups discussion, this may lead
people to change (a) the religious preference that they reveal to others, (b) their underlying
religious preference, (c) neither, or (d) both. Less explored is the possibility of norm defiers.
Bicchieri (2006) highlights that preferences can change with or against expressed norms.
Norm compliers will want to adapt their preferences to those expressed by their group, but
norm defiers will want to act contrary to preferences expressed by their group. However,
while aptly capturing the behavior of a few, norm defiance is unlikely to describe the behavior
of a broad population.
Thus, there are two main channels by which focus groups may affect people’s private
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preferences: (1) Public and group preferences expressed in focus groups may have no effect
on an individual’s original preference, which suggests that private preferences are fairly stable
in the face of social norms. Or (2), public and group preferences in focus groups may shift
an individual’s preference towards the expressed group norm or decision, which suggests
that social norms become internalized. If there are changes in private preferences due to
social interactions in focus groups, this underscores the model’s depiction of all preferences
as innately social.
5.3 Theory and Hypotheses
5.3.1 Hypotheses of difference and polarization
Based on the process described above, I propose two families of hypotheses. First, I examine
hypotheses of difference to establish that there are statistical differences between prefer-
ences that people express in private and what they express in public, as groups, and again in
private (after discussions have taken place). If private, public and group preferences differ,
the findings will establish the relevance of considering the social sphere when considering
armed conflict’s effects on social punishment.
Then, I ask how private preferences change as they move from the private to the public
spheres and back again. I propose hypotheses of polarization; along the trajectory from
private to group preferences, norms theories suggest that preferences will move unidirectionally
(in the direction of dominant preferences) to greater extremes. But, I also examine how
interactions in the public sphere shape the private preferences that people hold. Norms
theories suggest that people will update their private preferences towards group norms after
engaging in group discussions. Thus, post-discussion private preferences will be more extreme
than pre-discussion private preferences, but potentially not as extreme as group preferences
themselves as people shift in line with expressed norms.
Protective masculine norms theory suggests that preferences change because of the
increased value of protection that men can offer - because of norms. Through examining how
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group dynamics influence the private preferences that people hold, this research provides
insights into the norms-based impetus to preference change - a key tenet of protective
masculine norms theory. In addition, examining how the social sphere interacts with private
preferences reveals insights into how changes in preferences for punishment, demonstrated
empirically, might perpetuate in post-conflict societies.
5.3.2 Hypotheses of aggregation and group dynamics
Having established armed conflict’s effects on the preferences for punishing rape, domestic
violence and stealing, two central questions remain: First, does preference change have impli-
cations for social punishment? Second and relatedly, does armed conflict have independent
effects on social dynamics?
In sum, armed conflict may affect public preferences for punishment because (a) preferences
in the public sphere may be affected because of changes in private preferences, (b) the public
sphere may be affected independently of private preferences112, (c) both, or (d) neither.
The first and most apparent hypothesis is that the effects of armed conflict on preferences
for punishment aggregate up to also affect the preferences that people express in public. In
turn, publically expressed preferences should affect group preferences and group decisions for
punishing rape, domestic violence and stealing.
Hypotheses of aggregation suggest that, when armed conflict increases how severely
people privately prefer to punish rape and stealing, they will also prefer to punish rape and
stealing more as groups. In this environment, perpetrators will be more likely to be socially
punished because of underlying “true” changes to the distribution of punishment preferences
in a community.
The opposite is true for domestic violence, since armed conflict decreases how severely
people prefer to punish this crime. However, because domestic violence is considered a more
112Effects on preferences in the public sphere could run in the opposite or the same direction as private
preference change.
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private crime, aggregation may be different - thus it is important to examine pathways of
change to social punishment specific to each crime.
Yet, the three step process model outlined in the theory section suggest several hypotheses
of group dynamics. Social dynamics could drive public and group preferences directly in
many ways. Armed conflict may add uncertainty about others’ preferences so individuals
do not know (could not well predict) the punishment preferences of others. If so, people in
conflict communities will not be able to adjust either their publicly expressed preferences
as effectively as places not exposed to recent armed conflict. This would lead to less of a
difference in private preferences as compared to publicly expressed and, potentially, group
preferences.
Another pathway by which armed conflict might have direct effects is by empowering
different individuals that hold more extreme views. As a result, empowered individuals drive
public and group preferences differently from their counterparts in other communities. This is
consistent with the framework of protective masculine norms where men that protect become
more empowered or revered.113 Alternatively, armed conflict may simply foster a discussion
environment that favors more extreme views rather than changing how power holders drive
group preferences.
Finally and more generally, armed conflict may affect people’s private preferences (as
shown in Chapter 3), but people may continue to reveal an unchanged preference to others. If
individuals choose to dissimulate their changed private beliefs after armed conflict, public and
group behavior may remain unchanged even though people’s underlying “true” preferences
are different. Kuran (1997) outlines preference expression as being dependent on individual
calculation of individual benefits, reputational benefits, and expressive benefits. If armed
113A study of how protective masculine norms affect group dynamics directly might examine changes in
dynamics of male/female decison-making power on punishment within a combined gender group. While I
chose not to do so here for ethical reasons, a differently formulated study could examine this dimension in the
future. Another method would be to identify and trace the role of power holders in decision-making within
groups in conflict and non-conflict communities. This would be possible to some extent in future analyses of
the existing data. However, prior to tracing these mechanisms, it is important to establish the relationship
empirically.
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conflict changes any of these factors, it may lead to differences in preferences that people
express in public and, in turn, differences in how groups punish crimes in the wake of armed
conflict.
Hypotheses of aggregation and hypotheses of group dynamics, however, are not mutually
exclusive. Changes to social punishment may occur because of private preference change in
the community and because of changes to group dynamics directly. Where co-existing, the
effects could also reinforce one another or cancel one another out.
5.4 Research Design
I design and implement a study within the same communities in eastern DR Congo to
investigate the relationship between private preferences, public preferences and armed conflict.
The form of the study uses a focus group setting to learn about private, publicly expressed
and group preferences for punishing crimes in both conflict and non-conflict villages.
Focus groups harness the form and content of conversations among participants of a
group discussion to reveal socially informed truths. Despite viewing and analyzing silences,
hesitations, and dominance in focus group conversations, questions still remain about how
the public nature of focus groups impacts what researchers learn. Even less explored are the
ways by which group discussions affect people’s preferences themselves, which have important
ethical implications for researchers that use focus groups worldwide.
5.4.1 Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo
The context of eastern Democratic Republic of Congo is germane to research on preferences
for punishing crimes against women for several reasons. First, there have been a substantial
number of focus groups highlighting the importance of social norms and social stigma around
violence against women in this context (Kelly et al. 2012, Kelly et al. (2011)). Is social
sanctioning important? Or might the public nature of research (in the form of focus groups)
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on this topic lead directly to the social nature of the results?114
Rape and wife-beating are sensitive subjects of research in DR Congo as they are anywhere
in the world. Because of its sensitive nature, participants in one-on-one surveys as well
as focus groups that discuss violence against women will be particularly cognizant of how
they report and frame their attitudes and experiences. Research on violence against women
is thus a very likely area where the public and private dimensions of preferences may be
differentiated.
Second, in a context innundated by research and efforts to address violence against women
through social engagement, there is an urgent need for researchers and advocacy organizers
alike to better understand how even their unintended interventions might affect peoples lives
on these important issues. If preferences become more extreme as a result of engaging in
focus group conversations, then there needs to be increased oversight and efforts to mitigate
potential harmful effects.
Third and finally, the study of local everyday social sanctioning behavior in eastern
Democratic Republic of Congo has been largely overlooked in the face of the dominant focus
on addressing rape perpetrated by armed groups as a tool of war (Autesserre 2012, Lake
(2014b)). Parsing apart the private and public dimensions associated with punishing everyday
local crime can inform efforts to decrease impunity and improve local security.
5.4.2 Design
Chapter 3 describes my measure of private preferences for punishing crimes against women
in eastern DR Congo. I held 80 focus groups across 20 villages - some villages that had and
some that had not experienced armed conflict events in the recent past. I chose to measure
these private preferences in the context of focus groups to integrate qualitative data that
114In a working paper with Koos (Koos and Lindsey 2019), we demonstrate the relevance of stigma - a form
of social sanctioning - to both individuals and communities in a representative sample outside of the focus
group context. The connection to this dissertation is interesting. When thinking about stigma, Koos and I
consider the social sanctioning of victims; when thinking about sanctioning in this dissertation, I consider the
social sanctioning of perpetrators.
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would help me to interpret the findings.
In addition to providing the opportunity to integrate qualitative work, the focus group
provided a context to measure how people change their preferences when moving from the
private to the public sphere.
Each focus group begins with a focus group leader verbally collecting basic background
data from participants. Following the receipt of these basic data, focus group facilitators
divide participants (ranging from 11 to 16 members in size) into subgroups of 3-4 members as
outlined in a detailed protocol. Dividing into subgroups facilitates the quantitative portion of
the research by augmenting the number of (sub)group level observations where I can observe
how the public dimension shapes the private sphere.115 The protocol yields approximately
230 subgroups from the sample of 80 focus groups and 960 participants.
To record the quantitative measurements, each participant is given a response card to
note their ideal response to the three hypothetical crimes. As depicted in Figure 3.2, the
card provides illustrations to represent different potential punishment options (also described
by the focus group leader) that can be characterized on a scale from less to more severe.
This approach aims to create a meaningful, contextual study for participants to engage in by
asking about actual punishment options rather than an abstract scale.
As described in the protocol outlined in Chapter 3, each focus group began with the
measure of private preferences that involved a description of hypothetical crime narratives
of rape, domestic violence and stealing. Crimes were presented in a randomized order and
participants circled their preferred punishment option for each crime on a card. The focus
group leader then collected folded pictoral cards of all three responses from each participant.
The participant’s indication of their preference on the folded card serves as the measure of
private preferences.116
After all response cards were collected, the focus group leaders asked about publicly
115While not analyzed here, subgroups are assigned to achieve a balanced number of both homogeneous
and heterogeneous groups in terms of education. This variable appears as a control in regression analyses.
116A description of the punishment options and a validation of the severity scale is detailed in Chapter 3.
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Figure 5.2: Order of Measurement
expressed preferences for each crime, in the same randomized order; then group preferences
for each crime in the same randomized order; and finally post-discussion private preferences
for each crime in the same randomized order. The order is summarized in Figure 5.2.
Private preference: First, participants circle their preferred punishment on the
pictorial card for all three crimes in private. The focus group leaders emphasize
that their response will not be shared with anyone. After all crime narratives
are read, participants fold the response card and return it to the focus group
leader. Respondents thus do not feel that they are being observed by focus group
leaders or by other participants of the focus group, approximating “true” private
preferences.
Public preference: Second, new cards are distributed. Participants repeat the
same task for all three crimes, but enumerators emphasize that each participant
will be asked to share his or her response card with his or her small subgroup of
3-4 participants. Once everyone has circled their public preference for each crime,
participants then share their response card with other subgroup members.
Group preference: Third, focus group leaders ask participants to discuss the
punishment options with their subgroup to decide which option is the subgroup’s
most preferred punishment. Focus group leaders then verbally ask each subgroup
about their choice and record the group’s preferred punishment accordingly. In the
background, focus group leaders also take note of important subgroup dynamics
and note if and when there are any cross subgroup dynamics at play.
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Post-discussion private preference: Finally, a third set of response cards are
distributed. Participants circle their preferred punishment on the pictorial card
for all three crimes in private. The focus group leaders emphasize that these
responses will not be shared with anyone. After all crime narratives are reviewed,
participants fold the response card and return it to the focus group leader in order
to best approximate participant privacy.
To facilitate repeated discussions of the same crime narrative as well as to focus the minds
of participants on a shared story, focus group leaders presented the illustrations drawn by a
local artist presented in Chapter 3 each time the crime was referenced. Focus group leaders
also reviewed the narrative each time.
Because the crime ordering is randomized, the randomization breaks the link between
the crime-specific findings and ordering effects. However, the order in which I measured
preferences is the same in every focus group to reflect the described process model. Therefore,
there are potential ordering effects between private preferences, publicly expressed preferences,
group preferences and post-discussion private preferences.117
To summarize, the design yields four sets of outcome variables relevant to this study:
private preferences, publicly expressed preferences, group preferences, and a second measure
of private preferences (post-discussion private preferences).
The structure takes the form of a within-subject experiment, where participants are
“treated” at each stage of measurement. For example, the design well translates into a
comparison between private and post-discussion private preferences, where the difference
between an individual’s response is attributable to the public and group measurement
components of the focus group discussion. However, the design does have limitations. It is not
possible to tease apart whether a focus group’s effects on post-discussion private preferences
117The design cannot address the question of whether, in an experimental study, a focus group that
measures only publicly expressed preferences would be different from a focus group that measures only private
preferences. However question can be explored in future research in a larger sample to build on the findings
here.
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Table 5.1: Mean and Difference from Private Punishment Preference
Mean SD Diff from Private 1 P-value of Diff
Rape
Private 3.175 1.216
Publicly Expressed 3.283 1.159 0.108 0.002
Group Choice 3.554 0.972 0.379 0.000
Post Discussion Private 3.334 1.145 0.159 0.000
Domestic Violence
Private 1.905 1.228
Publicly Expressed 1.935 1.248 0.029 0.416
Group Choice 1.733 1.149 -0.172 0.000
Post Discussion Private 1.852 1.229 -0.053 0.187
Stealing
Private 2.923 1.239
Publicly Expressed 2.945 1.235 0.021 0.553
Group Choice 3.088 1.158 0.164 0.000
Post Discussion Private 2.994 1.215 0.070 0.056
are attributable to expressing a preference in public or to the process of forming a group
preference. For some comparisons, it remains a bundled treatment.
The measurement procedure contributes a new method to the empirical measurement of
preferences that also accounts for group norms. The method is feasible to apply in almost
any focus group setting, including focus groups with unlettered populations as in eastern
Democratic Republic of Congo. It provides an additional avenue to checking our assumptions
about private preferences in focus groups and learning why and how they change.
5.5 Evidence
5.5.1 Relationship between private, public and group preferences
To begin the analysis, I calculate the individual-level means, take the difference, and conduct
paired t-tests on the difference between public, group and post-discussion private preferences
and original “true” private preferences for punishing rape, domestic violence and stealing.
This analysis pools responses from both male and female focus group participants.
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As suggested by hypotheses of difference, the naive difference in means analyses depicted
in Table 5.1 points to statistically significant differences between private preferences for
punishing rape and preferences influenced by the social sphere. There are also statistically
significant differences between private preferences for punishing stealing and group preference
as well as post-discussion private preferences. Finally, there are statistically significant
differences between group preferences for punishing domestic violence and private preferences.
Given the context, people may have less knowledge about others’ preferences on punishing
domestic violence and stealing as compared to rape, which is widely discussed. Without
information about what the “right” response is people cannot account for the expected
preferences of others when expressing their preference in public. This may explain observed
differences in whether people adapt their “true” private preferences when expressing them to
their groups.
Another relevant question related to hypotheses of difference, however, is whether publicly
expressed, group, and post-discussion private preferences are different from one another.
Table 5.2 reveals the statistical significance of the differences across all private and public
measures of preferences for each crime. For interpreting the direction of difference across
measures, note that the column variable mean is subtracted from the row variable mean.
P-values are denoted by asteriks using standard significance thresholds.
While there is some variation across crimes, it is clear that social measures are also
statistically different from one another. For rape, domestic violence, and stealing; the difference
between publicly expressed and group preferences is statistically significant, suggesting that
it is not only the preference that is revealed driving preference aggregation but also group
dynamics. For all three crimes, there is also a statistically significant difference between
group measures and the private preferences that people report after group discussions. Thus,
even while Table 5.1 suggests participants change their preferences, participants do not fully
conform with the preferences of their groups.
As suggested by hypotheses of polarization, preferences for punishing rape and stealing,
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Table 5.2: Difference across all Punishment Preferences
X = Private X = Public X = Group
Rape
Diff: Public - X 0.11**
Diff: Group - X 0.38*** 0.27***
Diff: PostDisc Private - X 0.16*** 0.05 -0.22***
Domestic Violence
Diff: Public - X 0.03
Diff: Group - X -0.17*** -0.2***
Diff: PostDisc Private - X -0.05 -0.08* 0.12***
Stealing
Diff: Public - X 0.02
Diff: Group - X 0.16*** 0.14***
Diff: PostDisc Private - X 0.07 0.05 -0.09**
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show that when moving from the private to the public sphere, people
exhibit punishment preferences for rape and stealing that are both statistically different and
more severe.
The public sphere operates a bit differently when it comes to preferences for punishing
domestic violence. Unlike rape and stealing, preferences for punishing domestic violence
become less (rather than more) severe when people act as groups. But this finding continues
to support hypotheses of polarization. The outcome variable, preferences for punishment, is
measured on a scale from 1 to 4, so the center point between 1 and 4 is 2.5. The mean private
preference for domestic violence falls below this central threshold - meaning a move towards
extreme is downward rather than upward in severity. Thus, as in the case of punishing rape
and stealing, the shift between private preferences and group preferences is moving towards
an extreme - but a low extreme rather than a high one.
Hypotheses of polarization also suggest that people’s post-discussion preferences are more
extreme than orignal or “true” private preferences, but - potentially - not as extreme as group
preferences (since influenced by but no longer in the public sphere). This is also borne out
in the data, because preferences move unidirectionally through the public sphere towards
extremes, but then moderate when they re-enter the private sphere.
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Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show that post-discussion private preferences are more extreme after
the discussion than original private preferences for punishing rape and stealing.118 While
there is not a statistical difference between private and post-discussion private preferences for
punishing domestic violence the estimated difference also runs in the expected (and opposite
direction). The trajectory of change from private to public spheres and back again becomes
most clear in Table 5.2, where the estimated differences between group preferences and
post-discussion private preferences all flip signs as preferences move back into the private
sphere.
There are other interesting differences to consider across the crimes that warrant future
study. For example, there is a positive and statistically significant difference between private
preferences and publicly expressed preferences only in the case of rape. Why is this not the
case for stealing? Adapting one’s preference prior to revealing that preference requires some
level of information about the preferences of others within one’s subgroup. Figure 3.4 and
Appendix A.4.1 show that even though the modal response is the same for rape and stealing,
there is more variation in responses for stealing than for rape. Focus group discussions with
elites in four villages about the findings also revealed that people thought the government was
ineffective in punishing stealing, but was effective in punishing rape. There may be variation
in people’s willingness to express a preference out of line with government policy as in the
case of stealing. People may be less clear about what the socially appropriate action is and
thus are less likely to update their preference before revealing that preference to others.
Taken together, the data in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 provide initial support for hypotheses
of difference and hypotheses of polarization. Public, private and group preferences are
statistically differentiable from people’s original private preferences - with some variation in
statistical significance - and social preferences tend to move towards extremes in the sample
pooling men’s and women’s responses.119
118For stealing, the estimated difference in means just misses the statistical threshold (as depicted in Table
5.1) but runs in the expected direction.






































































Figure 5.3: Men and Women’s preferences
But, there are reasons to expect differences in group dynamics according to gender. And
one might expect such differences to be particularly true for preferences around gender-based
violence such as rape and domestic abuse. To what extent do hypotheses of difference and
polarization hold when dividing the data between men and women? Figure 5.3 presents plots
of the means for all respondents and then disaggregates the results by gender. Error bars
indicate standard errors of the means.
The plots reveal descriptively how preferences for punishing rape follow similar trajectories
for men and women as they engage with others in the social sphere. In line with the
hypotheses of difference and the hypotheses of polarization, both men and women hold clearly
differentiable private, public, group and post-discussion private preferences, particularly in
the case of rape. However, there is little need to disaggregate men’s and women’s preferences
for punishing rape, because they are so closely related.
Men and women’s preferences for punishing domestic violence also move in the same
direction for punishing domestic violence. However, the trends suggest that women’s prefer-
ences might be even more affected by group dynamics than men’s. For stealing, however, the
opposite is true. There are few observed differences between the public and private spheres
preferences among groups are more extreme than the average of individual preferences with movement in the
direction of the preferred pole (Myers and Lamm 1976; Lamm and Myers 1978).
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for women’s preferences; instead, observed changes in Table 5.1 and Figure 5.3 seem to be
driven by changes in men’s preferences for punishing stealing rather than women’s.
To test more rigorously for differences between men and women and to account for the
group nature in which the data was collected, I conduct an additional analysis where I combine
(or stack) data from all outcomes and run one regression with several dichotomous indicators
for whether the outcome is a private, a publicly expressed, a group, or a post discussion private
preference. As currently structured, the base term for each coefficient is private preferences.
When an interaction term is statistically significant, this means that it is statistically different
from private preferences. Preferences for punishing rape, domestic violence, and stealing
are depicted in Tables 5.3-5.5. In each table, Model 1 includes individual-level fixed effects,
Model 2 adds a control variable for the gender of the respondent, Model 3 adds an interaction
term between the preference type and gender, and Model 4 adds individual-level fixed effects
to Model 3.
The models in Table 5.3 confirm what was presented descriptively in Figure 5.3. Publicly
expressed, group choice and post discussion preferences for punishment are statistically
different and more extreme than private preferences for punishing rape. Whether or not a
respondent is male or female is not driving differences in how the public sphere affects private
preferences for punishing rape.
Table 5.4 confirms that group preferences for punishing domestic violence are statistically
more extreme (less severe) than private preferences for punishing domestic violence. Models
2-4 in Table 5.4 show that female respondents prefer less punishment for domestic violence
across the board, but effects of the public sphere on preference are not heterogeneous by
gender. Both men and women prefer to punish domestic violence less as groups.
Focus group participants in elite focus groups suggest that the observed difference between
men’s group and private preferences for punishing domestic violence were most likely affected
by the knowledge about the behaviors of other men in their groups. When men know
that other men in their groups have perpetrated domestic violence, they will be unlikely
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Table 5.3: Private versus Group Outcomes: Rape
Dependent Variable: Punishment Preferences
Stacked Outcomes
Ind.FEs Female.Ctrl Female.Het All
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public (base=Private) 0.108∗∗ 0.108∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.043) (0.056) (0.065)
Group (base=Private) 0.379∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.085) (0.106) (0.122)
PostDisc Private (base=Private) 0.159∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗
(0.057) (0.049) (0.067) (0.078)
Female 0.014 0.077 −0.188∗∗∗
(0.148) (0.154) (0.061)
Female x Public (base=Private) −0.133 −0.133
(0.091) (0.105)
Female x Group (base=Private) −0.087 −0.087
(0.113) (0.131)
Female x PostDisc Private (base=Private) −0.030 −0.030
(0.096) (0.111)
Constant 3.589∗∗∗ 3.168∗∗∗ 3.134∗∗∗ 3.805∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.106) (0.109) (0.046)
Indiv. Fixed Effects? Yes No No Yes
Observations 3,972 3,972 3,972 3,972
Adjusted R2 0.495 0.014 0.014 0.495
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)
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Table 5.4: Private versus Group Outcomes: Domestic Violence
Dependent Variable: Punishment Preferences
Stacked Outcomes
Ind.FEs Female.Ctrl Female.Het All
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public (base=Private) 0.029 0.029 0.053 0.053
(0.041) (0.035) (0.047) (0.054)
Group (base=Private) −0.172∗∗ −0.172∗∗ −0.101 −0.101
(0.080) (0.069) (0.099) (0.114)
PostDisc Private (base=Private) −0.053 −0.053 0.011 0.011
(0.069) (0.060) (0.064) (0.073)
Female −0.326∗∗∗ −0.252∗∗ −2.926∗∗∗
(0.123) (0.123) (0.068)
Female x Public (base=Private) −0.043 −0.043
(0.074) (0.086)
Female x Group (base=Private) −0.132 −0.132
(0.121) (0.140)
Female x PostDisc Private (base=Private) −0.119 −0.119
(0.097) (0.112)
Constant 1.049∗∗∗ 2.081∗∗∗ 2.042∗∗∗ 4.009∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.124) (0.119) (0.049)
Indiv. Fixed Effects? Yes No No Yes
Observations 3,972 3,972 3,972 3,972
Adjusted R2 0.504 0.021 0.021 0.505
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)
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Table 5.5: Private versus Group Outcomes: Stealing
Dependent Variable: Punishment Preferences
Stacked Outcomes
Ind.FEs Female.Ctrl Female.Het All
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Public (base=Private) 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.022
(0.034) (0.029) (0.060) (0.069)
Group (base=Private) 0.164∗∗ 0.164∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.072) (0.067) (0.078)
PostDisc Private (base=Private) 0.070 0.070 0.125∗∗ 0.125∗∗
(0.055) (0.047) (0.051) (0.058)
Female −0.282∗∗ −0.194 −0.662∗∗∗
(0.144) (0.135) (0.069)
Female x Public (base=Private) −0.001 −0.001
(0.102) (0.117)
Female x Group (base=Private) −0.248∗∗ −0.248∗∗
(0.109) (0.126)
Female x PostDisc Private (base=Private) −0.101 −0.101
(0.070) (0.080)
Constant 3.186∗∗∗ 3.076∗∗∗ 3.029∗∗∗ 3.889∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.091) (0.095) (0.041)
Indiv. Fixed Effects? Yes No No Yes
Observations 3,972 3,972 3,972 3,972
Adjusted R2 0.533 0.015 0.016 0.535
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)
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to condemn this behavior as groups. Thus qualitative accounts suggest that descriptive
norms led more men to choose the lowest possible level of punishment when acting as groups.
Women also expressed knowledge that women preferred domestic problems to remain in their
homes - thus descriptive norms may be affecting women’s behavior in groups as well.120
Table 5.5 confirms the visual depiction presented in Figure 5.3. Group preferences are
statistically different and more severe than private preferences for punishment in Models 1
and 2 which do not account for gender. The effect of a group discussion within a focus group
has different effects depending on whether men or women are acting as groups. When acting
as groups, men prefer more punishment for stealing than they do privately. Women, however,
prefer less punishment (but roughly equivalent to zero difference) than they do privately.
Men also seem to be more influenced by expressed group norms in the private sphere, since
post-discussion private preferences are positively and significantly related to the severity of
men’s preferences for punishing stealing (.125).
To summarize, the findings suggest that preferences get more extreme in nature as they
move through the public sphere. Preferences for punishing rape and stealing, which on
average elicit a higher severity of punishment, become even more severe when people act as
groups. Preferences for punishing domestic violence, which elicits a much lower severity of
punishment on average, become even less severe when people act as groups. In the case of
stealing, the focus group discussion leaves men with more extreme views on punishment than
they had prior to the group discussion.
The update to men’s private preference for punishing stealing is plausibly related to
protective masculine norms theory, which suggests that men are encouraged to act protectively
towards their communities by rooting out harmful crimes such as rape and stealing. This
means that men’s private preferences are driven by a normative dynamic encouraging men to
engage in protective behavior against this crime.
120Yet, these descriptive accounts fail to account for why people still feel free to express their private
condemnation of the act in their publicly expressed preference.
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5.5.2 Normative nature of preference change
The question of whether and how focus group discussions change people’s preference highlights
important ethical considerations related to focus group research - a widespread form of research
undertaken worldwide. If engaging in discussions has the power to change people’s private
preferences, then researchers need to take measures to mitigate potential harm to participants
or others that may emerge from preference change.
To further investigate the effects of focus group discussions and gain insights into the
normative nature of preference change, I examine the extent to which group preferences drive
post-discussion private preference change using a within-subject experimental design. To
do so, I regress post-discussion preferences, preferences which have been “treated” with the
social influence of an expressed group preference, on group preferences. The models control
for a respondent’s original “true” private preference, examines the effect of group preference
or “treatment” (=1, 2, 3, or 4), and the interaction between them to account for the fact
that an individual’s preference helped to determine each group’s preference. I present the
coefficient estimates from the linear regression models in Figure 5.4.121
All models include fixed effects at the focus group level and the same individual-level
characteristics and design-based controls described in Chapter 3. The first Model, “All” in
Figure 5.4, includes a control variable for whether or not a respondent is female. The Men’s
model (Model 2) drops the female control and examines only the men’s data. The Women’s
model (Model 3) accordingly examines only the women’s data. Tables that include more
details about these models are provided in Tables B.6- B.8 in the Appendix.122
Across all three crimes, the coefficients reveal that both an individual’s private preference
and a group’s expressed preference are positively and significantly related to an individual’s
post-discussion private preference. The more severely an individual prefers to punish a
121Full models are included in the Appendix Tables B.1-B.2
122Since more highly powered, I also ran models with a triple interaction term between private preferences,





















































































































































Preferences for Punishing Stealing
Figure 5.4: Coefficient Estimates of Variables Identifying Group Effects on Post-FG Private
Preferences
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criminal the more he or she want to punish him after the discussion. The more severely an
individual’s group prefers to punish a criminal the more he or she want to punish him after
the discussion. The interaction term between an individual’s original private preference and
an individual’s group preferences is included to account for how his or her original preference
influences the group’s decision. Interaction terms are substantively small across all crimes
and do not substantively change point estimates.
In the within-subject experimental framework, exposing individuals to the “treatment” of
a group preference, affects the severity of people’s preferences for punishment. This treatment
involves public expression of preferences, a group decision about preferences and a multitude
of group dynamics that remain unaccounted for. Yet, this “treatment” models many norms
interventions as well as research-oriented focus group dicussions designed either to change
or learn about people’s local perceptions. However, researchers often fail to consider how
these discussions - on their own, even without an explicit normative agenda - express norms
and thus contain the potential to beget preference change. This has positive implications
for well designed norm change interventions that seek to change preferences by engaging
in discussions about preferences and norms. However, these findings have surprising and
harmful implications for any discussion of norms that may beget harm.
This study has examined preferences for punishing rape, domestic violence and stealing
through hypothetical crime narratives. This removes the discussion, to some extent, from
the specific instances of crimes. However, take for example the many focus groups being
held throughout eastern DR Congo on community stigmatization of rape victims (Kelly et
al. 2011; Kelly et al. 2012). Does engaging in such discussions beget further stigmatization?
Does talking about the pervasiveness of domestic violence in one’s community encourage more
acceptance of domestic violence? This study provides empirical support for cautionary tales
suggested by theories of norm change. Talking about the pervasiveness of a descriptive norm
can yield greater tolerance for that behavior (Tankard and Paluck 2016). While described in
the literature, this possibility is rarely accounted for by researchers in their work.
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In sum, the models presented thus far provide support for the two sets of hypotheses
suggested by social norms theories and the three-step process model that I have outlined in
this chapter. Overall preferences are distinct depending on whether they are measured in
the private or the public sphere. They also tend to be more extreme in the public sphere,
particularly when people act as groups.
This section adds to this discussion by demonstrating in yet another way, the normative
nature of preference change. Individuals change or update their private preferences as a result
of engaging in discussions with their groups. And, as shown, these preferences become more
extreme. Thus any effect that armed conflict has on preferences for punishing crimes, can be
reinforced and further polarized in the social sphere over time. The next section turns to the
effects of armed conflict.
5.5.3 Effects of armed conflict
Findings from Chapter 3 showed that armed conflict increases how severely men preferred
to punish rape and stealing and decreases how severely both men and women preferred to
punish domestic violence. Given the process model, measurement method and established
statistical difference between private, public, group and post-discussion preferences described
here, it remains to be seen whether and how these effects on private preference influence
punishment in the social sphere.
Hypotheses of aggregation suggest that armed conflict’s effects on private preferences will
also be evident when measuring preferences in the social sphere. To examine armed conflict’s
effects across public and private dimensions, I run 4 linear regression models, estimating
armed conflict’s effects on public, group and post-discussion private preferences for punishing
each crime alongside armed conflict’s effect on private preferences. I use the models and
matched pair design presented in Chapter 3 to identify armed conflict’s effects and include
the same range of control variables. Tables B.3-B.5 in the Appendix include the relevant
tables from which these coefficient estimates are drawn.
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Figure 5.5 presents the estimated effect of armed conflict on each outcome variable (labeled
along the x axis) in each of the 4 models associated with each crime. The first column of
figures, “All”, reflect the “Basic” models from Chapter 3, where the gender of the respondent
is included only as a control. The second and third column draw from an “Interacted” model
to examine heterogeneous effects of armed conflict and the gender of the respondent. Again,
the theory of protective masculine norms suggests heterogeneous effects of armed conflict by
gender for both rape and stealing, but pooled effects of armed conflict for domestic violence.
For comparison sake, the first reported effect of armed conflict, “Private”, in each subfigure
re-reports the findings from Chapter 3.
With some minor variation, Figure 5.5 shows that the effects of armed conflict on private
preferences are remarkably consistent between the private and public spheres.
Men privately prefer to punish rape and stealing more severely as a result of armed
conflict; and this finding holds for publicly expressed preferences for punishing rape as well
as for post-discussion private preferences. The estimate of armed conflict on preferences
for punishing rape loses statistical significance for group preferences, likely because the
intracluster correlation coefficient for group preferences will inevitably be high for the group
measures - weakening the statistical power of the group models. However, the group preference
estimate gains statistical significance in the pooled model examining armed conflict’s effects
on punishing rape.
Also consistent with findings from Chapter 3, men both privately, publicly and as groups
prefer to punish stealing more severely as a result of armed conflict. The findings among
women approximate zero in the public sphere as they did in the private sphere.
Armed conflict’s effects on preferences for punishing domestic violence deviate when they
enter the public sphere to some extent. Armed conflict’s effects on group preferences are
strongly negative in the pooled models and for men in the heterogeneous models. Armed
conflict’s effects on group preferences also gain statistical significance among women in
















































































































































Preferences for Punishing Stealing
Figure 5.5: Effects of Armed Conflict on Private and Public Outcomes
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accounting for group dynamics by measuring the preferences of groups. Note also, that
although the coefficient plot shows a negative effect of armed conflict on private preferences
for punishing domestic violence, the interaction term remains statistically insignificant (as
depicted in the Chapter 3 model).
Overall the estimates of armed conflict’s effects across private, public, and group preferences
suggest that armed conflict affects all outcomes in the same direction and with roughly similar
significance levels as for private preferences. In this way, the analyses in Figure 5.5 provide
support to hypotheses of aggregation. Armed conflict’s effects on private preferences translate
to the public sphere. Group dynamics do not interfere with these effects even while there is
suggestive evidence that group dynamics may also be at work.
In several cases, the effects of armed conflict appear to be substantively larger on publicly
expressed, group, and post discussion private preferences than on private preferences. However,
more formal tests are needed to examine whether the effects of armed conflict are statistically
different from one another across models.
To statistically test for differences, I run linear regression models on the stacked data to see
whether the interaction between the type of outcome (whether a preference measurement is
private, public, group or post-discussion private) and armed conflict is statistically significant
for explaining the severity of punishment preferences for the three crimes in my study. These
models also employ matched pair fixed effects to better identify the effect of armed conflict.123
Table 5.6 shows that armed conflict does not have significantly different effects on publicly
expressed preferences, group preferences, or post discussion private preferences as compared
to private preferences. The interacted models show that this is also true when accounting for
heterogeneous effects by gender. Even though the magnitude of the effect of armed conflict is
estimated to be larger for group preferences than for private preferences in Figure 5.5, the
effect size is not statistically different.
123Tables B.6-B.8 in the Appendix provide additional analyses to check for possible heterogeneous effecs by
gender with a triple interaction term. Estimated effects of armed conflict do not substantively differ.
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Table 5.6: Heterogeneous effects of outcome type with armed conflict
Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime
Rape Domestic Violence Stealing
Basic Interacted Basic Interacted Basic Interacted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Armed Conflict 0.198 0.378∗∗∗ −0.224∗∗ −0.234 0.215 0.414∗∗
(0.138) (0.137) (0.106) (0.166) (0.177) (0.179)
Female 0.090 0.263 −0.399∗∗∗ −0.408∗∗ −0.284∗∗ −0.094
(0.131) (0.202) (0.099) (0.159) (0.137) (0.229)
Public 0.043 0.043 0.035 0.035 0.008 0.008
(0.050) (0.050) (0.058) (0.058) (0.033) (0.033)
Group 0.342∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ −0.100 −0.100 0.145 0.145
(0.088) (0.088) (0.086) (0.086) (0.089) (0.089)
PostDisc Private 0.088∗ 0.088∗ −0.051 −0.051 0.057 0.057
(0.051) (0.051) (0.083) (0.083) (0.063) (0.063)
Armed Conflict x Female −0.334 0.017 −0.352
(0.257) (0.203) (0.293)
Armed Conflict x Public 0.122 0.122 −0.011 −0.011 0.026 0.026
(0.082) (0.082) (0.071) (0.071) (0.058) (0.058)
Armed Conflict x Group 0.072 0.072 −0.142 −0.142 0.037 0.037
(0.168) (0.168) (0.134) (0.134) (0.144) (0.144)
Armed Conflict x PostDisc Private 0.134 0.134 −0.004 −0.004 0.026 0.026
(0.095) (0.095) (0.120) (0.120) (0.095) (0.095)
Constant 2.690∗∗∗ 2.555∗∗∗ 2.468∗∗∗ 2.478∗∗∗ 3.241∗∗∗ 3.178∗∗∗
(0.388) (0.334) (0.278) (0.314) (0.342) (0.361)
PAIR Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,968 3,968 3,968 3,968 3,968 3,968
R2 0.125 0.131 0.081 0.081 0.066 0.071
Adjusted R2 0.121 0.126 0.076 0.076 0.061 0.066
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)
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The estimated effect of armed conflict on private, public and group measures of preferences
are consistent. Armed conflict likely affects the severity of preferences for punishment due
to changes in private preferences rather than due to its effects on group dynamics alone.
The consistency of this finding of armed conflict’s effects on in private, public and group
dimensions gives greater weight to the claim that private preference change has implications
for how people actually treat perpetrators of local crimes in the social sphere.
Hypotheses suggesting that private preferences aggregate to affect behavior in the public
sphere and hypotheses suggesting that armed conflict affects group dynamics directly are not
mutually exclusive. Support for hypotheses of aggregation only suggests that group dynamics
do not interfere with armed conflict’s effects on the private sphere. It remains possible that
group dynamics may mitigate or amplify the observed effects.
Does armed conflict affect group dynamics directly and in what direction? In order
to assess the potential that armed conflict may affect group dynamics directly alongside
preference change itself, I examine armed conflict’s effects on preference convergence and
preference difference. If armed conflict affects convergence, this means that it affects how
powerful norms are - the extent to which people change their preferences to be in line with
the social sphere. Armed conflict may make it more likely that people want to converge or
conform with the preferences of others in their community. Convergence is a measure of
absolute value or distance across private and public dimensions.
Figure 5.6 largely reveals null results for convergence and fails to provide support for
hypotheses of group dynamics. Associated tables are included in Tables B.9-B.12 in the
Appendix. Armed conflict is not impacting convergence towards a norm in a way apparent
across the data. The single statistically significant finding (which might be random due
to the sheer number of analyses presented) is that armed conflict increases convergence
between men’s post-discussion private preferences and the preferences of their groups for
punishing domestic violence but decreases this convergence for punishing stealing. Both




















































































































































































































































Preferences for Punishing Stealing
Figure 5.6: Effects of Armed Conflict on Convergence across stages of process model
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it is shaping internalization in a crime-specific way.
Analysis of the effects of armed conflict on women’s preferences for punishing stealing
(estimated in models that include an interaction term with the sex of the respondent)
approaches statistical significance, such that armed conflict may also be directly impacting a
specific group dynamic related to this crime.
Given few and disparate findings on theories of convergence and strong support for
hypotheses of polarization in the previous section, armed conflict may not change convergence;
instead it may directly influence group dynamics by shifting public, group and post-discussion
preferences towards extremes. Therefore, I examine armed conflict’s effects on the difference
(rather than the absolute value of the difference) to check for armed conflict’s effects on group
dynamics of polarization.
Figure 5.7 reveals starkly different results. Associated tables are included in Tables
B.13-B.16 in the Appendix. For rape, armed conflict increases the difference between the
preference that both men and women (in pooled models) express in public and the preference
that they hold in private. In Kuran’s terminology, people in conflict-affected communities
are more likley to “dissimulate”" their true preference up front (reporting a more severe
preference than their true preference for punishment) - but this is only true for the crime of
rape. People’s post-discussion private preferences are also more greatly changed, increasing
in severity from their original private preference in communities that have been recently
exposed to armed conflict. This effect is mainly driven by the female sample and again is
only relevant for the crime of rape.
Armed conflict also has limited direct effects on group dynamics related to domestic
violence. Group preferences become more extreme (less severe in terms of punishment) as
compared publicly expressed preferences, where these findings are mainly driven by the male
sample. There are no estimated effects of armed conflict on group dynamics of polarization
for the crime of stealing.



















































































































































































































































Preferences for Punishing Stealing
Figure 5.7: Effects of Armed Conflict on Difference across stages of the process model
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no clear trends that emerge from the multiple analyses. At most, armed conflict has some
limited direct effects on convergence and polarization - but this is crime specific, gender
specific and outcome specific. The findings, however, echo a useful word of caution against
extrapolating findings about social dynamics related to one crime to another crime.
While armed conflict does not appear to have any overarching direct effects on group
dynamics, the evidence strongly support theories of aggregation. Armed conflict’s effects on
private preference for punishment translate from the private sphere, to the public sphere and
back again. This provides insights into the relevance of the theory of protective masculine
norms and the associated preference change for how people treat perpetrators of these crimes
in the social sphere. It also provides insights into how preference change associated with
armed conflict may persist through engagements with others on these issues in the social
sphere.
5.6 Discussion
The theory of protective masculine norms describes how and why armed conflict affects
preferences for punishing crimes against women. Armed conflict increases how severely men
prefer to punish rape and stealing but decreases how severely people prefer to punish domestic
violence. This chapter bolsters the relevance of the findings and support the theory in three
ways.
First, it demonstrates the relevance of armed conflict’s effects on private preferences
(revealed in Chapter 3) by showing that private preferences aggregate to affect preferences
for punishing crimes in the public sphere. By showing the relevance of private preferences
in a social context, this examination brings the outcome from Chapter 3 one step closer
to actual social punishment. When armed conflict affects people’s private preferences for
punishing local crimes, this preference change translates into the social sphere unimpeded by
social factors and group dynamics. The effects of armed conflict also translate back again,
evidenced by consistent effects on private preferences measured after group discussions take
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place.
In the same vein, this chapter presents hypotheses about how group dynamics might be
directly affected by armed conflict. The observed effects of armed conflict are disparate and
crime specific, but provide insights into the myriad of ways that norms may shape private
preferences when they enter the public sphere. Importantly for this study, observed group
dynamics are not strong enough or consistent enough to offset the relevance of armed conflict’s
effects on private preferences.
Second, the theory of protective masculine norms suggests that norms (what people think
others want them to do or think) drive preference change. In the wake of war, demand for
protective male behavior changes, protective masculinity becomes more highly prized, and
this leads to changed preferences for punishing local crimes. This chapter delves into the
social nature of preferences and preference change for punishing local crimes.
Findings from 80 focus group discussions (divided into 230 subgroups) reveal statistical
differences between private, public, group and post-discussion private preferences. In terms of
methods, this underscores the importance of treating private, public, group and post-discussion
private preferences as distinct outcomes.
The data also suggest that preferences become more extreme when moving from stage to
stage. This underscores the social nature of preferences, because it shows how preferences
change through interactions in the social sphere. The social nature of preference change is
a central tenet of protective masculine norms theory. As evidenced by the effects of group
discussions on post-discussion private preferences, social interaction can foster changes even
to private preferences.
There are important ethical implications of this finding. The analyses shows that prefer-
ences for punishing crimes become more extreme as a result of the focus group discussions.
This suggests less tolerance for rape and stealing but more tolerance for domestic violence
because of discussions. Researchers must be more aware that engaging in discussions of
this kind can alter people’s preferences and must clearly and transparently address these
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ethical considerations prior to facilitating discussions. At minimum, protocols for engaging
in focus groups should involve communicating the potential effects to participants prior to
and debriefing after engaging in discussions of this kind.
While supporting the theory of protective masculine norms by revealing the social nature
of preferences and showing that preferences do change, the findings from this chapter also
raise new questions. If changing preferences is as simple as discussing preferences, then are
protective masculine norms driving the results? Is conversation about rape, domestic violence
and stealing another mechanism that can explain war’s effects?
One reason to doubt that it is not solely conversation about these issues that are driving
results is that models in Chapters 3 include control variables for individual measures of social
engagement with others in the community. Despite this control, armed conflict continues
to have effects on preferences for punishing rape, domestic violence and stealing. Second,
how people engage with one another in dicusssion (e.g. absolute or directional convergence)
does not change as a result of armed conflict. If people conversed more about rape, domestic
violence and stealing as a result of armed conflict (a conversation mechanism), then one would
have expected that communities exposed to armed conflict would have already experienced
more convergence towards norms (as a result of the relative increase in discussions). However
convergence as a result of group discussions is not substantively or statistically different in
conflict and non-conflict communities.
In sum, this chapter demonstrates that expressions of norms in focus groups fosters
preference change. Preferences change because of social factors as suggested by protective
masculine norms theory. The conversation mechanism highlighted by the structure of this
study also poses an interesting avenue for future research; it demonstrates a channel by which
advocacy organizations with well designed norm change interventions may effectively affect
preferences towards punishing these forms of violence. Future research should examine how
harmful norm change brought about by armed conflict might be effectively mitigated through





In the aftermath of war, how does armed conflict continue to affect women’s security? Does
armed conflict transmit effects beyond armed groups to change societies?
This dissertation has explored these questions by examining the effects of local exposure
to armed conflict on the social context of violence against women in eastern DR Congo.
The social context of violence against women reflects tolerance for violence of this kind
and how women are treated in their day-to-day lives. My framework for thinking about
the social context, described in Chapter 1, emphasizes social sanctioning as normatively
important, measurable, and relevant to deterring violent crime. Chapter 2 further motivates
the centrality of social sanctioning for punishing crimes against women in the case of eastern
DR Congo by highlighting systematic gaps between legal codes and processes for punishing
local crime.
The quantitative analysis of armed conflict’s effects on preferences for punishing crimes
(presented in Chapter 3) reveals a social context in which both men and women prefer to
punish domestic violence less severely in the aftermath of war. At the same time, men, but
not women, prefer to punish rape more severely as a result of war. This presents a puzzling
set of findings for theories of violence against women, because it suggests an environment
more tolerant of some forms of violence against women but less tolerant of others. This raises
questions about whether the determinants of one form of violence against women are relevant
to other forms. Discussions held across 80 focus groups reveal no relationship between rape
and domestic violence in the minds of participants.
In addition, armed conflict’s effects on preferences for punishing rape are consistent with
armed conflict’s effects on preferences for punishing stealing - a general crime as closely tied
to gender. Such similar effects lead to questions about the question. Is violence against
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women a crime to be understood and analyzed seperately from other crimes? Or does violence
against women share important dimensions with other crimes?
The qualitative insights from data gathered in connection with the initial quantitative
study in 20 villages begin to reveal a new dimension for characterizing rape, domestic
violence and stealing as crimes. People think about rape and stealing as public matters
that present, pose a harm, or threaten their communities. Dissimilarly, people think about
domestic violence as a private matter that does not impact the community.124 Based on this
differentiation, I build a theory of protective masculine norms - a new theory that describes
what happens when men are driven to protect as a result of community exposure to war.
The centerpiece of this dissertation is the theory of protective masculine norms, explicated
in Chapter 4. The theory explains how armed conflict exposure changes people’s security
calculations such that they demand more community protection in the wake of war. Since
men are thought of as protection providers, communities demand more male protection after
exposure. I argue that this change in demand leads to a change in norms. People begin to
revere male protective behavior more than previously.
Step 1: Demand -> Norms
In support of the assumptions within the theory of protective masculine norms, I show
that community protection is understood as a male enterprise and people make different
security tradeoffs when considering how to punish perpetrators of rape, domestic violence,
and stealing. Of crime perpetrators, only perpetrators of domestic violence are considered
apt contributors to community security that warrant inclusion in security networks. Process
tracing of when and how people prepare for armed conflict reveals that people respond
to incidents of insecurity in eastern DR Congo; they often do so by giving and receiving
security information and preparing to flee. The evidence suggests that community security
124Indeed, gender remains an important component here. Whose harm is considered a public threat is
related to the relative status of women to begin with.
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and expectations that men contribute to community security are important social dynamics
in the aftermath of armed conflict that can drive norm change.
Step 2: Norms -> Preferences
The next component of protective masculine norms theory is that this norm change that
I have described leads to preference change.125 A comparison of people’s preferences before
and after people’s engagement with their communities about social punishment (in Chapter
5) shows that preferences for punishing crimes are innately social and affected by social
interaction with others in their community. This finding adds plausibility to the claim that
armed conflict’s effects on masculine norms has implications for preference change.
Step 3: Preferences -> Sanctioning
Chapter 5’s focus on social sanctioning in the public sphere also demonstrates the relevance
of changed preferences for punishing crime to real world social settings where social punishment
ultimately takes place. Armed conflict does not appear to affect group dynamics directly in
a consistent way. Instead, armed conflict’s effects on norms and preferences translate into
social sanctioning behaviors of groups.
To summarize, this dissertation has described a trajectory of change that begins with
a community’s exposure to armed conflict. This exposure fosters demand for protection
and then protective masculinities, which, in turn affect preferences for social sanctioning
and social sanctioning behaviors themselves. The causal chain that I describe is, indeed,
multi-step; but each step that I have described is supported both by original data analysis
and broader theory. In describing this causal chain, this work engages in a much needed
discussion of the mico-level processes by which armed conflict may transmit effects into the
postconflict space (Østby, Leiby, and Nordås 2019).
125Indeed, the findings from Chapter 3 show that armed conflict affects people’s preferences for punishing
crimes. But are people’s preferences affected by expressions of norms as protective masculine norms theory
suggests?
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As a scope condition of this research, I have focused on factors that may influence social
sanctioning of violence against women through the social context: preferences, norms, and
group dynamics. Because of this focus, the effects that this research finds have the potential
to persist even when institutions are rebuilt and armed groups leave. In addition, the analysis
of focus group discussions in Chapter 5 provide suggestive evidence that the effects of armed
conflict on preferences for punishment will persist as they are reinforced through discussions
in the social sphere.
The alternative hypotheses that I have explored have de-emphasized structural arguments
that may foster women’s insecurity without changing preferences or norms. In Chapter 3, I
examined whether women’s empowerment, backlash and violent masculinities would affect
preferences for punishing rape, domestic violence and stealing - finding effects that contradicted
each of these alternative hypotheses. In Chapter 4, I weighed additional alternative arguments
such as the continued insecurity associated with conflict exposure, reactions to conflict-related
crime, and state capacity - all which might affect social sanctioning through preferences. Yet,
I do not find support for alternative theories.
6.2 Levels of Violence against Women
Social sanctioning is also relevant because of its potential deterrent effect on violence against
women. While I have focused on preferences for punishment among individuals and groups
throughout this dissertation, I have also described a theoretical relationship between social
sanctioning of violence against women and deterrence.
The relationship between violence against women and social sanctioning of it is the
fourth step suggested by the chain of logic that I have presented. Does the threat of social
punishment serve to deter rape? How does tolerance for the perpetration of domestic violence
relate to levels of domestic violence?
Step 4: Sanctioning -> Violence
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The relationship between violence against women and the social sanctioning of violence
against women is important to address for two reasons. First, measuring violence against
women is the focus of the majority of the literature on armed conflict’s effects on violence
against women. Establishing this relationship helps to speak to this literature more broadly.
Second, there is an additional pathway by which armed conflict may affect social sanction-
ing of violence against women through changes in preferences and norms. Armed conflict may
directly affect violence against women and - only then - the preferences and norms related to
sanctioning it.
6.2.1 Empirical challenges
The ability to answer questions about deterrence confronts empirical challenges. To focus on
social sanctioning outcomes, I reserved discussion of deterrence for this final chapter. The
day-to-day violence that women experience is broad, elusive and difficult to measure, precisely
because of the social context, which is the subject of this study. As explicated in Chapter 5,
reporting rape and domestic violence to researchers or authorities is a social process where
respondents must reveal their acts or experiences in order for their acts or experiences to
be known. Because the social context determines how sensitive it is to reveal an act or
experience of violence, the threat of social punishment may affect whether respondents report
violence, may deter violence, or both. Since increased reporting is a normatively positive
outcome, it becomes difficult to interpret statistical associations.
6.2.2 Evidence of Deterrence
I examine observational evidence for the deterrent effect of social sanctioning and its relation-
ship with war by constructing several regression models to observe statistical relationships
and discuss potential associations. The sanctioning measures draw from a composite measure
of social punishment variables presented in Chapter 2 (Table 2.3). Social sanctioning is
measured as the average of the perceived proportion of men and male youth in communities
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that male respondents believe would socially punish someone for perpetrating rape. I use
men’s perception of social sanctioning in the village, because this is the population for
which deterrence is theorized to operate. In deterrence models, it is perceived potential for
punishment rather than actual potential for punishment that deters. To reflect deterrence,
the measures of sanctioning for this analysis focus on perceptions.126
The measures of sexual violence incorporate data as reported in a survey by both men
and women about household exposure within the past 6 months. It includes sexual violence
perpetrated by insiders as well as outsiders, which is not the focus of this study.127 This
measure of sexual violence also yields low estimates, which means that analyses will be
caveated to consider underreporting.128
Because deterrence happens not at the individual level, but at the village level, I estimate
the relationship between armed conflict, social sanctioning, and violence measures by taking
the maximum (=1) of all responses at the village level (men’s and women’s). There are a
total of 679 villages in the sample.The models are presented in Table 1.129
Table 1 shows that, even with the caveat of underreporting, social punishment is negatively
related to sexual violence in the expected direction of deterrence theories. However, the
estimate is not statistically significant. Model 2 suggests that armed conflict increases levels
of sexual violence in line with the existing literature, although the relationship is also not
statistically significant.
Only when armed conflict and social punishment are interacted in Table 1 Model 4 is
armed conflict a significant factor influencing sexual violence. Sexual violence does not
126The measures differ from those in previous chapters, which focused on actual potential for punishment:
preferences for punishment both among individuals and groups.
127This means that some part of the statistical relationship between armed conflict and sexual violence will
be driven by perpetration by armed groups. But, because the measure asks about the past 6 months rather
than past 5 years, it is not only capturing sexual violence by armed groups.
128The data draw from a large representative survey of IRC program villages in eastern DR Congo (described
in Chapter 2). The direct questions on sexual violence were asked in the context of a long survey and were
not the survey’s focus. This likely explains low levels of reporting.
129Models are all ordinary least squares regression models.
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Table 6.1: Social Punishment, Armed Conflict and Sexual Violence
Dependent Variable
Sexual Violence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social Punishment −0.010 −0.009 0.003
(0.013) (0.013) (0.015)
Armed Conflict 0.021 0.019 0.274∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.131)
Armed Conflict x Social Punishment −0.072∗∗
(0.036)
Constant 0.059 0.020 0.053 0.010
(0.048) (0.015) (0.052) (0.056)
Province Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 703 679 674 674
R2 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.018
Adjusted R2 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.010
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Figure 6.1: Conditional Effect of Armed Conflict Given Social Sanctioning
increase as much with conflict when people perceive there there will be social sanctioning
against it. Thus, in the presence of social punishment, the harmful effects of armed conflict
on sexual violence seem to be mitigated.
To further interpret the data, Figure 6.1 shows the distribution of the mean level of social
sanctioning across villages. The figure also plots Model 4’s estimates of armed conflict’s
effects for those values of social punishment. Armed conflict is estimated to increase sexual
violence when men perceive that between almost no one and half of men would socially
punish rape. Where men estimate that between half and more than half of men would
socially punish rape, armed conflict has roughly zero and nonsignificant effects on sexual
violence. Social sanctioning does seem to deter sexual violence in the wake of armed conflict.
While Figure 6.1 suggests that perceived social sanctioning moderates but does not reverse
the harmful effect of armed conflict, moderation is difficult establish since men’s perceptions
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of social punishment are measured after armed conflict takes place and simultaneously with
measures of sexual violence.
This study’s exploration of the social context provides a unique opportunity to consider
how it influences violence against women with attention to how it may also affect standard
measures of this violence. Whether people report sexual violence in surveys, particularly sexual
violence by insiders, may be contingent on beliefs about social punishment for themselves
or for fellow villagers that may have perpetrated it. As suggested in Chapter 5, if villagers
underreport sexual violence in places where more social punishment is expected, the results
could be driven by social desirability bias as well.
Despite potential for biases in measurement, the relationship between sexual violence
and armed conflict are consistent with existing research on sexual violence after war. The
finding that perceived sanctioning can moderate the harmful effects of armed conflict on
sexual violence also underscores the relevance of social punishment for dynamics of violence.
The analyses here provide insights into the deterrence framework and how researchers might
consider perceptions of potential sanctioning alongside sanctioning itself.
6.3 Methodological Contributions
The theory of protective masculine norms has been developed over the course of this disserta-
tion in an iterative process. What begins as a deductive exploration of theories and empirical
tests of those theories in the case of eastern DR Congo develops into an inductive exercise in
theory building with further exploration and testing in the same case. My quantitative study
of matched (similar) pairs of villages in eastern DR Congo closely integrated complementary
qualitative work. These qualitative data provided the bridge from quantitative null findings
for existing theories in Chapter 3 to a new theory and research agenda on protection and
violence in Chapter 4. In terms of methods, the research process highlights the value of
pursuing the interpretation of unexpected results in a rigorous and ethical way.
The project also demonstrates what can be gleaned from considering several outcome
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variables together. Because examining many outcomes can lead to random findings of
statistical significance, scholars often choose to narrow their focus to a single outcome or
domain. However, combining expectations about several outcome variables provides important
insights into theory. The interpretation of the findings and the role of gender in Chapter
3 would have been different had I not looked at the combined outcomes of rape, domestic
violence and stealing in one research setting. Essentially, the project contributes to the
empirical study of violence against women by looking at outcomes beyond violence against
women.
My approach to measuring social sanctioning outcomes uses short narratives and images
for each crime that have been formulated in partnership with Congolese researchers to speak
to the local context. This allows me to examine rape by insiders even when people tend
to think about rape by outside actors such as armed group members. Using real local
punishments to represent a severity scale also serves to further embed and interpret the
results with respect to the context. Such strategies are time intensive but push research to
engage with local meanings. At the same time, the scale allows consideration of how armed
conflict might affect the severity of punishment elsewhere.
The delineation of private, publicly expressed and group preferences in Chapter 5 inspire
questions about measurement of a broad range of outcomes. Certainly, there are some
scenarios in which private preferences are relevant for behavior, such as voting in secret
ballots (as long as people truly believe that these ballots are secret). However, in studies that
seek to understand how people behave in public and as groups, researchers should consider
asking questions in those arenas.
Finally, the methods that I employ in this study draw upon common practices in research:
focus groups and interviews. But what happens when we begin to look at a participant’s
engagement in research as a treatment? Combined with norms theories, my findings that
focus group discussions change preferences suggest that researchers need to begin thinking




Given the widespread nature of violence against women, patriarchy, and armed conflict,
protective masculine norms are likely relevant to understanding a wide range of cases and
even other situations. The specific theory of protective masculine norms advanced here,
however, describes and examines the evidence for how armed conflict affects preferences for
punishing publicly threatening (and publicly non-threatening) crimes in eastern DR Congo.
To what extent can the theory describe armed conflict’s effects on community dynamics of
punishment in other contexts?
Several scope conditions have been introduced throughout this dissertation. First, the
findings may be dependent on particular forms of violence that communities experience
during war. Villages in eastern DR Congo have been exposed to brutal forms of violence
at the hands of armed groups. The theory may be less relevant to other types of wars
where civilians are not targeted and people do not sense a need for community protection
from future episodes of violence. Civil wars - where fighting occurs within the borders of
states, where populations are likely to interact with armed groups, and where there are often
lingering issues of insecurity left unaddressed (or unaddressable) by states - is where the
theory of protective masculine norms will be most directly applicable. However, the theory
may be relevant to explaining post-conflict dynamics in internationally contested zones where
international war repeatedly occurs and states do not respond by providing security for their
populations.
As described, the theory of protective masculine norms specifies different theoretical
implications (or predictions) for how armed conflict affects preferences for punishing rape,
domestic violence and stealing. But, the crime-specific implications were derived in terms of
how people in DR Congo perceive them - either as public threats or as private crimes. Thus,
questions about armed conflict’s effects in other contexts must begin with a question about
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how people in those communities perceive local crimes.
In the introduction, I described why I chose to place intimate partner rape aside during
this study of armed conflict’s effects in DR Congo. In DR Congo, intimate partner rape
neither is nor is perceived as a crime. However, in contexts where intimate partner rape is a
crime, it is often perceived of as a private matter much akin to how domestic violence has
been described in this study. While this perception would need to be investigated within
any context prior to deriving the implications of the theory for punishing crimes, commonly
shared understandings suggest that armed conflict will decrease social sanctioning of (and
increase tolerance of) intimate partner rape.
Another condition for armed conflict’s effects is that people should have a memory of the
conflict event and consider the possibility of its recurrence when punishing local crimes. Thus
the relevance of the theory is dependent on both a community’s actual and perceived security
from repeated episodes of war. Thus there remain questions about how the effects of armed
conflict carry over in the long term, particularly in post-war contexts where security has
been reestablished. Future research should explore how collective memory shapes people’s
protective behavior over time.
6.4.1 Croatia
To begin considering the theory’s application in another context, I assess its plausibility in
Croatia using original research gathered prior to my work in DR Congo. In 2015, I spent one
month in Vukovar and Osijek, Croatia - two border communities with Bosnia and a site of
widespread violence during its wars following the fall of Yugoslavia in 1991. During this time,
I spoke with 12 human rights and NGO workers in the area, individuals that were often from
these communities that had also been working in their advoacacy roles since the aftermath of
the war.
I held conversations about violence against women in their societies, its sources, and how
women’s positions have changed in the aftermath of war. Several points that stand out in
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these conversations suggest the relevance of protective masculine norms in this very different
context. Interview participants pointed out that women were empowered during armed
conflict. Women were able to move around more than men during the war and took on new
responsibilities. There was a female Croatian president at the time of my interviews. However,
the effects of armed conflict on women’s roles are also complex because of accompanying
changes to the national religious structure. Participants identify religion as counteracting
some advancements, relegating (or revering) women’s contributions within the home.130
Most tellingly, even while interview participants recognized that armed conflict empowered
women in some ways, they also emphasized men’s perpetration of domestic violence in the
aftermath of war and the problem that this continued to pose within their society. They also
described the empowerment of men and male groups because of their contributions to war.
Men are revered because of their engagment in war fighting and male groups, particulary
veterans organizations, feel entitled to behave as they please. Taken together, the discussions
suggest that while women were empowered during war, men were also empowered during war
because of their wartime contributions.131
In terms of the theory of protective masculine norms, men in these societies may be given
more leeway to perpetrate domestic violence because of their contributions to fighting in war.
However, it is unclear how armed conflict shapes sexual violence or the social sanctioning of
it in the contemporary period. As in DR Congo, many advoacy groups and researchers have
highlighted sexual violence as it is associated with war in the former Yugoslavia. Because
this study was not designed specifically to shift the focus away from wartime sexual violence
(which was top on people’s conversions) to the focus on sexual violence after war, this remains
a question for future research on protective norms in this case.
While Croatia is a very secure state, threats of ethnic violence associated with language
130This suggests one of the large complications involved in studying armed conflict in the aggregate rather
than focusing in micro-level subnational effects.
131Women’s empowerment theories often miss the potential role for men’s empowerment and how people
might revere their waging of violence in the past.
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differences took place around the time of this research. These threats may have invoked
memories associated with the war. Thus, the Croatian case speaks to the potential longevity




This dissertation has opened a new research agenda on social sanctioning of violence against
women and other crimes by asking about war’s effects on the post conflict space. But how do
factors other than war affect protective masculine norms? To what extent are the results
that I find in this dissertation contingent on the context of this war? What other crimes and
social phenomena do protective masculine norms affect?
Despite the compelling logic of the theory of protective masculine norms, it is explored
only very tangentially in the literature, because protection and violence appear contradictory.
Thus, many questions remain about the nature of protective masculine norms as well as
factors that affect and are affected by them.
Other Contexts: First are questions about the context specific nature of armed conflict’s
effects on protective masculine norms and social sanctioning in eastern DR Congo. While
preliminary empirical work in Croatia and the breath of critical feminist literature on
patriarchy suggest that armed conflict will have similar effects in other contexts, examining
different types of armed conflict as well as different forms of community exposure to violence
is essential to establishing the breadth of the theory’s application. In communities that have
experienced war in the more distant past, an important element will be variation in the
nature of collective memory.
Other Shocks: Second, future research should explore how other shocks such as natural
disasters influence micro-level protective behaviors in its wake. To what extent do other
incidents of insecurity affect protective behaviors differently? Exploring similarities and
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differences between armed conflict and other shocks will yield insights into micro-level factors
that drive changes in protective masculine norms. Other types of shocks such as natural
disasters may or may not be accompanied by beliefs in the primacy of men’s protection, which
is central to the theory. Gang warfare and terrorism are more likely to lend themselves to
similar community responses as armed conflict. Yet, such potential applications of the theory
remain to be explored. Another shock that warrants future research is advocacy geared
towards changing norms. While my research suggests that norms interventions can be effective
in changing attitudes and norms of social sanctioning, a field experiment implemented with
protective masculine norms in mind is the next step towards establishing this claim.
Other Outcomes: Third, this research has addressed the relationship between protective
masculine norms and rape, domestic violence and stealing. In future research in DR Congo
and beyond, it would be useful to consider other crimes in terms of public-private dimensions
such as illicit drug use and tax evasion, which could be perceived as private or public
crimes. Another central outcome to explore is the extent to which the findings of increased
tolerance for domestic violence in the aftermath of war affect women’s engagement with their
communities - either socially or politically. An increased focus on protection and safety can
translate into decreased mobility for women and negatively affect the inclusiveness of the
society in which they live.
Other Groups: Finally, protective masculine norms theory calls attention to an un-
dertheorized and paradoxical aspect of male protection and violence in war. It describes
protection and dependence on one another for protection within communities. This disser-
tation establishes gender as one important dimension for considering who contributes to
community protection, but perhaps there are additional dimensions of power and vulnerability
to be explored. For example, men from particular ethnic groups may be thought of as ideal
protectors and given more leeway to dominate other groups and perpetrate intra-community
violence. Vulnerable groups may, in turn, be more acceptant of this violence when faced with
threats by outsiders.
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6.5.2 Unifying Disparate Findings
While inspiring future questions, the theory of protective masculine norms already seems to
unify a set of disparate findings in the literature, such as findings that domestic violence
increases after war (Østby, Leiby, and Nordås 2019); that enforcement of rape law improves
after war (Haglund and Richards 2017); and that people become more prosocial, involving
themselves more in their community as a result of war (Bauer et al. 2016; Blattman and
Miguel 2010; Koos 2018).
If people value community protection more in the wake of armed conflict because of
insecurity, villagers may become more prosocial and involve themselves in their communities
after war in order to augment protection. Bauer et al’s meta-analysis (2016) of armed
conflict’s prosocial effects suggests that people do become more prosocial as a result of war,
but also draws upon studies with a dominance of men in the sample. Thus it may be men,
rather than villagers more widely, engaging more in their communities after war - and this
engagement may be related to protection. This explanation, however, diverges from those
described (but not tested) in this literature.
Similarly, when people are concerned about maintaining access to male protection in their
communities, they will choose to punish domestic violence less. According to the theory of
protective masculine norms, the level of domestic violence in the wake of armed conflict is due
to community dependence on domestic violence perpetrators for security and an unwillingness
to punish.
Finally, enforcement of rape laws may improve in the wake of war, because commmunities
themselves seek to root out behaviors that threaten those communities. Change may emerge
through bottom-up social sanctioning processes rather than top-down legal channels alone.
6.6 Policy Implications
Legal reforms across the world have been geared towards reducing violence against women by
ending impunity for crimes. However, violence against women takes places in a social context
199
that can bear little relationship to law. This research has examined armed conflict’s effects
on social sanctioning - commonly held individual and group preferences for punishment -
that can both impede (in the case of domestic violence) and complement (in the case of rape)
intended effects of legal reform.
The social nature of violence against women suggests that policy aimed to reduce this
violence may benefit from considering bottom-up social approaches alongside top-down legal
reform. My research shows that armed conflict changes preferences for punishment through its
impact on norms. Under certain conditions, both norms and attitudes can change relatively
quickly. This is in contraposition to the widespread understandings of attitudes and norms
as inhibiting rather than facilitating change (Alesina, Brioschi, and Ferrara 2016). Thus, one
avenue by which advocacy organizations may change attitudes related to punishment is by
implementing interventions that target norms.
Yet, in their engagements with the community, advocacy organizations also face challenges.
The analysis in Chapter 5 shows that engagement with communities about preferences changes
preferences. This has positive implications for well designed norms change interventions but
also highlights potential harms that may emerge from discussing harmful norms. Researchers
and advocacy groups must reflect on the potential repercussions of engaging with people
both as groups and as individuals to address these crimes.
This dissertation provides a nuanced understanding of the social context in which violence
against women takes place in eastern DR Congo. Many interventions seek to address rape
alone or rape and domestic violence together; but, the findings suggest that interventions
should address social impunity for each crime independently. Addressing rape in the aftermath
of armed conflict will not necessarily translate into reducing domestic violence, where armed
conflict seems to have the most harmful effects. One approach that advocacy organizations
may take is to frame domestic violence as a public crime that harms communities. However,
policy implications will differ depending on the perceptions of these crimes in other contexts.
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6.7 Women’s Security
This dissertation, entitled “Women’s Security After War”, has investigated women’s security
after war by looking at the effects of armed conflict on the social sanctioning of violence
against women. What has this trajectory of research, culminating in the theory of protective
masculine norms, discovered about women’s security?
Indeed, armed conflict has gendered effects on security. The empirical findings in Chapters
3 and 5 show that people are less willing to punish crimes of domestic violence in the aftermath
of war, which creates a conducive environment for violence of this kind. But, at the same
time, men are driven to protect their communities, preferring more punishment for other
harmful crimes. Recognizing tradeoffs between community protection and private violent
crime provides a multidimensional, nuanced account of women’s security.
But, at the same time, this dissertation questions the very idea of women’s security as
a standalone feature of society. In its response to questions about women’s security, this
research turns the concept on its head. Community exposure to armed conflict and collective
behaviors to avoid armed conflict affect the behaviors and security of entire communities.
Women’s security is not women’s security per se; preferences for punishing violence against
women are intertwined with the security of communities and of men.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
A.1 Ethical Standards
As in any research involving vulnerable populations and particularly on a subject of violence
against women, it is important to take precautions to protect human subjects at each stage
of the research process. All protocols in this research have been approved by Columbia
University’s Institutional Review Board.132 In addition to standard IRB protocols for
participant recruitment and informed consent, my research procedures were built around the
following ethical guidelines.
Participants in my study were never asked direct questions about experiences of rape
or domestic violence. If discussion of ongoings in the community came up, people were
encouraged to leave the discussion anonymous. All questions about crimes were based on
hypothetical rather than real scenarios, formulated to reflect the context.
In accordance with ethical guidelines for research on violence against women, I also chose
not to hold focus groups with men and women together. A male enumerator led all discussions
with men and a female enumerator led all discussions with women.
Finally, I made efforts to be highly inclusive in the procedure for recruiting participants.
First, I designed the study to include illiterate populations. Second, village chiefs were
specifically tasked with identifying individuals from lower and upper strata of society to be
included as potential participants.
132Protocol AAAQ5105 is associated with the analyses of data from the IRC evaluation (Chapter 2 and
matching procedure in 3). Protocol AAAQ9306 is associated with the several rounds of focus group and
interview research gathered in eastern DR Congo (Chapters 3, 4 and 5). Protocol AAAP8451 is associated




A.2.1 Province and Territory Selection
I use a matched pair design within two territories in South Kivu: Walungu and Uvira. South
Kivu is also one of three provinces in which two panel surveys of a large community driven
development program took place. The first survey occurred in 2011 and the second in 2015.
These surveys are relevant to the hypothesis tests and generalizability of this study because I
use them to select the villages in my final sample. This has two implications.
First, the villages in my sample are villages that were defined by the International Rescue
Committee (IRC) as places where they could potentially implement their community driven
development program. This sample is broad and unique as it goes well beyond the well-beaten
path of advocacy work, which tends to cluster near cities. The complete IRC sample is
associated with one of the largest community development programs in the area.133 The
figure below provides an overview of the villages populations in my final sample of 20 villages;
it shows that village size is varied and well distributed.134
Second, the two surveys allow me to identify armed conflict statistically using a matching
procedure based on the datasets related to the surveys. In this project, I use data from
the 2015 survey in order to identify whether armed conflict occurred in South Kivu villages
within the past 5 years. I combine this with data from the 2011 survey to match villages
based on like characteristics prior to these recent episodes of armed conflict.
My village selection method proceeds as follows. First, I select two territories in South
Kivu where there were enough episodes of armed conflict in the past 5 years to match
on armed conflict within the territory. It is important to match within territories rather
than across territories to hold political and administrative boundary characteristics constant.
Across all territories of IRC operations in South Kivu, the distribution of armed conflict
133For a full description of the IRC sample, see Humphreys et al. (Forthcoming).
134Population data was collected in my qualitative interviews with village chiefs. The final sample of
villages excludes the attrited village and includes its replacement.
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Figure A.1: Distribution of Village Populations (Final Sample of 20 Villages)
within the past 5 years as measured in the 2015 survey is as follows: Kalehe=5/43 villages,
Mwenga=6/44 villages, Uvira=18/61 villages, Walungu=9/110 villages. I select the territories
of Walungu and Uvira, because they have higher amounts of recent community armed conflict
exposure and a higher number of villages in the IRC sample.
A.2.2 Matching Procedure
Within Walungu and Uvira territories of South Kivu, I pair each village exposed to armed
conflict in the past 5 years with a village that has not been exposed to armed conflict in the
past 5 years using a nearest neighbor matching algorithm.
Matching was conducted based on a question in a survey which I helped to implement
during several months of fieldwork in eastern DR Congo. This 2015 survey was part of a
long-run evaluation of the same community driven development program (Laudati, Mvukiyehe,
and Van der Windt 2016).
The following characteristics are summarized at the village level and employed in the
matching specification: gender attitudes, attitudes towards mistreatment of women, domestic
violence as measured by a list experiment, sexual violence as measured in a list experiment,
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having earned no income in the past week, level of trust in coethnic villagers, trusting
coethnics more than noncoethnic villagers, likelihood a bike would be stolen if left outside,
three principle components for household goods to indicate household wealth, exposure to
war between 1996 and 2011, the IRC’s community driven development treatment (which was
randomized), proximity to mine, proximity to forest, proximity to mountains, and an ethnic
fractionalization index. Again, all matching variables were based on a survey implemented
within these villages in 2011.
The matching procedure was implemented in R using MatchIt.135 The figure displays
propensity scores before and after nearest neighbor matching, showing improvement in overall
propensity scores. Note that this analysis is related to the matching procedure itself and the
full set of matched pairs (only a subset of which were selected for this study).
(a) Uvira (b) Walungu
Figure A.2: Matched and Unmatched Propensity Score Distributions
135Daniel E. Ho, Kosuke Imai, Gary King, Elizabeth A. Stuart (2011). MatchIt: Nonparametric Prepro-
cessing for Parametric Causal Inference. Journal of Statistical Software, Vol. 42, No. 8, pp. 1-28. URL
http://www.jstatsoft.org/v42/i08/
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(a) Before Matching (b) After Matching
Figure A.3: Propensity Score Histograms in Uvira
(a) Before Matching (b) After Matching
Figure A.4: Propensity Score Histograms in Walungu
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A.2.3 Village Covariate Balance achieved through Matching
The following figure, created using the cobalt package in R,136 demonstrates the covariate
balance a achieved through the specified matching algorithm.
Again, this analysis is related to the matching procedure itself and the full set of matched
pairs (only a subset of which were selected for this study).
(a) Covariate Balance in Uvira (b) Covariate Balance in Walungu
Figure A.5: Village Level Covariate Balance
Overall, covariate balance is achieved for many of the important variables in the matching
model specification. In Uvira, Domestic Violence, No Income, Coethnic Trust are balanced.
The randomized community development program by the IRC, whether there was a Mine
Nearby, and whether there was a Forest nearby are also balanced. Villages exposed to armed
conflict in Uvira between 2011 and 2015 are virtually indistinguishable in these dimensions
along geographic dimensions. While balance is not achieved, the matching procedure improves
balance on gender attitudes, attitudes towards the mistreatment of women, incidence of sexual
violence, and whether villagers trust coethnics more than non-coethnics. However, there
136Noah Greifer (2019). cobalt: Covariate Balance Tables and Plots. R package version 3.7.0. https:
//CRAN.R-project.org/package=cobalt
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are some tradeoffs. Matching creates additional imbalance in perceived security (whether
a bicycle left outside overnight will be there the following morning) and one dimension of
wealth (PCA 2).
In Walungu, covariate balance is achieved for attitudes towards mistreating women,
domestic violence, sexual violence, coethnic trust, prior war exposure (betweeen 1996 and
2011), and whether or not a forest is nearby the village. The matching procedure substantively
improves balance in gender attitudes, though balance is not fully achieved. The matching
prodecure also improves whether people trust coethnics more than noncoethnics, one wealth
component (PCA 3). Like in Uvira, however, the matching procedure creates more imbalance
on perceived security in the village as well as some components of the wealth measure (PCA
1). It also increases imbalance on ethnic fractionalization.
In sum, covariate balance is achieved or substantively improved along many dimensions: in
terms of violence against women, in terms of attitudes towards women, in terms of community
trust, and in terms of some conflict relevant geographic variables. Improvement along these
dimensions comes with some additional imbalance in perceived insecurity and wealth or
income measures. It is the author’s contention that the balance achieved is a substantial
improvement along the most important dimensions. Keeping the full set of the variables in the
matching algorithm allows for more transparency in balance and imbalanced characteristics.
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A.2.4 Final Village Selection and Sample
After pairing each village exposed to armed conflict with a control village in its territory,
I randomly select 5 matched pairs from each territory such that there are 10 villages in
Walungu and 10 villages in Uvira, resulting in a total of 20 villages for the study.
Due to security conditions, one village was replaced from the first nonconflict village in
list of randomized replacement village pairs. The village that was matched with the attrited
village had already been surveyed, so the replacement village joins the pair-mate of the
attrited village to form one “unmatched” pair. In a robustness check detailed later in the
appendix, I show that the findings hold when dropping the “unmatched pair” where there
was one attrited village.
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A.3 Participants
A.3.1 Recruitment of Focus Group Participants
The village chief identified potential participants and the research team followed up by inviting
the identified persons to attend a focus group on that same day. In eastern DR Congo, there
is no census to draw a truly random selection from. Lists from which “random samples” tend
to be drawn are provided by the village chief, which not only fails to eliminate the potential
for bias but also presents a tradeoff in terms of time. Creating village lists and running focus
groups with randomly selected participants would require multiple days in each village.
Rather than staying multiple days in a village, teams arrived and conducted all focus
groups on the same day. Spending a single day in each village decreases the potential for
chiefs to organize handpicked participants and keeps the subject matter from circulating the
community prior to the focus group discussions. To even further mitigate bias, enumerators
asked village chiefs to include individuals from both higher and lower echelons of society.
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A.3.2 Pooled Descriptive Statistics of Participants
Table A.1: Summary Characteristics of All Participants (Pooling Men and Women)
MIN MAX N MEAN SD ICC
Age 18 100.0 995 36.67 15.60 0.079
Education 0 3.3 994 1.24 1.01 0.076
Years in Village (Categorical) 1 4.0 995 3.24 0.93 0.067
Frequency Meeting Others 1 4.0 995 3.49 0.84 0.229
Homogeneous Subgroup 0 1.0 995 0.60 0.49 0.008
Exp. Armed Violence (Ever) 0 1.0 995 0.71 0.45 0.041
Exp. Armed Violence (last 5yrs) 0 1.0 995 0.35 0.48 0.151
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A.3.3 Gender Differences in Characteristics of Participants




Years in Village (Categorical) 0.77 0.000
Frequency Meeting Others 0.28 0.000
Homogeneous Subgroup -0.11 0.001
Exp. Armed Violence (Ever) -0.39 0.000
Exp. Armed Violence (last 5yrs) -0.31 0.000
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A.3.4 Balance on Participant Characteristics in Conflict and Non-Conflict Vil-
lages
The primary concern of this nonrandom sample of focus group participants from each village
is that chiefs in villages recently exposed to armed conflict may select people differently than
those in villages that have not been recently exposed. To mitigate this bias, all chiefs were
asked not to exclude people whose lives had been greatly affected by armed conflict.
The tables below present additional descriptive characteristics of participants not detailed
in the main text. Note that these analyses are the final set of villages (thus include the
replacement village and exclude the attrited village in the sample). The tables are followed
by graphic representations of differences at the individual level and then across pairs at the
village level.
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Table A.3: Participant Characteristics by Recent Village Conflict Exposure (Pooling Men
and Women)
N(C) MEAN(C) SD(C) N(NC) MEAN(NC) SD(NC) PVALUE(C-NC)
Age 504 37.81 15.39 491 35.51 15.75 0.02
Education 504 1.20 0.99 490 1.28 1.02 0.25
Years in Village (Categorical) 504 3.31 0.89 491 3.17 0.97 0.02
Frequency Meeting Others 504 3.46 0.86 491 3.51 0.82 0.30
Homogeneous Subgroup 504 0.60 0.49 491 0.60 0.49 0.89
Exp. Armed Violence (Ever) 504 0.71 0.45 491 0.71 0.45 0.82
Exp. Armed Violence (last 5yrs) 504 0.39 0.49 491 0.32 0.47 0.02
Table A.4: Participant Characteristics by Recent Village Conflict Exposure (among Women)
N(C) MEAN(C) SD(C) N(NC) MEAN(NC) SD(NC) PVALUE(C-NC)
Age 263 34.52 14.20 274 32.86 13.00 0.16
Education 263 0.92 0.95 274 1.05 0.99 0.15
Years in Village (Categorical) 263 2.99 0.89 274 2.79 0.96 0.01
Frequency Meeting Others 263 3.33 1.00 274 3.38 0.95 0.62
Homogeneous Subgroup 263 0.67 0.47 274 0.62 0.49 0.20
Exp. Armed Violence (Ever) 263 0.87 0.33 274 0.91 0.29 0.26
Exp. Armed Violence (last 5yrs) 263 0.55 0.50 274 0.45 0.50 0.01
Table A.5: Participant Characteristics by Recent Village Conflict Exposure (among Men)
N(C) MEAN(C) SD(C) N(NC) MEAN(NC) SD(NC) PVALUE(C-NC)
Age 241 41.40 15.86 217 38.85 18.14 0.11
Education 241 1.51 0.95 216 1.57 0.98 0.49
Years in Village (Categorical) 241 3.66 0.76 217 3.66 0.73 0.96
Frequency Meeting Others 241 3.59 0.65 217 3.69 0.59 0.11
Homogeneous Subgroup 241 0.52 0.50 217 0.57 0.50 0.35
Exp. Armed Violence (Ever) 241 0.53 0.50 217 0.47 0.50 0.26







































































Indiv. Exposure to Violence (Past 5 Yrs)
Village Treatment Condition
Figure A.6: Participant Covariate Balance across Conflict and Non-Conflict Villages
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Figure A.10: Punishment Preferences among Women by Conflict
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A.4.2 Validation of Severity Scale
Table A.6: Mean Severity Rankings from focus group discussions
Counsel Payment Expulsion Prison Beating
Women (Means) 1 2.345 3.436 4.345 3.891
Women (SD) 0 0.775 0.877 0.865 0.832
Men (Means) 1 2.043 3.174 4.708 4.130
Men (SD) 0 0.209 0.576 0.550 0.626
a Calculated at the focus group level (80 focus groups)
233
A.4.3 Gender Differences in Punishment Preferences
Table A.7: Gender Difference in Outcome Data on Preferences for Punishment
N MEAN SD N(F) MEAN(F) SD(F) N(M) MEAN(M) SD(M) P(DIFF)
Rape 993 3.18 1.22 537 3.21 1.23 456 3.13 1.20 0.322
DV 993 1.91 1.23 537 1.79 1.21 456 2.04 1.24 0.001
Stealing 993 2.92 1.24 537 2.83 1.28 456 3.03 1.19 0.013
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A.5 Models
A.5.1 Models disaggregated by Participant Gender
Because of differences between men and women for both covariates and for outcomes, I also
conduct analyses using the divided data. While these models do not test for differences in the
effects of armed conflict on men and women, models using the gender disaggregated samples
do allow covariates to be estimated for each group separately.
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Table A.8: Private Preferences for Punishment (Divided Data with Covariates)
Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime
Rape Domestic Violence Stealing
Men Women Men Women Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Armed Conflict 0.454∗∗∗ −0.015 −0.156 −0.264∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗ 0.103
(0.113) (0.219) (0.219) (0.093) (0.150) (0.257)
Education 0.162∗∗ 0.163∗∗ −0.184∗∗∗ 0.020 0.040 0.163∗∗
(0.075) (0.066) (0.069) (0.061) (0.069) (0.080)
Frequency Meeting Others −0.011 −0.011 −0.041 −0.018 0.071 −0.130
(0.122) (0.090) (0.136) (0.099) (0.182) (0.109)
Homogeneous Subgroup −0.044 0.218 0.025 −0.014 −0.046 −0.054
(0.145) (0.215) (0.139) (0.134) (0.174) (0.160)
Years in Village 0.014 −0.006 −0.118 −0.006 0.009 −0.034
(0.061) (0.036) (0.083) (0.057) (0.053) (0.052)
Narrative Order: Rape 0.241∗∗ 0.170
(0.097) (0.115)
Narrative Order: DV 0.138 0.057
(0.189) (0.133)
Narrative Order: Stealing 0.144∗ 0.163
(0.081) (0.175)
Constant 2.327∗∗∗ 2.484∗∗∗ 3.132∗∗∗ 2.408∗∗∗ 2.514∗∗∗ 3.186∗∗∗
(0.649) (0.542) (0.849) (0.288) (0.719) (0.590)
PAIR Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 455 537 455 537 455 537
R2 0.145 0.133 0.106 0.073 0.083 0.058
Adjusted R2 0.116 0.108 0.075 0.047 0.052 0.030
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)
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A.5.2 Models without Covariates
Table A.9: Private Preferences for Punishment (Pooled Data without Covariates)
Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime
Rape Domestic Violence Stealing
Basic Interacted Basic Interacted Basic Interacted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Armed Conflict 0.211 0.445∗∗∗ −0.268∗∗ −0.299 0.234 0.471∗∗∗
(0.141) (0.150) (0.105) (0.187) (0.164) (0.151)
Armed Conflict * Female −0.431 0.056 −0.437∗
(0.293) (0.225) (0.263)
Female 0.104 0.325 −0.286∗∗ −0.315∗∗ −0.181 0.043
(0.148) (0.246) (0.117) (0.155) (0.132) (0.208)
Constant 3.099∗∗∗ 2.982∗∗∗ 2.635∗∗∗ 2.650∗∗∗ 3.273∗∗∗ 3.154∗∗∗
(0.260) (0.245) (0.164) (0.173) (0.125) (0.131)
PAIR Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 993 993 993 993 993 993
R2 0.080 0.087 0.061 0.061 0.036 0.044
Adjusted R2 0.069 0.076 0.051 0.050 0.025 0.032
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)
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Table A.10: Private Preferences for Punishment (Divided Data without Covariates)
Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime
Rape Domestic Violence Stealing
Men Women Men Women Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Armed Conflict 0.464∗∗∗ 0.008 −0.266 −0.262∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗
(0.133) (0.232) (0.173) (0.093) (0.139) (0.176)
Constant 3.190∗∗∗ 3.126∗∗∗ 2.551∗∗∗ 2.417∗∗∗ 3.031∗∗∗ 3.301∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.435) (0.438) (0.144) (0.092) (0.415)
PAIR Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 456 537 456 537 456 537
R2 0.115 0.090 0.077 0.071 0.073 0.034
Adjusted R2 0.095 0.073 0.056 0.054 0.053 0.015
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)
A.5.3 Attrition Analysis
Because of security conditions, one village attrited from the sample. The following models
assess robustness of findings to attrition by dropping the “unmatched” pair, where one of the
villages in the matched was replaced with a randomly ordered village from an “unselected”
matched pair.
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Table A.11: Private Preferences for Punishment dropping one matched pair due to attrition
(Pooled Data)
Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime
Rape Domestic Violence Stealing
Basic Interacted Basic Interacted Basic Interacted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Armed Conflict 0.311∗∗ 0.523∗∗∗ −0.249∗ −0.291 0.309∗ 0.322
(0.122) (0.143) (0.138) (0.242) (0.182) (0.211)
Armed Conflict * Female −0.397 0.071 −0.023
(0.307) (0.249) (0.269)
Female 0.161 0.370 −0.298∗∗ −0.337∗ −0.210 −0.198
(0.158) (0.241) (0.124) (0.186) (0.142) (0.254)
Constant 2.569∗∗∗ 2.387∗∗∗ 2.656∗∗∗ 2.705∗∗∗ 3.104∗∗∗ 3.100∗∗∗
(0.420) (0.382) (0.276) (0.319) (0.374) (0.398)
PAIR Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 884 884 884 884 884 884
R2 0.113 0.120 0.073 0.073 0.074 0.074
Adjusted R2 0.098 0.103 0.057 0.056 0.058 0.057
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (18 villages)
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Table A.12: Private Preferences for Punishment dropping one matched pair due to attrition
(Divided Data)
Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime
Rape Domestic Violence Stealing
Men Women Men Women Men Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Armed Conflict 0.517∗∗∗ 0.123 −0.326 −0.247∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗ 0.338
(0.121) (0.229) (0.268) (0.109) (0.162) (0.230)
Constant 2.398∗∗∗ 2.621∗∗∗ 3.424∗∗∗ 2.250∗∗∗ 2.449∗∗∗ 2.780∗∗∗
(0.650) (0.478) (0.907) (0.285) (0.735) (0.476)
PAIR Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 409 475 409 475 409 475
R2 0.158 0.130 0.105 0.086 0.093 0.080
Adjusted R2 0.128 0.103 0.074 0.058 0.061 0.052
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (18 villages)
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A.5.4 Models for Ordinal Outcome
Table A.13: Odds Ratios: Effects accounting for 4-point Ordinal Outcome
Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime
Rape Domestic Violence Stealing
Basic Interacted Basic Interacted Basic Interacted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Armed Conflict 1.450∗∗∗ 2.197∗∗∗ 0.676∗∗∗ 0.721∗ 1.393∗∗∗ 1.819∗∗∗
(0.138) (0.198) (0.132) (0.192) (0.124) (0.192)
Armed Conflict * Female 0.442∗∗∗ 0.885 0.623∗
(0.276) (0.268) (0.260)
Female 1.521∗∗∗ 2.285∗∗∗ 0.546∗∗∗ 0.581∗∗∗ 0.759∗ 0.969
(0.161) (0.212) (0.154) (0.205) (0.143) (0.196)
Education 1.407∗∗∗ 1.402∗∗∗ 0.942 0.941 1.188∗∗∗ 1.181∗∗
(0.074) (0.074) (0.069) (0.069) (0.065) (0.066)
Frequency Meeting Others 0.987 0.988 0.921 0.924 0.867∗ 0.876
(0.097) (0.096) (0.089) (0.089) (0.084) (0.084)
Homogeneous Subgroup 1.245 1.268∗ 0.957 0.960 0.887 0.889
(0.138) (0.139) (0.132) (0.132) (0.127) (0.127)
Years in Village 0.980 0.994 0.964 0.966 0.938 0.945
(0.086) (0.087) (0.078) (0.078) (0.073) (0.074)
Narrative Order: Rape 1.366∗∗∗ 1.401∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.088)
Narrative Order: DV 1.274∗∗∗ 1.290∗∗∗
(0.093) (0.097)
Narrative Order: Stealing 1.320∗∗∗ 1.255∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.083)
PAIR Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 992 992 992 992 992 992
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard Errors NOT clustered at the village level in this analysis
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A.5.5 Models with Dichotomized Outcomes
Table A.14: Private Preferences for Counsel by a Fellow Villager (Pooled Data)
Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime
Rape Domestic Violence Stealing
Basic Interacted Basic Interacted Basic Interacted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Armed Conflict −0.064 −0.138∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗ 0.116 −0.036 −0.089
(0.044) (0.048) (0.047) (0.096) (0.058) (0.066)
Armed Conflict * Female 0.139 −0.031 0.095
(0.099) (0.115) (0.090)
Female −0.004 −0.076 0.160∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.092∗ 0.041
(0.050) (0.076) (0.056) (0.059) (0.048) (0.070)
Constant 0.283∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗ 0.269∗ 0.040 0.057
(0.138) (0.128) (0.133) (0.147) (0.176) (0.175)
PAIR Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 992 992 992 992 992 992
R2 0.077 0.085 0.077 0.077 0.053 0.056
Adjusted R2 0.062 0.069 0.062 0.061 0.038 0.040
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)
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Table A.15: Private Preferences for Chief Demands Payment to the Aggrieved Party(Pooled
Data)
Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime
Rape Domestic Violence Stealing
Basic Interacted Basic Interacted Basic Interacted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Armed Conflict −0.008 −0.008 −0.021 −0.072 −0.058∗∗ −0.031
(0.013) (0.026) (0.017) (0.054) (0.023) (0.047)
Armed Conflict * Female −0.0001 0.088 −0.048
(0.043) (0.088) (0.068)
Female −0.058∗∗∗ −0.058 −0.063 −0.110∗∗ −0.011 0.014
(0.021) (0.039) (0.042) (0.055) (0.029) (0.045)
Constant 0.265∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗ 0.222∗∗ 0.180 0.171
(0.065) (0.069) (0.085) (0.099) (0.127) (0.123)
PAIR Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 992 992 992 992 992 992
R2 0.040 0.040 0.032 0.036 0.028 0.029
Adjusted R2 0.024 0.023 0.016 0.019 0.012 0.012
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)
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Table A.16: Private Preferences for Expulsion from the Community (Pooled Data)
Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime
Rape Domestic Violence Stealing
Basic Interacted Basic Interacted Basic Interacted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Armed Conflict 0.001 −0.017 −0.022∗ −0.013 0.014 −0.025
(0.019) (0.034) (0.013) (0.024) (0.027) (0.045)
Armed Conflict * Female 0.034 −0.015 0.070
(0.046) (0.032) (0.055)
Female −0.046∗ −0.064∗∗ −0.034∗∗ −0.026 −0.054∗ −0.092∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.030) (0.016) (0.023) (0.032) (0.031)
Constant 0.149∗ 0.163∗ 0.112∗∗ 0.103 0.248∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.086) (0.054) (0.063) (0.095) (0.094)
PAIR Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 992 992 992 992 992 992
R2 0.026 0.027 0.026 0.026 0.018 0.021
Adjusted R2 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.002 0.004
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)
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Table A.17: Private Preferences for Twenty Years in Prison (Pooled Data)
Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime
Rape Domestic Violence Stealing
Basic Interacted Basic Interacted Basic Interacted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Armed Conflict 0.069 0.125∗∗ −0.057∗∗ −0.042 0.029 0.080
(0.044) (0.063) (0.027) (0.058) (0.062) (0.072)
Armed Conflict * Female −0.104 −0.027 −0.089
(0.106) (0.075) (0.102)
Female 0.052 0.106 −0.092∗∗∗ −0.077 −0.024 0.024
(0.062) (0.093) (0.033) (0.060) (0.057) (0.089)
Constant 0.165 0.124 0.388∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗ 0.376∗∗ 0.360∗∗
(0.193) (0.187) (0.077) (0.102) (0.147) (0.158)
PAIR Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 992 992 992 992 992 992
R2 0.079 0.082 0.034 0.034 0.037 0.038
Adjusted R2 0.064 0.066 0.018 0.017 0.021 0.022
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)
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Table A.18: Private Preferences for Beating to Near Death (Pooled Data)
Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime
Rape Domestic Violence Stealing
Basic Interacted Basic Interacted Basic Interacted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Armed Conflict 0.001 0.038∗ 0.002 0.011 0.050 0.066∗∗
(0.018) (0.023) (0.014) (0.013) (0.036) (0.031)
Armed Conflict * Female −0.069 −0.015 −0.028
(0.049) (0.029) (0.059)
Female 0.056 0.092∗ 0.028 0.036 −0.002 0.013
(0.037) (0.053) (0.018) (0.024) (0.023) (0.038)
Constant 0.137∗ 0.110 0.045 0.035 0.155 0.150
(0.078) (0.089) (0.053) (0.057) (0.097) (0.095)
PAIR Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 992 992 992 992 992 992
R2 0.041 0.045 0.047 0.047 0.053 0.053
Adjusted R2 0.026 0.028 0.031 0.030 0.037 0.036
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)
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Appendix to Chapter 5
Table B.1: Determinants of Post Discussion Private Preferences















Rape: Private x Group −0.050
(0.049)
DV: Private x Group 0.053∗∗
(0.026)
Steal: Private x Group 0.015
(0.034)
Focus Group Fixed Effects? (N=79) Yes Yes Yes
Controls? Yes Yes Yes
Observations 992 992 992
R2 0.528 0.478 0.554
Adjusted R2 0.484 0.429 0.513
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard Errors clustered at the Village level (20)
247
Table B.2: Determinants of Post Discussion Private Preferences (Divided Data)
Dependent Variable: Punishment Preferences
Rape DV Stealing
Men Women Men Women Men Women





DV: Private 0.332∗∗∗ 0.036
(0.120) (0.072)
DV: Group 0.392∗∗ 0.201∗
(0.154) (0.108)
Steal: Private 0.466∗∗ 0.155
(0.190) (0.153)
Steal: Group 0.468∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗
(0.154) (0.135)
Rape: Private x Group −0.069 −0.046
(0.049) (0.064)
DV: Private x Group −0.011 0.095∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.036)
Steal: Private x Group −0.025 0.016
(0.052) (0.046)
Focus Group Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 455 537 455 537 455 537
R2 0.512 0.551 0.519 0.430 0.559 0.552
Adjusted R2 0.458 0.509 0.467 0.377 0.511 0.510
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard Errors clustered at the Village level (20)
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Table B.3: Preferences for Punishing Rape
Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime
Private Public Group PostDisc Private
Basic Interact Basic Interact Basic Interact Basic Interact
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Armed Conflict 0.205 0.448∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.569∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗ 0.331 0.337∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗
(0.131) (0.133) (0.092) (0.121) (0.135) (0.208) (0.126) (0.143)
Armed Conflict x Female −0.450∗ −0.486∗ −0.112 −0.290
(0.272) (0.280) (0.307) (0.307)
Female 0.173 0.407∗∗ 0.023 0.275 0.083 0.142 0.079 0.230
(0.146) (0.206) (0.158) (0.214) (0.134) (0.241) (0.164) (0.224)
Constant 2.472∗∗∗ 2.291∗∗∗ 2.709∗∗∗ 2.514∗∗∗ 3.218∗∗∗ 3.173∗∗∗ 2.834∗∗∗ 2.717∗∗∗
(0.455) (0.409) (0.407) (0.365) (0.410) (0.387) (0.397) (0.334)
Observations 992 992 992 992 992 992 992 992
Adjusted R2 0.098 0.105 0.112 0.122 0.130 0.130 0.126 0.129
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Pair Fixed Effects (10 Pairs); SEs clustered at the village level (20 villages)
Table B.4: Preferences for Punishing Domestic Violence
Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime
Private Public Group PostDisc Private
Basic Interact Basic Interact Basic Interact Basic Interact
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Armed Conflict −0.230∗∗ −0.191 −0.215∗ −0.096 −0.388∗∗∗ −0.479∗∗ −0.221∗ −0.326∗
(0.111) (0.215) (0.110) (0.195) (0.126) (0.187) (0.133) (0.193)
Armed Conflict x Female −0.067 −0.206 0.157 0.182
(0.249) (0.242) (0.238) (0.233)
Female −0.321∗∗∗ −0.285∗ −0.339∗∗∗ −0.228 −0.510∗∗∗ −0.595∗∗∗ −0.426∗∗∗ −0.524∗∗∗
(0.120) (0.172) (0.112) (0.186) (0.149) (0.210) (0.108) (0.156)
Constant 2.688∗∗∗ 2.646∗∗∗ 2.534∗∗∗ 2.408∗∗∗ 2.351∗∗∗ 2.448∗∗∗ 2.181∗∗∗ 2.293∗∗∗
(0.269) (0.311) (0.276) (0.316) (0.451) (0.462) (0.342) (0.398)
Observations 992 992 992 992 992 992 992 992
Adjusted R2 0.053 0.053 0.071 0.072 0.097 0.097 0.073 0.073
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Pair Fixed Effects (10 Pairs); SEs clustered at the village level (20 villages)
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Table B.5: Preferences for Punishing Stealing
Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime
Private Public Group PostDisc Private
Basic Interact Basic Interact Basic Interact Basic Interact
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Armed Conflict 0.209 0.356∗∗ 0.229 0.484∗∗∗ 0.264∗ 0.484∗∗∗ 0.248 0.419∗∗
(0.177) (0.176) (0.148) (0.126) (0.142) (0.182) (0.159) (0.167)
Armed Conflict x Female −0.260 −0.454 −0.391 −0.302
(0.276) (0.283) (0.348) (0.335)
Female −0.199 −0.059 −0.178 0.066 −0.426∗∗ −0.215 −0.332∗∗ −0.169
(0.139) (0.239) (0.135) (0.190) (0.180) (0.299) (0.147) (0.244)
Constant 3.270∗∗∗ 3.224∗∗∗ 2.573∗∗∗ 2.492∗∗∗ 3.974∗∗∗ 3.904∗∗∗ 3.357∗∗∗ 3.303∗∗∗
(0.405) (0.415) (0.316) (0.335) (0.489) (0.529) (0.380) (0.384)
Observations 992 992 992 992 992 992 992 992
Adjusted R2 0.042 0.043 0.056 0.063 0.120 0.126 0.051 0.053
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Pair Fixed Effects (10 Pairs); SEs clustered at the village level (20 villages)
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Armed Conflict 0.198 0.378∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗
(0.138) (0.137) (0.139)
Female 0.090 0.263 0.363∗
(0.131) (0.202) (0.202)
Public 0.043 0.043 0.098
(0.050) (0.050) (0.086)
Group 0.342∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.088) (0.124)
PostFG Private 0.088∗ 0.088∗ 0.140∗∗
(0.051) (0.051) (0.069)
Armed Conflict x Female −0.334 −0.418
(0.257) (0.268)
Armed Conflict x Public 0.122 0.122 0.143
(0.082) (0.082) (0.106)
Armed Conflict x Group 0.072 0.072 −0.060
(0.168) (0.168) (0.208)
Armed Conflict x PostFG Private 0.134 0.134 0.055
(0.095) (0.095) (0.132)
Female x Public −0.098
(0.125)
Female x Group −0.206
(0.136)
Female x PostFG Private −0.093
(0.114)
A.Conflict x Female x Public −0.047
(0.179)
A.Conflict x Female x Group 0.237
(0.219)
A.Conflict x Female x PostFG Private 0.145
(0.182)
Constant 2.690∗∗∗ 2.555∗∗∗ 2.500∗∗∗
(0.388) (0.334) (0.338)
PAIR Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes
Controls? Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,968 3,968 3,968
R2 0.125 0.131 0.132
Adjusted R2 0.121 0.126 0.125
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)
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Armed Conflict −0.224∗∗ −0.234 −0.183
(0.106) (0.166) (0.178)
Female −0.399∗∗∗ −0.408∗∗ −0.287∗
(0.099) (0.159) (0.147)
Public 0.035 0.035 0.047
(0.058) (0.058) (0.075)
Group −0.100 −0.100 0.028
(0.086) (0.086) (0.120)
PostFG Private −0.051 −0.051 0.079
(0.083) (0.083) (0.080)
Armed Conflict x Female 0.017 −0.072
(0.203) (0.218)
Armed Conflict x Public −0.011 −0.011 0.011
(0.071) (0.071) (0.095)
Armed Conflict x Group −0.142 −0.142 −0.244
(0.134) (0.134) (0.187)
Armed Conflict x PostFG Private −0.004 −0.004 −0.129
(0.120) (0.120) (0.122)
Female x Public −0.021
(0.102)
Female x Group −0.229
(0.151)
Female x PostFG Private −0.233∗∗
(0.110)
A.Conflict x Female x Public −0.045
(0.149)
A.Conflict x Female x Group 0.178
(0.235)
A.Conflict x Female x PostFG Private 0.222
(0.185)
Constant 2.468∗∗∗ 2.478∗∗∗ 2.410∗∗∗
(0.278) (0.314) (0.316)
PAIR Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes
Controls? Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,968 3,968 3,968
R2 0.081 0.081 0.082
Adjusted R2 0.076 0.076 0.076
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)
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Armed Conflict 0.215 0.414∗∗ 0.391∗∗
(0.177) (0.179) (0.186)
Female −0.284∗∗ −0.094 −0.032
(0.137) (0.229) (0.231)
Public 0.008 0.008 −0.051
(0.033) (0.033) (0.092)
Group 0.145 0.145 0.280∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.089) (0.106)
PostFG Private 0.057 0.057 0.121∗∗
(0.063) (0.063) (0.049)
Armed Conflict x Female −0.352 −0.303
(0.293) (0.276)
Armed Conflict x Public 0.026 0.026 0.139
(0.058) (0.058) (0.116)
Armed Conflict x Group 0.037 0.037 0.035
(0.144) (0.144) (0.136)
Armed Conflict x PostFG Private 0.026 0.026 0.007
(0.095) (0.095) (0.099)
Female x Public 0.106
(0.156)
Female x Group −0.240∗∗
(0.098)
Female x PostFG Private −0.114
(0.084)
A.Conflict x Female x Public −0.208
(0.199)
A.Conflict x Female x Group −0.014
(0.221)
A.Conflict x Female x PostFG Private 0.027
(0.137)
Constant 3.241∗∗∗ 3.178∗∗∗ 3.143∗∗∗
(0.342) (0.361) (0.372)
PAIR Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes
Controls? Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,968 3,968 3,968
R2 0.066 0.071 0.073
Adjusted R2 0.061 0.066 0.066
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)
253
Table B.9: Convergence between Private and Publicly Expressed Preference
Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime
Rape Domestic Violence Stealing
Basic Interacted Basic Interacted Basic Interacted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Armed Conflict 0.044 0.023 −0.067 −0.077 −0.105 −0.069
(0.062) (0.093) (0.055) (0.089) (0.078) (0.117)
Armed Conflict * Female 0.040 0.017 −0.064
(0.186) (0.139) (0.176)
Female −0.035 −0.055 0.050 0.041 0.120 0.155
(0.091) (0.136) (0.086) (0.112) (0.077) (0.133)
Constant 1.128∗∗∗ 1.144∗∗∗ 1.436∗∗∗ 1.446∗∗∗ 0.770∗∗∗ 0.759∗∗∗
(0.260) (0.250) (0.180) (0.201) (0.269) (0.272)
PAIR Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 992 992 992 992 992 992
R2 0.060 0.060 0.045 0.045 0.021 0.022
Adjusted R2 0.044 0.043 0.030 0.029 0.005 0.005
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)
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Table B.10: Convergence between Publicly Expressed and Group Preference
Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime
Rape Domestic Violence Stealing
Basic Interacted Basic Interacted Basic Interacted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Armed Conflict −0.086 −0.250∗ −0.041 0.042 −0.023 −0.136
(0.072) (0.137) (0.074) (0.149) (0.056) (0.085)
Armed Conflict * Female 0.305 −0.143 0.200
(0.227) (0.208) (0.154)
Female −0.163 −0.321∗∗ −0.130 −0.053 0.022 −0.086
(0.128) (0.147) (0.111) (0.164) (0.084) (0.118)
Constant 0.906∗∗∗ 1.028∗∗∗ 1.174∗∗∗ 1.086∗∗∗ 1.487∗∗∗ 1.522∗∗∗
(0.321) (0.318) (0.237) (0.291) (0.340) (0.343)
PAIR Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 992 992 992 992 992 992
R2 0.065 0.071 0.037 0.038 0.041 0.043
Adjusted R2 0.050 0.054 0.021 0.021 0.025 0.026
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)
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Table B.11: Convergence between Group and Post-FG Private Preference
Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime
Rape Domestic Violence Stealing
Basic Interacted Basic Interacted Basic Interacted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Armed Conflict 0.011 0.014 0.078 0.262∗∗ 0.010 −0.128∗∗
(0.071) (0.144) (0.074) (0.119) (0.039) (0.063)
Armed Conflict * Female −0.006 −0.318∗∗ 0.245∗∗
(0.233) (0.158) (0.109)
Female −0.161 −0.158 −0.216∗∗ −0.045 −0.069 −0.201∗∗∗
(0.131) (0.116) (0.086) (0.132) (0.068) (0.075)
Constant 0.454 0.452 0.634∗∗ 0.438 1.258∗∗∗ 1.302∗∗∗
(0.292) (0.306) (0.252) (0.272) (0.190) (0.182)
PAIR Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 992 992 992 992 992 992
R2 0.087 0.087 0.058 0.064 0.050 0.054
Adjusted R2 0.072 0.071 0.043 0.048 0.035 0.038
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)
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Table B.12: Convergence between Private and Post-FG Private Preference
Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime
Rape Domestic Violence Stealing
Basic Interacted Basic Interacted Basic Interacted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Armed Conflict 0.063 0.105 −0.030 −0.010 −0.106 −0.040
(0.079) (0.097) (0.087) (0.121) (0.079) (0.095)
Armed Conflict * Female −0.078 −0.035 −0.117
(0.141) (0.154) (0.132)
Female 0.565∗∗∗ 0.605∗∗∗ 0.119 0.138 0.478∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.098) (0.095) (0.116) (0.068) (0.091)
Constant 0.385 0.354 1.500∗∗∗ 1.479∗∗∗ 1.089∗∗∗ 1.068∗∗∗
(0.276) (0.283) (0.309) (0.313) (0.283) (0.287)
PAIR Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 992 992 992 992 992 992
R2 0.123 0.124 0.037 0.037 0.092 0.093
Adjusted R2 0.109 0.108 0.022 0.021 0.077 0.077
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)
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Table B.13: Difference between Private and Publicly Expressed Preference
Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime
Rape Domestic Violence Stealing
Basic Interacted Basic Interacted Basic Interacted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Armed Conflict 0.102∗ 0.121 0.015 0.095 0.019 0.129
(0.053) (0.096) (0.070) (0.127) (0.058) (0.122)
Armed Conflict * Female −0.036 −0.139 −0.193
(0.178) (0.168) (0.186)
Female −0.151 −0.132 −0.018 0.056 0.020 0.125
(0.102) (0.147) (0.095) (0.123) (0.110) (0.169)
Constant 0.237 0.223 −0.153 −0.239 −0.697∗∗ −0.732∗∗
(0.228) (0.247) (0.283) (0.300) (0.332) (0.360)
PAIR Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 992 992 992 992 992 992
R2 0.026 0.026 0.012 0.013 0.021 0.023
Adjusted R2 0.010 0.009 −0.004 −0.004 0.005 0.006
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)
258
Table B.14: Difference between Publicly Expressed and Group Preference
Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime
Rape Domestic Violence Stealing
Basic Interacted Basic Interacted Basic Interacted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Armed Conflict −0.036 −0.238 −0.173∗∗∗ −0.383∗∗ 0.035 −0.0004
(0.097) (0.207) (0.061) (0.149) (0.075) (0.131)
Armed Conflict * Female 0.374 0.363 0.062
(0.283) (0.245) (0.199)
Female 0.061 −0.134 −0.171 −0.367∗∗ −0.247∗ −0.281
(0.154) (0.182) (0.155) (0.169) (0.135) (0.198)
Constant 0.509 0.659∗ −0.183 0.040 1.401∗∗∗ 1.412∗∗∗
(0.320) (0.339) (0.402) (0.392) (0.410) (0.424)
PAIR Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 992 992 992 992 992 992
R2 0.070 0.076 0.037 0.041 0.079 0.079
Adjusted R2 0.054 0.060 0.021 0.025 0.064 0.063
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)
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Table B.15: Difference between Group and Post-FG Private Preference
Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime
Rape Domestic Violence Stealing
Basic Interacted Basic Interacted Basic Interacted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Armed Conflict −0.066 −0.163 −0.167∗∗∗ −0.153 0.015 0.065
(0.095) (0.189) (0.062) (0.154) (0.070) (0.110)
Armed Conflict * Female 0.179 −0.025 −0.089
(0.280) (0.217) (0.147)
Female 0.005 −0.088 −0.085 −0.071 −0.094 −0.046
(0.150) (0.145) (0.132) (0.165) (0.092) (0.102)
Constant 0.384 0.456 0.170 0.154 0.617∗ 0.601∗
(0.296) (0.324) (0.256) (0.264) (0.334) (0.340)
PAIR Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 992 992 992 992 992 992
R2 0.074 0.075 0.026 0.026 0.047 0.047
Adjusted R2 0.058 0.059 0.010 0.009 0.031 0.031
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)
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Table B.16: Difference between Private and Post-FG Private Preference
Dependent Variable: Punishment of Crime
Rape Domestic Violence Stealing
Basic Interacted Basic Interacted Basic Interacted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Armed Conflict 0.131∗∗ 0.046 0.009 −0.135 0.039 0.063
(0.062) (0.103) (0.097) (0.122) (0.057) (0.090)
Armed Conflict * Female 0.159 0.249 −0.042
(0.175) (0.191) (0.125)
Female −0.095 −0.177 −0.105 −0.239∗∗ −0.133∗∗ −0.111
(0.087) (0.115) (0.094) (0.113) (0.067) (0.085)
Constant 0.362∗ 0.426∗∗ −0.507∗ −0.353 0.087 0.079
(0.190) (0.192) (0.294) (0.307) (0.249) (0.254)
PAIR Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 992 992 992 992 992 992
R2 0.023 0.024 0.028 0.031 0.035 0.035
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.007 0.012 0.014 0.019 0.018
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard Errors clustered at the village level (20 villages)
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